VALUES, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE OPTIMIZING SOCIETY by FOSS, DENNIS CARLETON
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Doctoral Dissertations Student Scholarship
Summer 1976
VALUES, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE
OPTIMIZING SOCIETY
DENNIS CARLETON FOSS
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation




This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original docum ent. While 
the m ost advanced technological means to  photograph and reproduce this docum ent 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
subm itted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to  help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or " ta rget"  for pages apparently lacking from  the docum ent 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to  obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to  insure you com plete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication th a t the photographer suspected tha t the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material beir.g 
photographed the photographer followed a definite m ethod in 
"sectioning" the material. It is custom ary to  begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to  continue photoing from left to  
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The m ajority of users indicate th a t the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a som ew hat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to  the understanding of the  dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Departm ent, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Sem e pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received.
Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
76-26,874
FOSS, Dennts C arleton , 1947- 
VALUES, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE OPTIMIZING 
SOCIETY.
U n iv ers ity  o f  New Hampshire, Ph.D. ,  1976 
S o c io lo g y , general
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
@  1 9 7 6
DENNIS CARLETON FOSS 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
VALUES, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE OPTIMIZING SOCIETY
fey
DENNIS C. FOSS 
B. A . ,  B a te s  C o l l e g e ,  1970 
M. A . ,  U n i v e r s i t y  of  New Ham pshire ,  1972
A THESIS
S u b m i t te d  to  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  New Hampshire 
I n  P a r t i a l  F u l f i l l m e n t  o f  
The R eq u irem en ts  f o r  th e  Degree  of
D o c to r  o f  P h i l o s o p h y  
G radu a te  School  
D epar tm en t  o f  S o c io lo g y  
J u l y  1976
This  t h e s i s  has  b e e n  examined and a p p ro v e d .
T h es is  ’d i r e c t o r ' ,  W a l t e r  F u c k l e y ,  P r o f .  o f  
S o c i o l o g y
L o ren  Cobb, A s s t .  P r o f .  o f  S o c i o lo g y
Muri y A. S t r a u s ,  P r o f .  o f  S o c i o lo g y
StephenyuT  W e b e r / 'A s s t .  P r o f . o f  P s y c h o lo g y
Yutaka Yamamoto/  A s s t . P r o f .  o f  P h i l o s o p h y
ag-g^
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This  work was i n  p a r t  made p o s s i b l e  b y  t h e  C e n t e r  f o r  
t h e  S tu d y  o f  M i d d l e - s i z e  C i t i e s  o f  th e  P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  
d i v i s i o n  o f  Sangamon S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y ,  and I  am i n d e b t e d  
t o  th e  C e n te r  f o r  s e e i n g  s u f f i c i e n t  m e r i t  i n  t h i s  p r o j e c t  
t h a t  t h e y  p r o v i d e d  me w i t h  p a r t i a l  r e l e a s e  t im e  i n  which 
to  p u r s u e  i t .  F u r t h e r ,  t h i s  work would n o t  have b e e n  
p o s s i b l e  i f  i t  were n o t  f o r  t h e  h e l p  and s u p p o r t  o f  
numerous i n d i v i d u a l s .  Dr.  W a l te r  B u ck ley  h as  p e r s o n a l l y  
b e e n  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a d d in g  new d i r e c t i o n s  t o  my t h i n k i n g  
i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  and h as  a c t e d  as  a  c o n t i n u a l  s t i m u l u s  f o r  
r e f i n e m e n t  and d e p th  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n .  G r e a t l y  a p p r e c i a ­
t e d  a r e  n o t  o n l y  t h e  t im e ,  e f f o r t ,  and i n v a l u a b l e  comments 
p r o v i d e d  b y  D r .  L o ren  Cobb, Dr .  Murray S t r a u s ,  D r .  S te p h e n  
Weber, and Dr .  Y u taka  Yamamoto, b u t  a l s o  t h e i r  a l l o w i n g  
me to  d e lv e  i n t o  t h i s  murky and m u c h - c o n te s t e d  a r e a  o f  
i n q u i r y .  D r .  Yamamoto's c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  work a r e  
a d d i t i o n a l l y  acknowledged ,  due t o  h i s  h e l p  i n  c l a r i f y i n g  
some complex p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i s s u e s  f o r  a  n o n - p h i l o s o p h e r ,  
as  w e l l  as  i n  c h a l l e n g i n g  my p o s i t i o n  i n  u s e f u l  and  i n s i g h t ­
f u l  w a y s .
I  am f u r t h e r  i n d e b t e d  t o  Dr .  M ichae l  Ayers and Dr .  John 
Munkirs  f o r  t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  d e v o te  much t im e  t o  go in g  
o v e r  th e  r o o t s  o f  i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t  t h i n k i n g ,  as  w e l l  a s  f o r
i i i
t h e i r  p e r s i s t e n c e  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  what  m us t  have  seemed 
t o  he e n d l e s s  a rg u m e n t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  D r .  Ayers  was 
w i l l i n g  to  s e r v e  a s  a  u s e f u l  s o u n d in g  b o a r d  f o r  new i d e a s  
as  w e l l  a s  t o  p e r f o r m  l e s s  r e w a r d i n g  t a s k s  su c h  as  t r a c k i n g  
down u n a v a i l a b l e  s o u r c e  m a t e r i a l s .  Dr.  Regan Sm ith  has  
b e en  h i g h l y  s u p p o r t i v e  and h e l p f u l  b o th  p e r s o n a l l y  and i n  
h i s  r o l e  as  C o o r d i n a t o r  o f  th e  S o c i o lo g y / A n t h r o p o l o g y  
Program a t  Sangamon S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y .
Also  a p p r e c i a t e d  a r e  th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made b y  D r .  Howard 
S h a p i r o ,  Dr .  D a n i e l  W i l l i a m s ,  Mr. G e r a ld  N o t a l i n g ,  Mr. K e i th  
F a r r i n g t o n ,  Ms. M ar tha  H ugg ins ,  Mr. C h a r l e s  C l e v e l a n d ,  and 
Mr. Harvey  B e l l  i n  te rm s  o f  v a l u a b l e  comments and i n t e r ­
a c t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  what  were g e r m i n a l  p o s i t i o n s  which  have 
b e e n  improved i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  work as  a  r e s u l t .  S p e c i a l  
th a n k s  go t o  Dr.  R i c h a r d  Dewey who w h i l e  n o t  d i r e c t l y  
c o n s u l t e d  on t h i s  work and who would u n d o u b t e d l y  d i s a g r e e  
w i t h  much o f  i t ,  h a s  by  th e  c l a r i t y  o f  h i s  t h o u g h t  and 
w e l l - c o n s i d e r e d  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  my p o s i t i o n s  added much 
to  th e  l i n e s  of  t h o u g h t  p r e s e n t e d  i n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  p a g e s .
I  am i n d e b t e d  t o  C a r o ly n  Van Houten  and Nancy A y e r s , b o t h  
f o r  t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s t r u g g l e  w i t h  t h e  marks on p a p e r  
t h a t  I  t r y  t o  p a s s  o f f  a s  h a n d w r i t i n g ,  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  t h e i r  
c a r e f u l  t y p i n g  u n d e r  t im e  p r e s s u r e .
F u r t h e r ,  i f  i t  were n o t  f o r  th e  e m o t i o n a l  and f i n a n c i a l  
s u p p o r t  o f  J e a n  and Woody F o s s ,  t h i s  work would n o t  have 
b e e n  p o s s i b l e  . F i n a l l y ,  I  c a n n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  e x p r e s s
my a p p r e c i a t i o n  t o  my w i f e  and c o l l e a g u e  Joyce  F oss  whose 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  beyond any  r e a s o n a b l e  e x p e c t a t i o n  i n  b o t h  
r o l e s  made t h i s  work a  r e a l i t y .
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ........................ . ...................................... v i i i
ABSTRACT .................................................................................. i x
I .  INTRODUCTION .........................................................................  1
I I .  SOCIOLOGY AS A VALUE FREE OR VALUE
NEUTRAL SCIENCE .................................................................  21
R e l a t e d  P o s i t i o n s  .....................................................  26
I I I .  VALUES IN SOCIOLOGY ........................................................  39
E x t r i n s i c  V a lu es  Employed i n  th e
Knowledge P r o c e s s  ..................................................... 4-1
V a lu es  and th e  Use o f  S o c i o l o g i c a l
Knowledge ..............................................................  50
Use o f  S o c i o l o g i c a l  Knowledge by
N o n - S o c i o l o g i s t s  .......................................................  65
S o c i o l o g y  as  "Value  F u l l "  -  Value
E x p l i c a t i o n  ...................................................................  75
The U l t i m a t e  B e n e f i t  o f  Knowledge ............... 78
S o c i o l o g i c a l  R e le v an c e  .........................................  82
IV. ONE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE CHOICE OF A
DECISION OR GOAL ORIENTATION: THE
SCEPTIC'S VIEW OF FACTS AND VALUES ...................  93
V. THE OPTIMIZING SOCIETY: A SUGGESTED
ORIENTATION FOR THE PROFESSION .............................  112
F u r t h e r  C l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e
P ro p o s e d  O r i e n t a t i o n  .............................................. 117
v i
P o s s i b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  S c e p t i c ' s
View f o r  t h e  R e l a t i o n  Between t h e
O p t i m i z a t i o n  o f  A l t e r n a t i v e s  O r i e n t a t i o n
and a  S u r v i v a l  O r i e n t a t i o n  ...............................  125
V I .  THE NATURALISTIC-EVOLUTIONARY VIEWs
ANOTHER POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE CHOICE
OF A GOAL OR DECISION ORIENTATION ...................... 128
W a d d in g to n ' s  N a t u r a l i s t i c -
E v o l u t i o n a r y  View   ................................................  130
W a d d in g to n ' s  H a n d l in g  o f  th e  
C r i t i c i s m s  Lodged A g a i n s t
N a t u r a l i s t i c  P e r s p e c t i v e s  .................................. 134
The N a t u r a l i s t i c - E v o l u t i o n a r y  
B a s i s  f o r  t h e  Choice  Between
E t h i c a l  Systems .......................................................... 139
P o t e n t i a l  C r i t i c i s m s  o f  th e
N a t u r a l i s t i c - E v o l u t i o n a r y  P o s i t i o n  ............  144
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  N a t u r a l i s t i c -  
E v o l u t i o n a r y  View f o r  t h e  Choice
o f  an  O r i e n t a t i o n  ...................................    152
V I I .  FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED
OPTIMIZING ORIENTATION ................................................  16?
O th e r  Reasons f o r  t h e  A d op t io n  o f
t h e  P rop o sed  O r i e n t a t i o n  ....................................  I 67
Three O the r  P o t e n t i a l  O r i e n t a t i o n s  ............  173
S o c i o l o g i c a l  Knowledge and Freedom ............  180
L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  P ro p o sed  O r i e n t a t i o n  . 192
REFERENCES .....................................................................  210
v i i
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Diagram m at ic  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  S u b - C a t e g o r i e s
o f  Norm at ive  Judgments .....................    6
2 .  Example o f  Mapped P h y s i c a l  E n v i ro n m en ts  and 
R e c r e a t i o n a l  B e h a v i o r a l  R e p e r t o i r e s ,  Used
i n  E x p l a i n i n g  " O p t i m i z a t i o n  o f  A l t e r n a t i v e s "  
O r i e n t a t i o n   ..........................................    119
v i i i
ABSTRACT
VALUES, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE OPTIMIZING SOCIETY
by
DENNIS C . FOSS
The c u r r e n t  d e b a t e  ov e r  t h e  p l a c e  o f  v a l u e s  w i t h i n  
t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  o f  s o c i o l o g y  i s  examined w i t h  th e  i n t e n ­
t i o n  o f  f u r t h e r i n g  d e b a t e  b y  (1 ) a d d in g  c l a r i t y  i n  th e  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  p r e s e n t  m a jo r  p o s i t i o n s ,  (2 ) s u g g e s t i n g  
w eak n esses  w i t h i n  t h o s e  p o s i t i o n s ,  and (3 ) o f f e r i n g  a 
p o s i t i o n  which  goes beyond p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n s  and which 
m ig h t  s e r v e  as  a new f o c u s  to  th e  d e b a t e .  The dom inan t  
p o s i t i o n  of " v a lu e  -freedom" i s  p r e s e n t e d  a l o n g  w i th  
c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  p o s i t i o n s .  An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  e x t r a - 
e p i s t e m i c  v a l u e s  as  t h e y  e x i s t  and seem l i k e l y  t o  c o n ­
t i n u e  t o  e x i s t  i n  s o c i o l o g y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  " v a lu e  f r e e "  
p o s i t i o n  i s  i n a d e q u a t e  b o t h  d e s c r i p t i v e l y  and p r e s c r i p -  
t i v e l y .  O th e r  c o u n t e r  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  found  to  be 
i n a d e q u a t e  i n  a l l o w i n g  o r  j u s t i f y i n g  th e  v a l u e  c h o ic e s  
t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be made i n  s o c i o l o g y .  Two com pe t ing  
b a s e s  f o r  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  a  h i g h  l e v e l  d e c i s i o n  o r  g o a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  a r e  examined -  th e  " s c e p t i c s  
view" and t h e  " n a t u r a l i s t i c - e v o l u t i o n a r y  v i e w ."  While  
th e  two p o s i t i o n s  a r e  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  i m p o r t a n t  
ways,  b o t h  s u g g e s t  and o f f e r  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  
an o r i e n t a t i o n  t h a t  s e e k s  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s  and s o c i e t i e s
w h ich  o p t im iz e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  open t o  s o c i e t a l  m em bers .
The o r i e n t a t i o n  i s  f u r t h e r  c l a r i f i e d ,  a d d i t i o n a l  r e a s o n s  
f o r  i t s  a d o p t i o n  by  s o c i o l o g i s t s  a r e  o f f e r e d ,  i t s  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n ' s  e p i s t e m i c  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  " t r u t h "  
i s  c o n s i d e r e d ,  and some p o s s i b l e  w e ak nesses  o r  l i m i t a t i o n s  




An i m p o r t a n t  o n -g o in g  d e b a te  h a s  e x i s t e d  i n  s o c i o l o g y  
o v e r  t h e  p l a c e  o f  v a l u e s  w i t h i n  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e .  While  
p r e - o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  c o n c e r n s  i n  any  d i s c i ­
p l i n e  may be d e b i l i t a t i n g ,  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  what  th e  
d i s c i p l i n e  s h o u l d  v a lu e  and  what  d i r e c t i o n s  i t  s h o u l d  
t a k e  i s  u s e f u l  and n e c e s s a r y .  I t  i s  and w i l l  p r o b a b l y  
r e m a in  an  o n - g o i n g  d e b a t e  i n  t h a t  d i v e r g e n t  p o s i t i o n s  
a r e  s t r o n g l y  f e l t  and t h e  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e d  a r e  complex 
and i n t e r r e l a t e d .  The work to  f o l l o w  does n o t  presume
to  r e s o l v e  th e  d e b a t e .  I t  more m o d e s t l y  hopes  to  f u r t h e r
th e  d e b a t e  by  ( l )  a d d in g  c l a r i t y  i n  th e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
c u r r e n t  m ajo r  p o s i t i o n s ,  (2) s u g g e s t i n g  w eak nesses  w i t h i n  
t h o s e  p o s i t i o n s ,  (3) p r e s e n t i n g  two c o n t r a s t i n g  b a s e s  
f o r  a new p o s i t i o n ,  and (4) o f f e r i n g  a  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  goes 
beyond p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n s  and which m ig h t  s e r v e  as  a  new 
f o c u s  f o r  the  d e b a t e .
S in c e  th e  te rm  " v a l u e "  p l a y s  a  m a jo r  r o l e  i n  t h e  work
t o  f o l l o w ,  i t  would be w e l l  t o  o f f e r  a  w o rk in g  d e f i n i t i o n
of  i t .  This  t a s k  i s  made e a s i e r  s i n c e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  t h e r e  
seems to  have b e en  a  s u r p r i s i n g l y  h i g h  d e g re e  o f  a g re e m e n t  
as  t o  th e  meaning o f  th e  te rm  i n  i t s  g e n e r a l  usage  by  p r o -
1
2f e s s i o n a l s  who a r e  most  h i g h l y  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  t h e  t e rm  
( p r i m a r i l y  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  and t o  l e s s e r  e x t e n t s  s o c i a l  and 
n a t u r a l  s c i e n t i s t s ) .  F ra n k e n a  ( 1 9 6 7 *2 3 0 ) s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
b e c a u se  t h e r e  has  c r e p t  i n t o  t h e  usage  t h e  h i g h  d e g re e  o f  
a m b i g u i ty  and  l o o s e n e s s  t h a t  h e a v i l y  u se d  te rm s  o f t e n  
e n g e n d e r ,  t h i s  n o t i o n  can  b e s t  be d e f i n e d  by  " k e e p i n g  to  
more t r a d i t i o n a l  t e rm s  su ch  a s  'g o o d '  and ' r i g h t . ' "  As 
a  r e s u l t ,  we t a k e  a s  a  b r o a d  w o rk in g  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
te rm  " v a l u e s "  " b e l i e f s  a b o u t  c l a s s e s  o f  o b j e c t s ,  s i t u a ­
t i o n s ,  a c t i o n s ,  and wholes  composed o f  them i n  r e g a r d s  
th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  good,  r i g h t ,  o b l i g a t o r y ,  o r  
o ug h t  t o  b e . "  This  d e f i n i t i o n  we t a k e  to  be c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  m ost  t r a d i t i o n a l  u se s  o f  t h e  t e rm  i n  p h i l o s o p h y  
( f o r  example ,  s e e  Hancock, 197^*1-11 ;  F ra n k e n a ,  1 9 6 7 ;
1973;  Bahm, 197^ ) .  F u r t h e r ,  w h i l e  t h e  t e rm  " v a l u e "  i s  
se ldom e x p l i c i t l y  d e f i n e d  when s o c i o l o g i s t s  and o t h e r  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  d i s c u s s  t h e  r o l e  o f  v a l u e s  i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
d i s c i p l i n e s ,  t h i s  w o rk in g  d e f i n i t i o n  a l s o  seems c o n s i s ­
t e n t  w i t h  t h e i r  u sag e  as  w e l l .  While  t h e r e  may be c o n ­
s i d e r a b l e  a g re e m e n t  a t  a  g e n e r a l  l e v e l  on t h e  u sa g e  o f  
th e  te rm  " v a l u e , "  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s a g r e e m e n t  as  
t o  how some of  th e  key  words used  i n  d e f i n i n g  v a l u e ,  such  
a s  "good" o r  " o b l i g a t o r y "  a r e  th e m s e lv e s  t o  be d e f i n e d ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  m ajo r  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  as  t o  t h e o r i e s  o f  v a lu e  
and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  t h e o r i e s .  (Some o f  t h e s e
3d i s a g r e e m e n t s  w i l l  be c o n s i d e r e d  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  w o rk . )  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  i s  some d i v e r g e n c e  as  t o  d i s t i n c t i o n s  and 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t h a t  m ig h t  o r  s h o u l d  he made i n  t h e  use 
o f  t h e  t e r m .  S in c e  some o f  them do add c l a r i t y  t o  our 
t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  the  te rm  t h e y  w i l l  be m en t io ned  b r i e f l y  
i n  t h i s  i n t r o d u c t i o n .  B e fo re  d o in g  so ,  however ,  i t  
s h o u l d  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  w o rk in g  d e f i n i t i o n  c o n ­
c e i v e s  o f  " v a l u e "  r a t h e r  b r o a d l y  and c o v e r s  q u i t e  a 
b i t  o f  g ro u n d ,  lum ping  t o g e t h e r  s e v e r a l  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
t y p e s  o f  judgments  o f  v a l u e .
Most s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  and s u r p r i s i n g l y  l a r g e  numbers 
o f  p h i l o s o p h e r s  use  th e  t e rm  " v a lu e "  a l t e r n a t e l y  o r  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  to  r e f e r  t o  b e l i e f s  a b o u t  on one hand 
what  i s  "good" and on th e  o t h e r  hand what i s " o b l i g a t o r y . "  
However, t h e s e  two u se s  o f  t h e  te rm  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .  
A l th o ug h  su ch  a d i s t i n c t i o n  may n o t  be n e c e s s a r y  f o r  
some t y p e s  o f  g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n ,  f o r  th e  sake  o f  c l a r i t y  
i t  seems w o r th w h i l e  t o  f o l l o w  th e  l e a d  o f  p h i l o s o p h e r s  
su ch  as  F ra n k en a  (1973)  hy  k e e p i n g  i n  mind s u b - c a t e g o r i e s  
o f  t h e  t e rm  " v a l u e  ju d g m e n t s . "  Thus, w i t h i n  th e  b ro a d  
c a t e g o r y  o f  v a l u e  judgments we may d i s t i n g u i s h  " judgm en ts  
of  o b l i g a t i o n "  and " ju dg m en ts  o f  v a l u e . "  "Judgments  o f  
o b l i g a t i o n "  r e f e r  t o  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  o r  k in d s  o f  a c t i o n s  
which we c o n s i d e r  r i g h t ,  wrong, o b l i g a t o r y ,  a  d u ty ,  o r  
oug h t  o r  ou g h t  n o t  to  be d o ne .  A secon d  type  o f  v a lu e  
judgment,  a " judgm ent  o f  v a l u e "  (w i th  " v a lu e "  u sed  i n  a 
more s p e c i f i c  s e n s e ) ,  r e f e r s  n o t  t o  a c t i o n s  o r  k in d s  of
a c t i o n s  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  p e r s o n s ,  o b j e c t s ,  s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s ,  
m o t i v a t i o n s ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  e t c .  We may c o n s i d e r  them 
to  be good, b ad ,  v i r t u o u s ,  b lam ew or thy ,  d e s p i c a b l e ,  and 
so f o r t h  (F ra n k en a ,  1973*9)•
F u r t h e r ,  w i t h i n  " ju d gm en ts  o f  v a l u e "  we may d i s t i n ­
g u i s h  judgments  o f  " m o r a l " and "n o n - m o r a l " v a l u e . F ra n k e n a  
(1973*9-10)  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  judgments  o f  m o ra l  v a l u e  
r e f e r  t o  p e r s o n s ,  m o t i v e s ,  i n t e n t i o n s ,  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s ,  
and t h e  l i k e .  Examples o f  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  i n c l u d e  judgments  
o f  m o ra l  v a lu e  a r e :  My f a t h e r  i s  a  good man; J o n e s '
c h a r a c t e r  i s  a d m i r a b l e ;  b e n e v o le n c e  i s  a  v i r t u e ;  and 
j e a l o u s y  i s  an  i g n o b l e  m o t i v e .  There  a r e  a l s o  judgments  
o f  n o n -m o ra l  v a l u e , i n  which  i t  i s  n o t  p e r s o n s ,  m o t i v a t i o n s ,  
e t c .  t h a t  a r e  e v a l u a t e d ,  b u t  " a l l  s o r t s  o f  o t h e r  t h i n g s  
such  as  c a r s ,  p a i n t i n g s ,  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  forms o f  governm ent ,  
and wha t  n o t .  We s a y  t h e y  a r e  good,  b ad ,  d e s i r a b l e ,  
■undes i rab le ,  and so on, b u t  we do n o t  mean t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
m o r a l l y  good o r  bad ,  s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  th e  
k in d s  o f  t h i n g s  t h a t  c an  be  m o r a l l y  good o r  bad"  (F ra n k en a ,  
1 9 73 * 9-10 ) -  Examples o f  n o n -m o ra l  v a l u e  judgments  a r e :
That  i s  a  good c a r ;  M in iv e r  Cheevy d i d  n o t  have  a  v e r y  
good l i f e ;  p l e a s u r e  i s  a  good i n  i t s e l f ;  and democracy  
i s  th e  b e s t  form o f  g o v e rn m en t .
While  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  e t h i c s  u s u a l l y  d e a l  w i t h  m o ra l  
o b l i g a t i o n ,  f o r  the  sake  o f  c o m p le t e n e s s  we may s i m i l a r l y  
d i s t i n g u i s h  m o ra l  f rom n o n -m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  even  though
5b o t h  r e f e r  t o  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  o r  k i n d s  o f  a c t i o n s .  Examples 
o f  judgments  of  m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n  a r e  : We o u g h t  t o  keep  ou r
p r o m i s e s ; I  o u g h t  t o  be c h a r i t a b l e ; we have an  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  f i g h t  f o r  o u r  c o u n t r y ;  and  a l l  men have a  r i g h t  t o  
r e b e l  when o p p r e s s e d .  Non-moral  judgments o f  o b l i g a t i o n ,  
w h i l e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  e v e r y d a y  l i f e ,  
a r e  n o t  u s u a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  e t h i c a l  d i s c o u r s e . F ran k en a  
(1973'• 11) o f f e r s  th e  f o l l o w i n g  examples  o f  n o n -m o ra l  
judgments  o f  o b l i g a t i o n :  You o u g h t  t o  buy a  new s u i t ;
you j u s t  have to  go t o  t h a t  c o n c e r t ;  i n  b u i l d i n g  a  b o okcase  
one s h o u l d  use  n a i l s ,  n o t  S c o tc h  Tape; and t h e  r i g h t  t h i n g  
to  do on f o u r t h  down w i t h  t h i r t e e n  y a rd s  t o  go i s  t o  p u n t .
The s u b - c a t e g o r i e s  o f  th e  g e n e r a l  te rm  " v a l u e  ju d g ­
ments"  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  d i a g r a m m a t i c a l l y  i n  F i g u r e  1 .  Again ,  
su c h  d i s t i n c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  c r u c i a l  t o  a l l  forms o f  d i s c o u r s e  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  v a l u e s , a s  f o r  example i n  c e r t a i n  g e n e r a l  
d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  w h e th e r  v a l u e s  have any p l a c e  a t  a l l  w i t h i n  
a  d i s c i p l i n e .  However, t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  o f t e n  do seem v e r y  
v a l u a b l e  b o t h  b e c a u s e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ty p e s  o f  v a lu e  ju d g ­
ments o f t e n  demand d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ,  and 
b e c a u s e  t h e r e  may be s a i d  to  e x i s t  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e tw ee n  them.
\
T hu s , f o r  e x a m p le , judgments  of1 m ora l  and n o n -m o ra l  
o b l i g a t i o n  p r o b a b l y  demand d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  
The ty p e  of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  t h a t  one m ig h t  o f f e r  f o r  a
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Diagram m at ic  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
S u b - C a t e g o r i e s  o f  N orm ative  Judgments
7judgment  o f  n o n -m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n  s u c h  as  "members o f  th e  
army ough t  t o  keep  t h e i r  r i f l e s  c l e a n  and i n  good r e p a i r , "  
would p r o b a b l y  be c o n s i d e r a b l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h e  ty p e  o f  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  would n eed  t o  be o f f e r e d  f o r  a  judgment 
o f  m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n  su c h  as  "one o u g h t  t o  j o i n  th e  army 
i f  o n e ' s  c o u n t r y  i s  t h r e a t e n e d . "  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  s u b ­
c a t e g o r i e s  seem u s e f u l  i n  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p o s i t i o n s  
o f t e n  may h in g e  on e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n c e s  as  to  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s  be tw ee n  t h e  t y p e s  o f  v a l u e  ju d g m en ts .  For  
example ,  two p e r s o n s  may b o t h  judge s o c i e t i e s  o f  a  c e r t a i n  
s o r t ,  s a y  j u s t  s o c i e t i e s ,  t o  be g ood .  They may s t r o n g l y  
d i f f e r  as  t o  what  a c t i o n s ,  i f  any ,  t h e y  a r e  o b l i g a t e d  to  
p e r f o r m  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  judgment o f  v a l u e  upon which 
t h e y  a g r e e .  One may c l a im  " s i n c e  I  v a l u e  a  j u s t  s o c i e t y ,
I  am o b l i g a t e d  t o  do a l l  i n  my power t o  make t h i s  s o c i e t y  
more j u s t .  I n  s h o r t ,  I  o u g h t  t o  do t h a t  which  b r i n g s  
a b o u t  t h a t  which i s  v a l u e d . "  The o t h e r ,  however ,  may h o ld  
e q u a l l y  a d a m a n t ly  " a l t h o u g h  I  a l s o  v a l u e  j u s t  s o c i e t i e s ,  
t h i s  by  no means o b l i g a t e s  me to  a c t  i n  s u c h  as  way as  to  
a t t a i n  such  a  s o c i e t y .  While I  may ap prove  o f  your  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a  j u s t  s o c i e t y ,  my v a l u i n g  such  
a  s o c i e t y  i n c u r s  no p e r s o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  upon me t o  h e l p  
b r i n g  i t  a b o u t . "  What b o t h  p a r t i e s  a r e  d i s a g r e e i n g  a b o u t  
i s  th e  r e l a t i o n  be tw een  judgments  o f  v a l u e  and judgments  o f  
o b l i g a t i o n .  Not d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  b e tw ee n  t y p e s  o f  v a lu e  
judgments  o f t e n  means t h a t  th e  e x a c t  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  d i s a g r e e -
8ment i s  n o t  p i n p o i n t e d ,  and th e  d i s c u s s i o n  c a n n o t  he 
s h i f t e d  t o  a  more f r u i t f u l  f o c u s .
The work t o  f o l l o w  d e a l s  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
a c t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  and o f  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  
as  a  w hole ,  and a s  such  h a s  a  p r i m a r y  c o n c e rn  w i t h  q u e s t i o n s  
t h a t  would f a l l  i n  th e  a r e a  which F rank en a  te rm s  " judgm en ts  
o f  o b l i g a t i o n . " S in c e  t h e  p r e s e n t  a u t h o r  p e r s o n a l l y  
f e e l s  u n c o m f o r t a b l e  w i t h  su c h  te rm s as  " o b l i g a t i o n "  and 
" d u t y , " and s i n c e  a rgu m en ts  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  l i t e r a t u r e  
a r e  se ldom  a r g u e d  i n  su c h  a  s t r o n g  f a s h i o n ,  su c h  c o n c e p t s  
do n o t  a p p e a r  h e r e  and t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  c e n t e r s  a ro u n d  what  
we a s  a  p r o f e s s i o n  and a s  i n d i v i d u a l s  ou g h t  o r  o u g h t  n o t  to  
d o .  Thus th e  t y p e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  a d d r e s s e d  a re s  
Ought s o c i o l o g i s t s  t o  s e e k  knowledge p u r e l y  f o r  i t s  own 
sak e  o r  ough t  t h e y  t o  s e e k  i t  to  be used  i n  a c t u a l i z i n g  
o t h e r  v a lu e d  e n d s ;  how s h o u l d  knowledge be d i s s e m i n a t e d ;  
oug h t  s o c i o l o g i s t s  t o  work f o r  one g roup  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y  as  
opposed  t o  o t h e r s  ; and o u g h t  s o c i o l o g i s t s  t o  a c t  i n  ways 
so  as  t o  change s o c i e t i e s  i n  c e r t a i n  d i r e c t i o n s  a s  opposed 
to  o t h e r s ?  The u l t i m a t e  c o n c e rn  o f  t h i s  work t h e n  i s  to  
c o n s i d e r  v a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n s  which c o n f l i c t  a s  to  what  s o r t  
o f  v a l u e  o r i e n t a t i o n ( s ) s h o u l d  g u id e  th e  p r a c t i c i n g  
s o c i o l o g i s t  and th e  d i s c i p l i n e  i n  c h o o s in g  b e tw ee n  f u t u r e  
c o u r s e s  o f  a c t i o n  and e v a l u a t i n g  p a s t  a c t i o n s .
I t  s h o u ld  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  f o c u s  o f  th e
9v a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n s  t o  be d i s c u s s e d  i s  " ju d gm en ts  o f  o b l i g a ­
t i o n , "  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  i s  d e v o te d  to  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  
" jud g m en ts  o f  v a lu e "  made i n  each  p o s i t i o n .  This  i s  due t o  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w h i l e  on many l e v e l s  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
d i s a g r e e m e n t  b e tw ee n  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n s ,  t h e y  s h a r e  an 
i m p l i c i t  " t e l e o l o g i c a l "  t h e o r y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  which  s e e s  
judgments  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  as  i n t i m a t e l y  l i n k e d  t o  judgments  of 
v a l u e .  They a r e  " t e l e o l o g i c a l "  i n  t h a t  judgments  a b o u t  
w h e th e r  an  a c t  o u g h t  o r  o ug h t  n o t  t o  be c a r r i e d  o u t  a r e  
b a s e d  upon th e  p r o b a b l y  f u t u r e  co n seq u e n ce s  o f  t h e  a c t i o n .  
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s  h o ld  t h a t  we o u g h t  
t o  do t h o s e  t h i n g s  which a r e  l i k e l y  t o  l e a d  t o  s t a t e s  o f  
a f f a i r s  t h a t  would be judged to  be o f  v a l u e .  Thus,  " j u d g ­
ments o f  o b l i g a t i o n "  demand d i s c u s s i o n  o f  " jud g m en ts  of 
v a l u e "  i f  one h o l d s  a  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y .  T e l e o l o g i c a l  
t h e o r i e s  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  can  p e rh a p s  be u n d e r s t o o d  more c l e a r l y  
b y  c o n t r a s t i n g  them t o  " d e o n t o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s  o f  o b l i g a ­
t i o n . "  D e o n t o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s  a rg u e  t h a t  t h a t  which  o u g h t  
t o  be done i s  n o t  d e p e n d e n t  w h o l ly  o r  i n  p a r t  upon th e  good 
p ro d u c e d  b y  an  a c t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  o f  c e r t a i n  a c t s  th e m s e lv e s  t h a t  make them o b l i g a t o r y  
a p a r t  f rom t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  Thus, a  d e o n t o l o g i c a l  v iew 
m ig h t  be t h a t  "one ough t  t o  keep  p r o m is e s "  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
i n h e r e n t l y  j u s t ,  o r  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  commanded by  God, e t c . ,  
and n o t  b e c a u s e  d o in g  so  would l e a d  t o  some v a l u e d  c o n se q u e n -
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c e s . (For  a  more e x te n d e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
and d e o n t o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s  o f  o b l i g a t i o n ,  s e e  F r a n k e n a ,
1 9 7 3 s1 4 - 3 3 . )  The t h i n g  to  b e a r  i n  mind i s  t h a t  t h e  v a r i ­
ous p o s i t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  work, w h i l e  d i f f e r i n g  a t  
many l e v e l s ,  s h a r e  an  i m p l i c i t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  of  
o b l i g a t i o n  which c h oo ses  be tw ee n  a c t s  n o t  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
some i n h e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which  e n t a i l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  
b u t  r a t h e r  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  a c t ' s  p r o ­
b a b l e  c o n s e q u e n c e s .
There  a r e  a  few a d d i t i o n a l  d i s t i n c t i o n s  and q u a l i f i c a ­
t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  te rm  " v a l u e "  i n  i t s  b r o a d e s t  s e n s e  
t h a t  s h o u l d  be made i n  o r d e r  t o  h e l p  t h e  r e a d e r  more 
f i r m l y  f i x  th e  way t h e  t e rm  w i l l  be u se d  i n  t h e  work t o  
f o l l o w .  F i r s t ,  w h i l e  t h e  t e rm  " v a l u e "  i s  used  h e r e  as  a  
noun,  i t  a l s o  h a s  v e r b  form s su c h  as  " t o  v a l u e , "  " v a l u i n g , "  
" v a l u e d , "  and " v a l u a t i n g . "  Terms su c h  as  " v a l u i n g "  a r e  
u se d  t o  s u g g e s t  an  a c t i v e  p r o c e s s  su ch  a s  t h e  a c t  o f  
c o m p a r iso n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  more p a s s i v e  n o t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  
of  t h e  p r o c e s s .  Some i n  f a c t  would p r e f e r  th e  v e r b  form 
i n  t h a t ,  among o t h e r  r e a s o n s ,  i t  does n o t  a l l o w  one to  
h o ld  a  v iew  o f  v a l u e s  t h a t  s e e s  them as  u n c h a n g in g  o r  
e t e r n a l .  While t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  s h o u l d  be k e p t  i n  mind, i t  
a l s o  seems t h a t  we c a n  d i s c u s s  a t  any  p o i n t  i n  t h e  c o n ­
t i n u o u s  v a l u i n g  p r o c e s s  th e  p r o d u c t s  o f  i t ,  and as  a r e s u l t  
t h e  noun u s a g e ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  b e i n g  t h e  p r e d o m in a n t  
c o n v e n t i o n ,  a l s o  h a s  some m e r i t .  At any  r a t e ,  when t h o s e
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who m ost  o f t e n  employ t h e  v e r b  fo rm  use  i t ,  t h e y  seem 
t o  use  i t  i n  ways c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  th e  w o rk in g  d e f i n i ­
t i o n .  "For  Dewey and R i c h a r d  M. Hare i t  [ v a l u a t i o n )  
c o v e r s  judgments  a b o u t  wha t  i s  r i g h t ,  wrong, o b l i g a t o r y ,  
o r  j u s t ,  a s  w e l l  a s  judgments  a b o u t  wha t  i s  good, bad ,  
d e s i r a b l e ,  o r  w o r th w h i l e "  (F ra n k en a ,  1 9 6 7 : 2 3 0 ) .
Dewey (1939 and e l s e w h e r e )  a l s o  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  two 
forms o f  v a l u i n g .  The t e rm  " v a l u i n g "  may be used  t o  r e f e r  
to  mere d e s i r i n g  o r  l i k i n g :  t h i s  may be  d e s c r i b e d  by  su ch  
te rm s as  " t o  p r i z e , "  " t o  e s t e e m , "  " t o  h o l d  d e a r , "  o r  " to  
l i k e . "  On th e  o t h e r  hand ,  " v a l u i n g "  can  be s a i d  to  
i n v o l v e  more t h a n  mere d e s i r i n g  o r  l i k i n g ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  to  
i n v o lv e  a c t i v e  r e f l e c t i o n  and co m p a r iso n  which may be 
d e s c r i b e d  by  su c h  te rm s  as  " t o  a p p r a i s e , "  " t o  e v a l u a t e , "  
o r  " t o  v a l u a t e . "  The w o rk in g  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  i n  l i n e  w i th  
t h i s  s e c o n d  u s a g e .  While  i n  common p a r l a n c e  we o f t e n  use  
th e  t e rm  t o  r e f e r  t o  p e r s o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  a s  i n  " I  v a lu e  
c h o c o l a t e  ove r  v a n i l l a  i c e  c re am ,"  t h e  te rm  i s  n o t  used  
i n  t h i s  s e n s e  h e r e  b u t  r a t h e r  r e f e r s  t o  judgments  o f  h i g h e r  
l e v e l  v a l u e ,  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  s o c i a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  m e re ly  
p e r s o n a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  Thus we d i s t i n g u i s h  be tw een  p e r s o n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e  and v a l u e  judgments  ( a l t h o u g h  v a l u e  judgments  
a l s o  may have i n f l u e n c e  on some t y p e s  o f  p e r s o n a l  p r e ­
f e r e n c e ) ,  and r e c o g n i z e  v a l u e s  (as  does  C . I .  Lew is ,  1 9 6 9 :
3 - 5 )  even  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  e t h i c s ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  
to  human g ro u p s ,  s o c i e t i e s ,  and mankind g e n e r a l l y .
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S o c i o l o g i s t s  have  o f  c o u r s e  b e e n  q u i c k  to  r e c o g n i z e
v a l u e s  as  p r i m a r i l y  s o c i a l  i n  n a t u r e ,  even  though  t h e y  may
he i n t e r n a l i z e d  by  i n d i v i d u a l s . P h i l o s o p h e r s  have  a l s o
come t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h i s ,  as  t h i s  p a s s a g e  on m o r a l i t y  by
F r a n k e n a  i n d i c a t e s :
Now, m o r a l i t y  i n  th e  s e n s e  i n d i c a t e d  i s ,  i n  one 
a s p e c t  a t  l e a s t ,  a  s o c i a l  e n t e r p r i s e ,  n o t  j u s t  a 
d i s c o v e r y  o r  i n v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f o r  h i s  
own g u i d a n c e .  L ike  o n e ' s  l a n g u a g e ,  s t a t e ,  o r  
c h u r c h ,  i t  e x i s t s  b e f o r e  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  who i s  
i n d u c t e d  i n t o  i t  and becomes more o r  l e s s  o f  a 
p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  i t ,  and i t  goes  on e x i s t i n g  a f t e r  
h im .  M oreover ,  i t  i s  n o t  s o c i a l  m e r e ly  i n  th e  
s e n s e  o f  b e i n g  a sy s te m  g o v e r n i n g  th e  r e l a t i o n s  
o f  one i n d i v i d u a l  to  o t h e r s . . . i t  i s  a l s o  l a r g e ­
l y  s o c i a l  i n  i t s  o r i g i n s ,  s a n c t i o n s ,  and f u n c ­
t i o n s  (F ra n k en a ,  1 9 7 3 : 6 ) .
The d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  " v a lu e "  a s  t h e  te rm  i s  used  h e r e  i n
i t s  i m p o r t a n t  s o c i a l  s e n s e ,  and  p e r s o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  can
p e rh a p s  be m ost  c l e a r l y  r e a l i z e d  when we r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  t h e
two o f t e n  c o n f l i c t .  I n d i v i d u a l l y ,  we o f t e n  p o s s e s s  s t r o n g l y
h e l d  p e r s o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  c e r t a i n  a c t s .  I t  i s  o f t e n
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  g ro up  and s o c i e t a l  l e v e l  v a l u e s  which  we have
i n t e r n a l i z e d  t h a t  p r e v e n t  us f rom a c t i n g  i n  th e  d i r e c t i o n s
o f  our  p r e f e r e n c e s . S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  v a lu e s
o f t e n  works t o  compel us t o  a c t  i n  ways t h a t  would n o t  o ccu r
i f  th e  m a t t e r  were one of  s im p le  p e r s o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e .
F u r t h e r ,  s i n c e  b o th  a r e  b e l i e f s ,  and s i n c e  b o t h  a re
b e l i e f s  t h a t  a r e  p r e - e m i n e n t l y  s o c i a l  even  when i n t e r n a l i z e d
by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i t  i s  a l s o  w e l l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  be tw een
a t t i t u d e s  and v a l u e s .  Rokeach (1 9 6 8 :159~ l6o )  a rg u e s  t h a t  an
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a t t i t u d e  may be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d  a s  "an o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  
s e v e r a l  b e l i e f s  f o c u s e d  on a  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t  ( p h y s i c a l  o r  
s o c i a l ,  c o n c r e t e  o r  a b s t r a c t )  o r  s i t u a t i o n . "  V a lu e ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  h an d ,  i s  a  " b e l i e f  t h a t  a  s p e c i f i c  mode o f  c o n d u c t  o r  
e n d - s t a t e  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  modes o f  
c o n d u c t  o r  e n d - s t a t e s  of  e x i s t e n c e .  Once a  v a l u e  i s  
i n t e r n a l i z e d  i t  becomes,  c o n s c i o u s l y  o r  u n c o n s c i o u s l y ,  a  
s t a n d a r d  o r  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  g u i d i n g  a c t i o n ,  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  
and m a i n t a i n i n g  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  r e l e v a n t  o b j e c t s  and 
s i t u a t i o n s ,  f o r  m o r a l l y  j u d g in g  s e l f  and o t h e r s ,  and f o r  
com par ing  s e l f  w i t h  o t h e r s "  (Rokeach, 1 9 6 8 : 1 6 0 ) .  Rokeach 
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  th o se  
o f  Clyde K lu c k h o ln ,  B r e w s te r  Sm ith ,  and Robin  W il l ia m s  and 
t h a t  v a l u e  once so  d e f i n e d  can  be s e e n  t o  d i f f e r  c o n ­
s i d e r a b l y  f rom a t t i t u d e .
While  an a t t i t u d e  r e p r e s e n t s  s e v e r a l  b e l i e f s  
f o c u s e d  on a  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t  o r  s i t u a t i o n ,  a  
v a l u e  i s  a  s i n g l e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y  
g u i d e s  a c t i o n s  and judgments a c r o s s  s p e c i f i c  
o b j e c t s  and s i t u a t i o n s ,  and  beyond im m edia te  
g o a l s  t o  more u l t i m a t e  e n d - s t a t e s  o f  e x i s t e n c e .  
M oreover ,  a  v a lu e  u n l i k e  an  a t t i t u d e ,  i s  an  
i m p e r a t i v e  t o  a c t i o n ,  n o t  o n l y  a  b e l i e f  a b o u t  
t h e  p r e f e r a b l e  b u t  a l s o  a  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  th e  
p r e f e r a b l e .  F i n a l l y ,  a  v a l u e ,  u n l i k e  an 
a t t i t u d e ,  i s  a  s t a n d a r d  o r  y a r d s t i c k  t o  g u id e  
a c t i o n s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  c o m p a r i s o n s ,  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  
and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  o f  s e l f  and o t h e r s  (Rokeach, 
1 9 6 8 :1 6 0 ) .
One f i n a l  p o i n t  s h o u ld  be made c o n c e r n i n g  v a l u e s .
While we c o n cu r  w i t h  Rokeach t h a t  " w h i le  an  a t t i t u d e  
r e p r e s e n t s  s e v e r a l  b e l i e f s  f o c u s e d  on a s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t  o r  
s i t u a t i o n ,  a  v a lu e  i s  a  s i n g l e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y
ih
g u i d e s  a c t i o n s . . . "  e t c . ,  we (and u n d o u b t e d l y  Rokeach as  
w e l l )  would n o t  w ish  i n f e r r e d  from t h i s  t h a t  v a l u e s  o c c u r  
i n  i s o l a t i o n .  While  v a l u e s  th e m s e lv e s  may be s i n g l e  
b e l i e f s ,  o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  g roups  and s o c i e t i e s  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  s i n g l e  v a l u e s  do n o t  e x i s t  i n  i s o l a t i o n  b u t  r a t h e r  
o ccu r  w i t h i n  t o t a l  s y s t e m s .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e  v a l u e s  w i t h i n  
t h e  s y s te m  t e n d  t o  be i n t e r r e l a t e d  and o f t e n  w i t h i n  th e  
sy s te m  t h e r e  a r e  s e t s  o f  v a l u e s  t h a t  a r e  m u t u a l l y  s u p p o r ­
t i v e .  This  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  v a l u e s  w i t h i n  th e  sy s tem  
n e v e r  c o n f l i c t ,  o r  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no i n t e r n a l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ,  
b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  s i n g l e  v a l u e s  may be p l a c e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  t h e  w i d e r  whole o f  which t h e y  a r e  a  p a r t .  The d i f f i c u l t y  
i s  t h a t  w h i le  we som etim es can  and do d i s c u s s  t o t a l  v a lu e  
s y s t e m s ,  i t  i s  o f t e n  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s i d e r  v a l u e  judgments  
s e p a r a t e l y ,  e i t h e r  b e c a u s e  we l a c k  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  c o n s i d e r  
them a l l  a t  o nce ,  o r  b e c a u s e  we c o n s i d e r  th e  p r o b a b l e  
l a c k  o f  c l a r i t y  i n  d o in g  so  i m p r u d e n t .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  
even when a v a l u e  i s  f o r  one r e a s o n  o r  a n o t h e r  c o n s i d e r e d  
a p a r t  f rom t h e  t o t a l  sy s te m ,  i t  i s  w e l l  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  
changes  i n  i t  w i l l  l i k e l y  have i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  changes  
i n  o t h e r  v a l u e s  as  w e l l .
We may summarize  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  te rm  " v a lu e "  
as  i t  w i l l  be u sed  i n  t h i s  work as  f o l l o w s .  A b ro a d  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  te rm ,  a r g u e d  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
u s a g e s  o f  p h i l o s o p h e r s  and  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  has  b e e n  
o f f e r e d :  " b e l i e f s  a b o u t  c l a s s e s  o f  o b j e c t s ,  s i t u a t i o n s ,
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a c t i o n s ,  wholes  composed o f  them, as  w e l l  as  c l a s s e s  o f  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  o b j e c t s ,  s i t u a t i o n s ,  a c t i o n s ,  and  wholes  
composed o f  them i n  r e g a r d s  t o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  good, 
r i g h t ,  o b l i g a t o r y ,  o r  ough t  t o  b e . "  I t  was n o t e d  t h a t  w i t h i n  
th e  b r o a d  w o rk in g  d e f i n i t i o n  s e v e r a l  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
c a t e g o r i e s  of  v a l u e  judgments  were lumped t o g e t h e r .
F o l lo w in g  F r a n k e n a  (1973) " ju dg m en ts  o f  v a l u e "  were d i s t i n ­
g u i s h e d  f rom  " ju d gm en ts  of o b l i g a t i o n , "  and w i t h i n  each  
c a t e g o r y  "m ora l"  and " n o n -m o ra l"  s u b - c a t e g o r i e s  were d i s ­
t i n g u i s h e d .  I t  was p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  s i n c e  th e  work i s  
p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  a c t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  
and o f  th e  p r o f e s s i o n  as a  whole ,  i t s  p r i m a r y  f o c u s  i s  
q u e s t i o n s  o f  what  o u g h t  to  be done, o r  q u e s t i o n s  of o b l i g a ­
t i o n .  However, s i n c e  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  t o  be  d i s c u s s e d  
i m p l i c i t l y  h o l d  t o  a  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  
which s e e s  th e  way we o u g h t  t o  a c t  a s  t i e d  t o  t h e  v a l u e  of 
the  p r o b a b l e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  an  a c t ,  " ju dg m en ts  o f  v a lu e "  
w i l l  be  g i v e n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  use  o f  
th e  noun  form " v a l u e "  was j u s t i f i e d  (as  opposed  t o  r e ­
s t r i c t i n g  t h e  work to  t h e  more a c t i v e  " v a l u i n g " ) :  v a l u e s
were d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from p e r s o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  w i t h  t h e i r  
s o c i a l  n a t u r e  s t r e s s e d ,  and were d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  f rom  a t t i ­
t u d e s ;  a n d  v a l u e s  were a rg u e d  to  o c c u r  w i t h i n  s y s te m s  r a t h e r  
t h a n  i n  i s o l a t i o n .  Having  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  way i n  which 
" v a l u e "  w i l l  be  u se d  i n  t h e  work t o  f o l l o w ,  we may now 
s k e t c h  o u t  t h e  way i n  which th e  work i s  o r g a n i z e d .
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C h a p te r  I I  o f f e r s  what  many c o n s i d e r  t o  he t h e  do m inan t  
p o s i t i o n  i n  s o c i o l o g y  -  t h a t  o f  " v a l u e  f reedom " o r  n e u t r a l ­
i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a l l  b u t  e p i s t e m i c  o r  knowledge v a l u e s . 
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  b a s i c  p o s i t i o n ,  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  d i s c u s s e d .  C h a p te r  I I I  c o n s i d e r s  
th e  r o l e  of  n o n - e p i s t e m i c  v a l u e s  i n  s o c i o l o g y  and a t t e m p t s  
t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  s u c h  v a l u e s  a r e  and a r e  l i k e l y  t o  
c o n t i n u e  to  be i n t e g r a l  p a r t s  o f  t h e  knowledge p r o c e s s  and 
th e  use  o f  s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge by  s o c i o l o g i s t s  and n o n ­
s o c i o l o g i s t s  a l i k e .  As a  r e s u l t ,  i t  i s  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  
p o s i t i o n  of  v a l u e  n e u t r a l i t y  o r  v a l u e  f reedom  i s  i n a d e q u a t e  
b o t h  d e s c r i p t i v e l y  and p r e s c r i p t i v e l y  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e s e  
v a l u e s .  Three o t h e r  p o s i t i o n s  -  " s o c i o l o g y  a s  v a l u e  f u l l , "  
" t h e  u l t i m a t e  b e n e f i t  of  s o c i o l o g y , "  and t h e  " s o c i o l o g i c a l  
r e l e v a n c e "  p o s i t i o n s  -  a r e  found to  s i m i l a r l y  i n a d e q u a t e  
i n  o f f e r i n g  a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  and g u i d i n g  t h e  numerous 
c h o ic e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  d o i n g  s o c i o l o g y  which  demand e x t r a -  
e p i s t e m i c  v a l u e s .  As a  r e s u l t ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i f  such  
e x t r a - e p i s t e m i c  v a l u e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be employed i n  the  
d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s ,  and i f  we w ish  t o  j u s t i f y  and 
e v a l u a t e  r e s u l t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  a v o id  h y p o c r i s y ,  
s o c i o l o g y  as  a  d i s c i p l i n e  a s  w e l l  a s  i n d i v i d u a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  
must choose  and make e x p l i c i t  a  " d e c i s i o n  o r  g o a l  o r i e n t a t i o n "  
t h a t  w i l l  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  s e r v e  a s  a  p o i n t  o f  r e f e r e n c e  i n  
d e c i s i o n  making  a t  t h e  numerous s t a g e s  o f  th e  knowledge 
g a t h e r i n g  p r o c e s s  and a t  the  same t im e  a l l o w  e v a l u a t i o n  and
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justification of those decisions.
Chapters IV and VI examine two alternate possible bases 
for choosing such a decision or goal orientation. The 
two possible bases examined are seen to be in disagreement 
in several important ways. While arguments for each, as 
well as the ways each would be critical of the other, 
are presented, no attempt is made to choose between them 
in that both are argued to be sufficiently reasonable to 
attract a large number of adherents in subsequent dis­
cussion and debate. Further, despite their basic disagree­
ments, each is considered to suggest and support the 
proposed "optimizing orientation."
More specifically, Chapter IV': considers one possible 
basis for the choice of such a decision or goal orientation. 
It takes what might be termed a "sceptic's view" concerning 
the use of facts as an ultimate basis for this choice 
insofar as the goal orientation has embodied in it some 
notion of a valued end. In particular, it asserts that the 
validity of all basic values is ultimately non-demonstrable 
with reference to facts and that valued ends can have only 
an assumptive basis. In accord with the sceptic's view and 
a corollary that values gain no additional validity by 
virtue of the characteristics of the individuals who possess 
them, it is argued that sociologists have no warrant for 
imposing their values upon the population as a whole. If 
the "sceptic's view" is accepted, the sociologist is thus
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placed in the awkward position of having to choose a high 
level decision orientation while admitting that the value 
of the orientation is of only assumptive validity.
Chapter V seeks to resolve this dilemma by offering 
as a decision orientation the "optimization of alternatives 
for all individuals," which while admittedly assumptive, 
has as a persuasive reason for its adoption its consonance 
with the sceptic’s view, in that it minimizes the unwarranted 
imposition of values on others. The chapter offers a basic 
discussion and explication of the orientation, while addi­
tional discussion is reserved for Chapter VII.
Returning to the bases for the choice of a decision 
or goal orientation, ChapterVI examines an alternative 
"evolutionary-naturalistic" position which clearly runs 
counter to and is critical of the sceptic's view concerning 
facts as a basis for this choice. This position sees the 
justification of value systems as being strongly tied in an 
instrumental way to their functioning in promoting human 
survival and evolutionary development. Thus the basis for 
choosing a decision orientation is bio-social knowledge and 
wisdom. After the "evolutionary-naturalistic" view is ex­
plained, it is argued that while it is radically different 
from the sceptic's view, it also suggests the merit of the 
choice of the "optimization of alternatives for all indivi­
duals" as a decision or goal orientation for sociology.
19
Again, the work does not attempt to argue the preferability 
of either of the competing bases, but instead suggests that 
both are worthy of consideration and both support the pro­
posed orientation.
In addition to the basic rationales already offered, 
ChapterVII offers what are believed to be additional per­
suasive reasons for adopting the orientation. The orienta­
tion is further discussed with special reference to alter­
native orientations, its relationship to the discipline's 
epistemic ethic of "truth," and possible limitations and 
difficulties of the orientation as proposed.
It should be noted that while the proposed orientation 
is considered by the present author to be the most reasonable 
and advantageous open to sociology, it is only one alter­
native. It is presumed that other competing orientations 
will be advanced with differing rationales. The primary 
hope is that the orientation and its underlying rationales 
are explicated with sufficient clarity as to allow both its 
strengths and weaknesses to readily emerge in an ensuing 
debate.
In addition to the usual difficulties of untangling 
the issues, searching for the right words to allow simpli­
fication of issues without distorting them, etc., two 
particular difficulties encountered deserve special mention. 
First, while a specific gender has usually been avoided 
when referring to sociologists, our language often forces
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the use of gender to avoid the awkwardness of such phrases 
as "when he or she seeks his or her..." As a result, the 
convention of referring to sociologists as masculine was 
followed, and will hopefully he recognized as just that - 
an unfortunate convention. Perhaps a more serious 
difficulty is encountered in that in dealing with a topic 
as basic to the discipline as its values an exceedingly 
wide range of areas of knowledge and argument are relevant 
and must be referred to - many of which necessarily fall 
outside the writer's discipline and specialization. In 
short, what often here is given brief consideration would 
be the topic of volumes by those who specialize in those 
areas. As a result, the necessary breadth of the discussion 
may demand what may at times seem a cursory or not suffi­
ciently qualified discussion in the eyes of the specialists. 
It is assumed, however, that such basic and far-ranging 
discussions are necessary, even if they are inadequate in 
the eyes of some, and further that such inadequacies 




SOCIOLOGY AS A VALUE FREE OR VALUE NEUTRAL SCIENCE
While within the last decade there has heen some 
shift away from the idea that sociology should be extri­
cated from various value stances, there is little doubt 
that the value free position has been the dominant one 
in sociology for the last fifty years. Although the 
roots of this position could be traced to considerably 
earlier times, the basis for the value free position is 
usually considered to be "Science as a Vocation," a 
speech presented by Max Weber at Munich University in 
1918. At that time, Weber was upset by the practices of 
Privatdozents, who were a rough German equivalent to U.S. 
graduate assistants, but who were paid no salary other than 
the lecture fees received from their students. In 
particular, he saw the Privatdozents propounding religious 
and political views that were calculated to draw crowds 
rather than to instruct, and were better suited to 
political or religious leaders than teachers-scientists 
(Weber, 19^8). Further, Weber lived at a time when more 
established faculty were using the lecture halls as forums 
to bolster nationalism, monarchy, and various religious 
beliefs .
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When Max Weber began to reflect on his 
academic vocation, he was appalled by the 
fact that social sciences were dominated by 
men who saw it as their patriotic duty 
to defend the cause of the Reich and the 
Kaiser in their teachings and writings.
They oriented their research toward enhancing 
the fatherland. It is against their
prostitution of the scientific calling that
Weber directed his shafts (Coser, 19^9-13^-135) •
As a result, Weber strongly argued that the social
sciences must be directed toward knowledge rather than
toward bolstering one's political position. While
in a political forum it is quite proper to offer one's
position clearly, and as Weber says use words as "swords
against the enemies," as "weapons," it should be remembered
that these words are not at that time tools of scientific
analysis. "It would be an outrage, however, to use words
in such a fashion in a lecture or in the lecture room"
(Weber, 19^8:145). Just as the teacher should remain
a-political, so too should the teacher as scientist,
for knowledge is the aim of science (Weber, 1 9 ^ 8 :1 3 9 )*
and "whenever the man of science introduces his personal
value judgment, a full understanding of the facts ceases"
(Weber, 19^8:1^6). Similarly, men of science must also
remain silent on religious issues, and in a sense,
science must be "irreligious" (Weber, 19^8:1^2). This
stand, put forth by Weber, that social scientists should
seek knowledge and avoid personal value judgments, is a
germinal statement of the more elaborate and explicit
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value neutrality positions that have been put forth by
more contemporary sociologists.
This contemporary position of sociology being
"value free" or "value neutral" is at bottom quite
straightforward and these two terms clearly reflect the
nature of the position. Put most simply, it is argued
that sociology must deal solely with facts and knowledge,
be free of value judgments in its practice, and remain
neutral concerning the issue of which values ought to be
held. Bierstedt offers one of the clearest statements of
the position.
It {sociology] is a science or it is nothing.
And m  order to be a science it must diligently 
avoid all pronouncements of an ethical 
character. As a science it cannot answer 
questions of value. It can have no traffic with 
normative statements because there is no 
logic of the normative. It can deal, as can the 
other sciences, only with questions of fact, 
with propositions, with statements capable of 
being true or false. It cannot deal with 
questions of good or bad, better or worse, 
right or wrong, or any question at all con­
taining the word 'ought.' The sociologist, 
in company with his brother scientists, has 
taken seriously the famous remark of Jeremy 
Bentham, that the word 'ought' ought never to 
be used, except in saying that it ought never 
to be used (Bierstedt, 19^8:31)•
What the value free position presents is the model 
of the social scientist who deals strictly with the 
facts, and does not enter into the realm of value 
judgments. Generally, statements in explication and 
defense of this position (and discussion of the topic 
generally) make sweeping generalizations concerning the
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place of values in sociology without distinguishing what 
are two separate questions. One question that may he raised 
is whether or not values are or ought to be a part of the 
body of sociological knowledge. A second question which is 
separable from the first is whether or not values are or 
ought to be an integral part of the process of seeking know­
ledge and embedded within the profession's orientation to 
how the knowledge is to be used. Thus, for example, the 
value placed upon certain types of knowledge and uses of it 
need not imply that the body of knowledge is value laden 
or is value free. The two issues are distinguishable as we 
can see when we point out that a certain physicist holds 
strong negative values concerning the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons without implying that his knowledge of particle 
physics is faulty or that the knowledge has values embedded 
within it. Bierstedt and others seem to conflate the two 
issues when sliding from statements like "scientists cannot 
answer questions of value" to general prohibitions that 
sociologists ought never to use the word "ought." This work 
does not consider the question of whether the body of empir­
ical knowledge has or ought to have value claims embedded 
within it. Rather, it deals only with the question of the 
place of values in the process of seeking and employing it.
Coser (1968) suggests that the value free position and 
the idea that sociologists should not enter into the realm
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of value judgments are dominant in sociology. He cites
Professor Ralph Thomlinson arguing for the value free
science of sociology: "If we want to understand what
makes our social world go round, we must study human
"behavior with the same detachment as the chemist regarding
a reaction in the test tube" (in Coser, 1968:108). While
he would point out differences between sociology and the
natural sciences, Talcott Parsons is also cited by Coser as
agreeing with this dominant position in sociology, "when
he writes that the basic premise on which sociology
rests is value neutrality 'lending clear primacy to
the values of the intellectual enterprise as such and
refusing to let it be dominated by other values,
notably those, on the one hand, of immediate practical
interests, on the other hand, those of particular
'world views' at religious or political levels'"
(Coser, 1968:109).
Not only do those who are sympathetic to the view
of value neutrality assume it to be the dominant
position in sociology, so in fact do critics such as
Gouldner, even though they consider its attainability
to be mythical.
...the myth of a value free sociology has been 
a conquering one. Today, all the powers of 
sociology, from Parsons to Lundberg, have 
entered into a tacit alliance to bind us to the 
dogma that, 'Thou shalt not commit a value 
judgment,' especially as sociologists. Where is 
the sociologist, where is the introductory text­
book, the lecture on principles, that does not 
affirm or imply this rule? (Gouldner, 1962:199),
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Clearly since Gouldner's writing of this statement 
in 1962, there has been considerable criticism of the 
position and it no longer has (if it ever had) the 
unanimous support that Gouldner suggests. While the 
majority of sociologists probably still do hold some 
form of this position, it is unnecessary to argue the 
proportions. It is sufficient for present purposes to 
say that the position of value neutrality in sociology 
continues to be an important one which has a large number 
of adherents.
Related Positions
In the pure form in which it has been presented, as 
well as in some of its other formulations, the value free 
position may seem to suggest that the sociologist have 
nothing whatsoever to do with values. Consider, for 
example, the following implications for the practicing 
sociologist:
Although all of his evidence indicates that the 
inequality of the human races is a myth, he 
would be the first to publish any evidence 
which would lend scientific support to the 
biases of a bigot. He does not characterize 
as evil so fundamental a process as conflict 
and is not tempted to declare that the abolition 
of war is a social good. For his is the duty 
and the responsibility to study social phenomena 
objectively and without prejudice - without even 
those prejudices which are on the side of the 
angels (Bierstedt, 19^8:316).
Does this then mean that sociologists must enter 
into no relations with values in order to legitimately 
hold a position of value freedom? The several closely
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related and often conjoined positions to follow suggest 
that this is not the case.
Study of Values. While the value neutral position 
prohibits the employment of personal values in studying 
social phenomena, or in the use of knowledge produced by 
that study, this clearly does not prohibit the socio­
logist from studying the values that people hold. Thus, 
one can maintain a stance of ethical neutrality while 
studying the values of any culture, subculture, or 
aggregate of individuals. The position does not pro­
hibit the sociologist from studying what people say 
ought to be valued, but does prohibit him from stating 
whether what people say ought to be valued, ought to be 
valued.
Role Differentiation. One might well ask then, are 
there no ends which sociologists value - no social 
problems that sociologists consider to be more than 
problems for the discipline of sociology? In short, 
is the sociologist an amoral person? No it is argued 
in an accompanying position, one may hold a position of 
value neutrality for sociology and still remain a moral, 
ethical, and valuing person. This is argued to be 
possible through "role differentiation." The argument 
is that to be a sociologist is just one of many roles 
that a person plays (or takes) and in that role he acts 
differently than he would in other roles that he
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enters, such as father, committee chairperson, or
f r i e n d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  j u s t  a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  f o r  anyone e l s e ,
he has different expectations placed on him when acting
as  a  s o c i o l o g i s t  t h a n  when t a k i n g  o t h e r  r o l e s .  While
as a sociologist he must remain free of value judgments,
there is nothing that prohibits him from expressing,
utilizing, or actualizing his values in some other
r o l e  he m ig h t  t a k e .  F o r  example ,  t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t
is free to take value stands in the role of citizen.
S c i e n c e  and c i t i z e n s h i p  a r e  two d i f f e r e n t  
t h i n g s . While a  g i v e n  i n d i v i d u a l  may p l a y  
two d i f f e r e n t  r o l e s ,  t h a t  o f  s c i e n t i s t  and 
t h a t  o f  c i t i z e n ,  i t  i s  o f  v i t a l  im p o r ta n c e  
t h a t  he n o t  t r y  t o  p l a y  them b o t h  a t  once 
and t h a t  the  two r o l e s  be  n o t  c o n fu s e d  e i t h e r  
by  the  s c i e n t i s t  o r  by  th e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  
( B i e r s t e d t ,  1 9 ^ 8 :3 1 3 ) .
Thus, i t  i s  a rg u e d  t h a t  one can  t a k e  a  p o s i t i o n  
o f  s o c i o l o g i c a l  v a lu e  n e u t r a l i t y ,  and  s t i l l  employ v a l u e s  
i n  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  o n e ' s  l i f e .
Hauser (1 9 6 9) has recently argued along these 
lines that while taking a position on social, poli­
tical, or economic issues would compromise sociologists 
in their basic tasks of investigation and education, 
sociologists can appropriately "express their value 
judgments through many other channels without destroying 
the image of the craft of sociology, (and) dragging 
sociology as a profession into the heart of the 
political arena." Since a sociologist can be a good
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scientist even if he is a naive citizen, "to confuse 
his roles is to gain nothing while risking his potential 
to he an effective scientist. It is the task of the 
sociologist to illuminate rather than to exhort, to 
analyze rather than to prescribe, to delineate problem 
areas rather than to confront them" (Hauser, 1969:1^2).
What Hauser, and others, "exhort" and "prescribe," is 
that sociologists do not have to be value free people, 
but they must segment their lives, and while value 
judgments can quite rightly enter into other segments 
of their lives, in that segment called "sociology," 
they should rigorously be excluded.
Here it is demanded that sociologists should segment 
their lives into different roles. This segmentation of 
one's life can be criticized as not allowing sociologists 
to act as whole persons. Oddly, as Coser points out, it 
is often those sociologists who explain other areas of 
social life in terms of role theory, which has a basis 
in role differentiation, who at the same time deny the 
possibility of role differentiation for sociologists. 
Further, he argues against criticisms of segmentation, say­
ing:
What I have in mind is a tendency in some 
circles to demand a merging of the role of 
sociologist with that of citizen? the 
tendency to assert that anybody who insists 
on the specificity of the scholar's role is 
not a full and responsible citizen, or a 
whole human being. This, I submit, is utter 
nonsense. I am indeed committed to the
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calling of sociology, but I have never felt 
that the discipline claimed more from me than 
segmental participation. Science is not 
one of those institutions which claim the 
total man. I can be a devoted sociologist 
and a socialist, gardner, or what not 
(Coser, 1 9 6 9 5 1 3 6) .
While there may be disagreement as to the degree to which
an individual can actually (successfully) differentiate
between the roles he plays, there is no doubt that some
degree of differentiation is possible and not necessarily
unhealthy
This is not to say that role differentiation is always 
easy or possible for all types of roles. Hauser, who 
was cited earlier in this section, for example, not 
only argues for a differentiation between the roles of 
sociologist and citizen, but also between the roles 
of sociologist and "social engineer." Thus, while 
Hauser wishes to prohibit sociologists from making 
value judgments, he sees no difficulty in their doing 
so as "social engineers." For example, he himself 
"was drawn into activities which led directly to 
significant innovations such as the Social Security 
system, the Atomic Energy Commission,...the public 
housing and urban renewal programs," etc. (Hauser, 
1 9 6 9 5 1^5 )* Presumably those who hired him as 
"social engineer" did so because they viewed him as a 
sociologist, and not simply as a bright citizen.
Further, as "social engineer," he probably did
research that might be construed as part of the role
of the sociologist. Also, he presumably did not
carry a set of signs proclaiming "I am now a sociologist,"
and "I am now a social engineer," to inform those
with whom he interacted of what role he was playing.
If the sociologist/citizen dichotomy is a difficult 
one to maintain, clearly the sociologist/social engineer 
dichotomy is impossible. Incidently, Hauser offers no 
warrant for allowing "social engineers" the right to make 
value judgments while prohibiting sociologists from 
doing so.
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Hypothetical Value Statements. The two positions 
related to the basic value free stance already suggest 
two ways that the sociologist can legitmately stand in 
relation to values. He may study the values of others, 
or he may express value judgments in some other role such 
as that of citizen. But the question remains, can the 
sociologist as. sociologist deal with value judgments 
in any other way besides studying them? Yes, he can 
deal with value judgments in certain prescribed 
ways if they are not his own. In a sense, he can say 
that "if this is the goal or value that you hold, 
then this is the way that you can actualize it." In 
Weber's words, "If you take such and such a stand, then, 
according to scientific experience, you have to use such 
and such a means in order to carry out your convictions 
practicably." The sociologist can confront you 
with the question of whether or not ends are worth the 
"inevitable means," but he cannot choose between them 
for you (Weber, 19^8:151) • (Weber suggests that each 
end is attainable through only one necessary, "inevitable" 
means. However, some sociologists who hold this position 
would be likely to argue that several alternative means can 
be suggested for a particular end, from which one may choose.) 
By suggesting the means by which others can actualize their 
values, the sociologist works with value judgments without 
contradicting a position of value neutrality, in that
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. . .he n e ed  have n o t h i n g  t o  do w i t h  s e t t i n g  
t h e  g o a l s  t h e m s e l v e s ; h e  n e ed ,  as  a  
s c i e n t i s t ,  n e i t h e r  p r a i s e  them a s  good n o r  
condemn them as  h a d .  I t  i s  r e q u i r e d  o f  him 
o n l y  t o  p h r a s e  h i s  p rob lem  i n  s u c h  a  way 
t h a t  he may d e t e r m i n e ,  w i t h  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
knowledge and e x p e r i m e n t a l  t e c h n i q u e s  a t  h i s
command, what  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  do i n  o r d e r  to
a c h i e v e  t h e  g o a l  ( B i e r s t e d t ,  1 9 ^ 8 :3 1 7 ) .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  show ing  t h e  means by  which  h yp o ­
t h e t i c a l  g o a l s  and v a l u e s  m ig h t  be a c h i e v e d ,  i t  i s
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  th e  s o c i o l o g i s t  c an  s i m i l a r l y  p o i n t
o u t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  h o l d i n g  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s .  Thus, 
th e  s o c i o l o g i s t  can  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  " i f  you h o ld  t h e s e  
v a l u e s ,  t h e s e  con seq u e n ce s  w i l l  f o l l o w . "  R o b e r t  Merton 
a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  can be a  v a l u a b l e  s e r v i c e  p r o v i d e d  by 
t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t .
. . . n o t  a l l  c o n d i t i o n s  and p r o c e s s e s  i n i m i c a l  
t o  th e  v a l u e s  o f  men a r e  r e c o g n i z e d  as  such  
b y  them. I t  i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  th e  s o c i o l o g i s t  
t o  r e p o r t  t h e  human con seq u e n ce s  o f  h o l d i n g  
t o  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  and p r a c t i c e s ,  j u s t  a s  i t  
i s  h i s  f u n c t i o n  t o  d i s c o v e r  and r e p o r t  t h e  
human c o n seq u e n ce s  o f  d e p a r t i n g  from th e  
v a l u e s  and p r a c t i c e s  (Merton ,  i n  C o s e r ,  1 9 6 8 : 1 1 3 ) .
The v a l u e  f r e e  s o c i o l o g i s t  t h e n  i s  r e q u i r e d  to  be
f r e e  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  v a lu e  o f  e n d s ,  o r  th e
v a l u e  o f  means to  e n d s ,  b u t  can s t a t e ,  b a s e d  on h i s
knowledge ,  t h e  t y p e s  o f  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and
s t r u c t u r e s  ( i . e .  means)  t h a t  c o u ld  be u se d  t o  o b t a i n
t h e s e  e n d s . S i m i l a r l y ,  w h i l e  he i s  p r o h i b i t e d  from
making v a l u e  judgm ents ,  he can l e g i t i m a t e l y  p o i n t  o u t
t h e  b e h a v i o r a l  and s t r u c t u r a l  c o n seq u e n ce s  o f  h o l d i n g
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certain values. Finally, he can also point out other
implications, such as conflicts and contradictions
that arise in holding certain sets of values.
Knowledge for its own Sake. A position closely
related to that of ethical neutrality is the idea
that sociological knowledge should he sought for its
own sake, or that it is intrinsically valuable. It
should be pointed out that while writers often suggest
this position in arguing for value neutrality, objectivity,
etc., they do not do so exclusively, and at some point
in their arguments the position is usually modified
to suggest that knowledge will be useful in other ways,
and is not merely intrinsically valuable. Merton argues
that this conjoining of knowledge as ultimately useful
and as intrinsically valuable is an idea that underlies
all sciences, not simply the social sciences. He
points out that when asked of what use was one of his
discoveries, Franklin replied:
'What good is a newborn baby?' - a reply
echoed by Pasteur and Faraday in the
century to come. This attitude expresses 
a double confidence: that fundamental
scientific knowledge is a self-contained 
good and that, in any case, it will in due 
course lead to all manner of practical 
consequences serving the varied interests 
of men. There is both an intrinsic and 
ultimate rationale for basic science'
(Merton ,  1 9 6 3 : 8 6 ) .
The "ultimate benefit" rationale will be covered later,
but it is important to remember that in practice it
normally is presented in conjunction with the idea
3^
of "knowledge for its own sake." The two are separated 
here not only for the sake of exposition, hut also because 
they are analytically distinct.
That sociological knowledge is valuable for its 
own sake is central to the idea of value neutrality in 
two ways. First, it supports the neutrality position, for 
it allows the exclusion of all other ends or values toward 
which sociology might strive. If all other ends or values 
are excluded, and knowledge was not maintained to be in­
trinsically of value, it would be impossible to argue that 
sociology itself is of value and should therefore be support­
ed. The assumption that sociological knowledge is a self- 
contained good, then, provides a rationale for maintaining 
that the enterprise can be freed from other values, and 
still be legitimately pursued. Second, in addition to 
making the exclusion of other values tenable, the intrinsic 
value of knowledge further supports ethical neutrality in 
that ethical neutrality can be argued itself to be of value 
for it is said to lead to sociological knowledge. Thus, 
in this sense, value neutrality is of instrumental value 
leading to the intrinsic good of knowledge, due to the way 
the knowledge process is conceived and the way values may 
interfere with that process.
...human beings are seen as being essentially
passive receptors of the reality experienced
through their senses. Knowledge of what we
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consider to be external reality is something 
that happens to us. It happens best when 
the only inner desire that motivates our 
attention is our unfettered curiosity, that is, 
a concern for knowing reality in terms that 
are independent of any other concern. Thus 
we are exhorted to practice what is called 
'pure science,' the search for the truth for its 
own sake, which is regarded as an intrinsically 
valuable activity. In the context of this 
search, our voluntary activities must be 
restricted to actions which allow us to 
observe phenomena that concern us while 
interfering with them as little as possible.
In other words, we must become passive receptors, 
doing only whatever is necessary to let reality 
speak for itself (Biblarz, 1969:2) 2
Thus, holding the position that knowledge is an
intrinsic good supports the value neutral position,
as seen in the preceding statement, in that it argues
that knowledge is a product of value neutrality, and
also in that at the same time it allows sociological
knowledge to remain of value while other values are
removed.
As pointed out earlier, the position that knowledge 
ought to be sought for its own sake is seldom offered 
in pure form - probably because it is difficult to
2
This statement by Biblarz is generally a fair repre­
sentation of the conception of knowledge and its 
relation to other concerns or values. However, it 
probably also over-emphasizes passivity in knowledge 
processes, an over-emphasis which leads to the 
criticism that knowledge cannot be acquired totally 
passively. The over-emphasis stems from the failure to 
distinguish between two types of activity: activity 
aimed solely at gathering knowledge and activity that is 
directed toward ends other than knowledge ("action"). 
Clearly, the operationalist is by definition not passive, 
yet he is also ideally motivated by "a concern for 
knowing reality in terms that are independent of any 
other concerns." Thus, he is only required to be passive 
in terms of those "other concerns."
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present a strong and convincing argument in its favor.
When one states that knowledge is sought for its own sake, 
one is implying that knowledge is of value or is of the 
highest value. Thus the idea that knowledge is intrinsic­
ally valuable may perhaps best be considered an assertion 
or assumption of value, and although arguments might be 
presented for it, these arguments are not without logical 
difficulties.
For example, one might argue that knowledge is intrin­
sically valuable in that it satisfies some sort of curiosity 
need. This line of reasoning is of couse self-contradictory 
in that one cannot posit that the intrinsic value of know­
ledge is derived from something extrinsic to it, such as a 
curiosity need. It could be suggested in rebuttal that 
there is no contradiction in that curiosity is not extrinsic 
to knowledge, but rather is the root or cause of knowledge 
and therefore is intrinsic to knowledge - in short, an 
inherent part of knowledge. Put another way, knowledge is 
not simply answers: questions are equally an inherent part 
of knowledge. Thus, curiosity, as the question, is intrin­
sic to knowledge. However, if this is the case, all that 
is really argued is that knowledge is intrinsically 
valuable because part of it is. Or in another form, 
knowledge is of value because it is of value.
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Other similar arguments could be mustered for 
knowledge for its own sake, such as "it is exciting," 
or "it makes our lot in life easier to bear if we under­
stand it," or "it makes one a whole person," etc. All such 
arguments suggest that there are other values that are 
placed above knowledge, and which knowledge is instrumental 
in achieving, and thus knowledge is not truly sought for its 
own sake. In fact, it is some other end which is sought, 
and the question as to whether it can be attained by know­
ledge or can better be reached through some other means
3
still remains unanswered.
Ultimately, the idea that sociological knowledge 
ought to be sought for its own sake is probably best 
considered an assertion or assumption which is based on 
the belief that knowledge is intrinsically valuable.
It is best considered an assumption for* (1) if one 
argues that its value is derived from something extrin-
3
-'Other arguments for seeking knowledge for its own sake 
may include a hidden circularity. Although it is 
included among other arguments, and not offered pre­
cisely for this purpose, an instructive example is 
suggested by Bendix (1970). It may be abstracted as 
follows: (1) the academic has a kind of political 
immunity which allows him to seek knowledge freely 
in that he has made an implied commitment to remain 
a-political - that is not to seek knowledge for ends 
other than for its own sake. (2) If the academic 
becomes political, that immunity will be lost, and thus 
others may intervene into the knowledge process and he 
will not be able to seek knowledge freely. (3) Therefore, 
knowledge should be sought for its own sake. Probably 
underlying the argument preceding statement (1) is the 
implicit statement, "knowledge is intrinsically valuable
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sic to it, it is no longer intrinsically valued; and on 
the other hand, (2) if one argues that it is intrinsically 
valuable because something intrinsic to it is valuable, 
then the argument is tautological. However, as suggested 
earlier, the "knowledge for its own sake" position is 
important for both understanding and assessing the merits 
of the value neutral position.
To assess the merits of the value neutral position in 
sociology, we must ask is sociology really free of values 
other than the value of knowledge for its own sake, or 
can it be, or ought it to be? To the extent that sociology 
is oriented toward values or directed toward ends other 
than sociological knowledge, we can say that it is not 
now value free or value neutral. To the same extent that 
sociology is likely in the future to seek ends other than 
pure sociological knowledge, it is also likely in the future 
not to be free of values.
and ought to be sought for its own sake." Inclusion of 





It will be argued here that the value free or 
value neutral position is unacceptable for several 
reasons. While a strict interpretation of the term 
"value free" may seem to imply that sociology is or 
ought to be free of all values, this clearly is not 
the intent of those who argue for the value free 
position. Specifically, at any point in time 
sociology may be conceived of as an imperfect body of 
knowledge. It is quite consistent with this position 
to hold or utilize in the practice of sociology either 
of two types of values: a meta-value of truth-seeking 
(the perfection of that body of knowledge), or values 
in seeking knowledge that are dictated by the discipline's 
conception of truth. Thus, for example, it would seem 
unfair and/or inaccurate to criticize one who holds a 
position of value freedom for claiming (1) that he 
values sociological knowledge, or (2) that he values 
one method more than another because it seems likely 
to increase sociological knowledge. It seems equally 
unreasonable to demand of a sociologist who maintains 
this position, that he currently be totally free of 
all extrinsic values, or that he prove that he or the
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profession will be free of values, just as it is 
unreasonable to ask him to prove that the body of 
sociological knowledge will be perfected. It does, 
however, seem reasonable to criticize this position 
if sociology is, and seems likely in all probability to 
remain, to an important degree not value free.
In particular, it is argued that the body of 
sociological knowledge is not itself the product of 
values that are solely intrinsic to that body of 
knowledge. Rather, it is a product of knowledge pro­
cesses that are, and with high probability will continue 
to be, directed by extrinsic values. Second, sociologi­
cal knowledge is not, and probably will not remain, 
neutral as to the values which direct its use. In 
short, knowledge is sought and employed to ends other 
than pure knowledge. To the extent that these claims
are true, sociology is not and is not likely to be 
1
value free. It is therefore argued that the value free 
position, as it is currently expressed, is inadequate 
as a reflection of current and probable future 
sociology, and as a way of dealing with extrinsic value
Although,as Dewey and Humber (I966t647) point out, there 
is a group of writers who argue that social scientists 
"...will, inescapably, make such value judgments," here 
it is argued only that they are likely to do so with high 
probability, rather than that they must "inescapably" 
do so. Arguing that sociologists must make value judg­
ments implies that there is something inherent in doing 
sociology that demands them. Any such argument would
4-1
orientations which are likely to continue to exist in 
sociology.2
Extrinsic Values Employed in the Knowledge Process
At numerous points in the knowledge process, the 
number of alternative ways of seeking knowledge that 
are open to the sociologist may be in part delimited on 
the basis of knowledge concerns - the state of the body 
of sociological knowledge, valued means believed to be 
likely to lead to knowledge, etc. However, such in­
trinsic "pure knowledge" values, are usually only cap­
able of partial delimitation of the alternatives 
available. Choice between the remaining alternatives de­
mands reference to other personally or socially held value 
judgments which are not implied by pure knowledge concerns.
probably at best be a tautology, where the necessity of 
value judgments is derived from the chosen definition 
of sociology. Thus, we settle for attempting to demon­
strate that there is a high degree of probability that 
value judgments will be employed in sociology. Just as 
it was conceded that it seems unreasonable to demand that 
it be demonstrated that sociology can be completely freed 
of values, it seems equally unreasonable to demand proof 
that sociology must inescapably (always) employ value 
judgments. 
o
Most simply, the position to be presented is that although 
it is conceivable that the employment of non-epistemic 
values in sociology will cease at some future date, this 
seems unlikely and therefore these values must be dealt 
with. The nature of the argument can be made clear in an 
analogy to sexual relations. While it is conceivable that 
at some future time everyone will decide not to indulge in 
sex, it seems highly unlikely. Given the existence of 
sexual relations now, and their high probability in the 
future, a prescription not to engage in sexual relations 
would not only inadequately reflect present and future 
behavior, but would also be of little use in deciding 
what are the best means of sexual expression.
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For example, one must choose a general problem area 
from the extremely large number of problems encompassed 
within the boundaries of sociology. The body 
of sociological theory, as well as the available data, 
both suggest and limit the possible number of problem 
areas that ought to be investigated, such as the nature 
of conflict, problems of social structure and social 
process, the problem of how social order is possible, 
etc. Yet as even a sociologist who defends the value 
neutral position suggest, knowledge concerns do not 
fully delimit the alternatives, and "... of those that 
are susceptible to scientific explanation, it is a 
matter of nonscientific decision that some ought to be 
investigated first and others at a later and more pro­
pitious time" (Bierstedt, 19^8:318). Other value 
judgments must be employed, for at a given point in 
time many issues will be viewed by the individual 
sociologist or the profession as being of equal theoretical 
importance. Also, it is no simple matter to determine 
the relative importance of the alternative problem areas 
to the body of knowledge as a whole, and as a result, 
the choice between them is more a function of other values 
than of careful weighing of their import to, and impact 
on, the knowledge system.
Similarly, once a problem is chosen it may be 
translated into an extremely wide number of substantive 
areas, and these alternatives are only partially delimited
k-3
by methodological concerns and theoretic applicability. 
Choosing to seek knowledge in the area of race relations 
rather than sex roles, creativity rather than conformity, 
the sociology or religion rather than the sociology of 
work, or any choice between such disparate areas as 
social stratification, the family, the sociology of 
war, and criminology, demands value judgments that are 
not implied by pure knowledge concerns.
Which general method or particular technique is 
chosen in seeking sociological knowledge is also only 
partly directed by pure knowledge concerns, such as the 
ability of the sociologist to meet the assumptions of the 
method or the extent to which the method is believed to 
be likely to lead to truth. Again, several options may 
be scientifically satisfactory, and the choice between 
them must be made on the basis of other values. Often which 
method is chosen is due to extrinsic concerns such as the 
use to which the knowledge will likely be put. Thus, 
while theoretical concerns may be satisfied by a fairly 
low degree of generalizability possessed by numerous 
methods, one method offering greater generalizability 
may be chosen if applicability (usefulness of findings) 
is a major concern. Similarly, a more stringent "level 
of significance" may be chosen than is demanded for 
simple theory testing if confidence in the findings is 
important for extra-theoretical reasons (as is the case
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in testing drugs). In fact, not only are extrinsic
values often necessary in the choice of methods and
techniques, they are often given priority over pure
knowledge values. Consider this statement by Gray,
offered in another connection:
But one should note that German physicians who 
systematically froze human beings in tubs of 
ice, and, in the conduct of sterilization 
experiments, sent electrical charges through 
female ovaries were quite useful to the Nazi 
regime. While some of these examples might 
seem extreme, one must recognize nonetheless 
that the behavior of these German scientists 
falls quite within the limits of the value 
free model offered (Gray, 1 9 6 8 :1 7 9 ) •
While Gray is quite correct in pointing out that 
the value free position must remain silent concerning 
such methods of gaining knowledge, it is equally 
instructive to remember that the vast majority of 
sociologists would not perform similar research even 
if their societies allowed them to. Also, while it has 
been suggested that a difficulty for sociology is the 
inability to conduct many societal level experiments that 
would provide important tests, because they are pro­
hibited by society (Nagel, 1 9 6 1 :4-50-4-51), many socio­
logists would not perform many of these tests due to 
their value commitments, even if they were permitted 
to do so by society. Thus, on many occasions the method 
most clearly suggested by pure knowledge concerns 
would be ruled out by other value judgments made by
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the sociologist. In the case of the choice of methods, 
then, the sociologist is not only not value neutral, 
hut certain value judgments are given precedence over 
knowledge concerns. If this were not the case, any 
method of seeking knowledge would he preferred to for­
going that knowledge, even if a particular method 
entailed death, suffering, or the violation 
of some other deeply held value.
At a more general level, the Code of Ethics of the 
American Sociological Association suggests that many 
extra-epistemic values are given precedence over 
knowledge concerns. Some values that are stated or 
implied in the Code are that the sociologist should:
(1) respect the right of privacy of subjects, (2) 
respect the right of confidentiality of subjects, (3) 
avoid personal harm to subjects, and ( f y ) avoid misin­
terpretation of his abilities (abstracted from Dorn 
and Long, 197^:33)* If ethical prescriptions such as 
these are taken seriously, presumably one would not 
violate them even if a loss of knowledge were the 
cost. For example, sociologists should "refuse to 
accept grants or contracts if such an acceptance would 
mean violation of ethical principles" (in Dorn and Long, 
197^03) • It would seem that such ethical principles are 
given precedence over knowledge - certainly they are 
given a co-equal status with epistemic values.
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Extra-epistemic values also come into play in 
terms of the choices as to how to disseminate the know­
ledge obtained. It may be argued that the future growth 
of the body of knowledge itself dictates that the know­
ledge obtained be published in certain sociological 
journals and not in others, in that their readerships 
are most likely to elaborate and extend this knowledge. 
However, the choice must at least be made whether or not 
to disseminate the information and theory to a wider 
audience. Whether parts of that body of knowledge 
should be popularized and presented to the general 
public is not a choice that can be made without reference 
to values that lie outside that body. Clearly, the decision 
to insure that one particular group, such as the military, 
a governmental body, or persons on welfare, is given 
access to sociological information, also demands reference 
to extra-epistemic values. Further, even the decision 
of whether or not to disseminate research findings 
within the discipline (consider the Jensen (1 9 6 9) study 
on black IQ) may have to be made in light of whether 
presumed outcomes of the findings, should they become 
generally known outside the discipline, were valued.
In short, there are many choices that must be made con­
cerning dissemination of the body of knowledge, which 
the body of knowledge cannot dictate.
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At the most general level, it may be argued that 
the epistemological process within sociology demands that 
non-epistemic values are and will be included if know­
ledge is to be efficiently and effectively sought.
First, it has been argued forcefully (primarily by those 
of a phenomenological and ethnomethodological bent) that 
gaining valid sociological knowledge of all kinds, and 
in particular gaining knowledge of experience, demands 
subjective involvement with those studied. The sub­
jective involvement which would allow an "inside track" 
to knowledge demands that the sociologist adopt and share 
the meanings, interests, and values of the studied group. 
According to this view, then, the sociologist will have 
to adopt a set of values in the pursuit of knowledge, and 
it seems likely that a large number of sociologists will 
continue to do this. (While a large number of sociologists 
could be cited in this connection, a clear presentation of 
the arguments is found in Phillips, 1971» particularly 
pp. 12^-160). Second, while Biblarz was cited in Chapter 
II as pointing out that the "value free" position rests 
on a conception of the knowledge process which is passive, 
he also points out that there exists an alternative more 
active view of how the knowledge process operated.
This alternative view sees humans as entities 
which exist in an environment with which they 
continuously interact, so that they are never 
passive receptors of experience. Reality is
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discovered in the context of acting within it 
for human (that is, value laden) purposes 
and human beings learn about the world by 
changing it or failing to change it; in the pro­
cess they also change themselves (Biblarz, 1969 0)*
This view of the epistemological process does not 
seem unreasonable, and as a result sociologists are 
likely to recognize that sociological knowledge is not 
the result of simple passive receptivity, but of 
sociological action. If knowledge continues to be sought 
by means of action, that is, behavior that is directed 
by values and value actualization, extra-epistemic values 
are likely to play a very significant role in the know­
ledge process .
To briefly summarize, at innumerable points in the 
knowledge process in which decisions must be made, extra- 
epis temic value judgments must be relied upon in making 
the final decision. It could be argued that many of these 
decisions are not based so much on beliefs as to what 
ought to be done, or is right, or is good, but rather are 
made on the basis of other factors such as simple personal 
preference, habit, paths of least resistance, or conformity 
to social convention. Thus for example, the choice of an 
individual sociologist to disseminate knowledge through a 
particular journal may be due to previous success in getting 
articles published, the journal's prestige, and the fact 
that respected colleagues have published there. While it 
may be admitted that factors such as these which we may not 
call strictly value judgments may often enter into individual
9^decision making, and even may be totally responsible for the 
decision made, such an admission does not seriously weaken 
the line of reasoning as a whole. First, while such factors 
may be seen as playing a role in many of these personal 
decisions, higher level value questions also usually play a 
major role in legitimating these factors (for example the 
question of the value of the social conventions, or his or 
her preferences). Second, while value judgments may not be 
made every time a decision is made, at some point basic 
questions such as the value of disseminating information 
to a wider public or merely to other professionals must be 
addressed in terms of the value of the general activity. 
Third, such decision making within major areas of choice 
does not take place solely, or perhaps even primarily, at 
the level of the individual, but rather at the level of 
the profession as a whole and major sub-groups within it. 
Such decision making usually demands evaluation that cannot 
be said to be a summation of mere personal preferences 
but takes into account what future professional directions 
are to be valued. Even professional conventions do not 
remain eternally unchallenged, but are from time to time 
evaluated and as a result justified and strengthened or 
found unjustified and modified or rejected. The point is 
that while the extra-epistemic decisions at numerous 
points in the knowledge process may be agreed to include 
factors and criteria which are not strictly evaluative,
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reference to values plays a highly significant role and 
seems likely to continue to do so.
Further, while various parts of the knowledge process 
have been treated separately for the sake of exposition, 
it should be noted that of course the parts of the 
knowledge process are interdependent, and choices made on 
the basis of value judgments will be reflected in other 
parts of the knowledge process as well. Since the value 
free position must necessarily remain silent regarding 
the choice of extra-epistemic values, it is useless in 
aiding and evaluating the choices that demand such values. 
It is similarly untenable in terms of the uses of socio­
logical knowledge, once obtained.
Values and the Use of Sociological Knowledge
As the body of sociological knowledge becomes 
increasingly refined, the possibilities for use of that 
body also increase. To the extent that this body of 
knowledge is used or applied, choices are made which 
involve extra-epistemic values. It is argued here, 
in similar fashion to the preceding section on the 
processes of seeking knowledge, that sociological 
knowledge is, and will likely continue to be, used to 
an important degree; as a result, the value neutrality 
position is neither reflective of, not adequate for 
dealing with, the situation.
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Necessary to the application of sociological know­
ledge is the ability to control. Again, in order to 
accurately represent the value neutral position, we 
must make at least one general distinction between 
the two major senses in which the term "control" is 
used. The first sense is that which we normally meet 
in introductory textbooks describing the goals of 
science as "explanation, prediction, and control."
In this sense the ability to control phenomena is 
sought not for its own sake but for the sake of testing 
the accuracy of a theory or explanation. To the extent 
that one is able to manipulate phenomena in a manner 
implied by the theory, it can be said that one's explan­
ation probably has some validity. If a sociologist 
seeks the ability to control solely as a means of testing 
his knowledge, we can say that his actions are dictated 
by epistemic concerns and that he has not himself 
violated the value free stance.
However, if the sociologist seeks to control 
phenomena for some other end than the test of theory, 
we can say that he is no longer following the dictates 
of value neutrality. In this second sense, then, the 
term "control" refers to manipulation of a phenomenon 
either by changing it from its present state or allowing 
the continuance of its present state, in light of some 
other valued end.^
3The term "control" will henceforth be used in this 
second, non-epistemic sense, unless clearly specified.
52
Of course, the two types of control are not unrelated. 
As control as a test of explanation improves, so does the 
possibility of using knowledge in other ways not dictated 
by knowledge values. In short, control can be more readily 
employed to achieve other ends.
It is perhaps for this reason, coupled with the 
recognition of the growth of the body of sociological 
knowledge, that concern has been expressed (as we shall see 
on the following pages) over current and future misuse of 
sociological knowledge and its resulting control capabil­
ities . Although there is considerable disagreement as to 
what constitutes misuse, there certainly seems to be a 
unifying concern about the ends to which sociological know­
ledge is put.
It is not argued here that knowledge will likely be 
misused, for what constitutes misuse depends upon the orien­
tation employed to evaluate the various uses. It is simply 
argued that sociological knowledge is likely to be used, 
and that the decisions as to whether or not to use socio­
logical knowledge at any particular time, and to employ it 
one way and not another, imply value choices - even if 
those values choices are not made explicit,
Before proceding, it should be pointed out that one 
may feel that any concern over the use of sociological 
knowledge may be premature or exaggerated in that the 
body of knowledge has not arrived at sufficient maturity 
to allow any significant degree of control. Raymond
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Bauer argues along these lines with reference to dis­
cussions of social responsibility within psychology, 
claiming that members of that discipline overstate 
their actual or potential power to manipulate human 
behavior (1 9 6 5). Citing such examples of overstatement 
in discussions of brainwashing and Yance Packard's 
Hidden Persuaders (1957)» Bauer argues that while there 
are dangers of abuse of psychological knowledge, these
should not be overstated and unrealistic dangers ima- 
kg m e d . As a result, psychologists should be 
"responsibly responsible" rather than"pseudo-respons- 
ible" - that is, discussions should deal with realistic 
rather than fanciful dangers (Bauer, 19&5) • Similarly, 
discussions of the potential misuses of sociological 
knowledge may be overstated as they have been in psych­
ology. Although one might contend that in the case of 
both disciplines there is little danger of being over­
cautious, Bauer counters that there are several ill- 
effects of such discussions.
The furor over 'hidden pursuasion' created a 
market for a considerable amount of bad research... 
The result of this, in turn, was to create 
disillusion and confusion in the ranks of lay­
men who had contact with this research. Visions
Bauer suggests an interesting - if undocumented - explan­
ation of the motivation of these discussions; "The only 
interpretation that I can put on the preference for the 
discussion of fanciful over realistic dangers is that they 
must serve some special need which, in turn, I infer to 
be enhancement of our egos as psychologists via an image 
of political omnipotence" (1965s51)*
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of the use of the social sciences for totali­
tarian control have caused us difficulties in the 
halls of Congress. Perhaps more serious and 
general is the impact of such discussions 
on reinforcement of the public image of 
psychologists as dangerous and untrustworthy 
(Bauer, 1 9 6 5s51)-
Just as Bauer claims that the discussion of the 
misuses of psychological knowledge are overstated, so too 
it can "be claimed that Bauer overstates the ill-effects of 
these discussions "in the halls of Congress" and elsewhere. 
While there is a danger of creating unfounded fear or 
hope through overstatement, sociological and psycholo­
gical knowledge is, and will in all probability con­
tinue to be, used. Sociological control capabilities, 
while clearly not Orwellian in nature, and while in 
infancy compared to those of the natural sciences, will 
be refined and should be recognized. Further, even 
given that current control capabilities are comparatively 
limited in all the social sciences.
...the issue of the control of behavior must 
be put into a broader time perspective...
If we put our research efforts in the longer 
context of the age of "the earth, the age of 
man, the age of psychology as a science, then 
it would seem clear that the scientific inform­
ation required for effective behavior control 
will probably be a reality in a relatively 
short period of time, be it 10, 20, or 100 
years (Krasner, 1965*12).
Still further, even if the time span for "effective"
behavioral control in deemed distant, sociological
knowledge may now be used for extra-epistemic ends
even if that knowledge is highly imperfect, and its
resulting effectiveness highly limited.
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S o c i o l o g i c a l  know ledge, th e n ,  h a s  some l i m i t e d  
c a p a c i t y  f o r  use  c u r r e n t l y ,  and  more e f f e c t i v e  c a p a b i l ­
i t i e s  may be presum ed t o  e x i s t  i n  th e  f u t u r e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e r e  h a s  e x i s t e d  a  c e r t a i n  d e g re e  o f  l e g i t i m a c y  i n  
s o c i o lo g y  b o th  f o r  s e e k in g  " u s e f u l "  know ledge, and f o r  
s o c i o l o g i s t s  d i r e c t l y  em ploy ing  t h a t  know ledge th e m s e lv e s .  
T his i d e a  t h a t  i t  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  to  employ s o c i o l o g i c a l  
knowledge f o r  e x t r a - e p i s t e m i c  e n d s ,  w h i le  h o t l y  c o n ­
t e s t e d ,  does  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a  number o f  s o c i o l o g i s t s  
would have b e en  w i l l i n g  to  use  s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge 
i f  g iv e n  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y .
I n  f a c t ,  th e  i d e a  o f  p u t t i n g  s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge 
to  u se  i s  n o t  a  r e c e n t  one: i t  h a s  b e e n  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  
e a r l y  s o c i o l o g i s t s  s o u g h t  s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge i n  
o r d e r  to  u se  i t  f o r  w hat t h e y  c o n s id e r e d  to  be th e  
b e t t e r m e n t  of s o c i e t y .  B raude v iew s th e  h i s t o r y  o f  
s o c io lo g y  i n  t h i s  way: " . . . s o c i o lo g y  was b o rn  o u t  o f  th e  
d e s i r e  to  p r o t e s t  a s  w e l l  a s  d i s c o v e r .  The W ards, th e  
Sim m els, th e  P a rk s ,  and even  th e  W ebers, c o u ld  n o t  se e  
knowledge a p a r t  from  a c t i o n ;  th e  v i t a  c o n te m p la t iv a  was 
c o te rm in o u s  w i th  th e  v i t a  a c t i v a " (B raude , 1 9 6 4 :3 9 7 ) -  
Many s o c i o l o g i s t s  o f  th e  s u c c e e d in g  g e n e r a t i o n  a l s o  saw 
s o c i o lo g y  a s  p r o d u c in g  u s a b le  know ledge, saw s o c i o l o g i s t s  
as  s o c i a l  e n g i n e e r s ,  and  fo u n d ed  such  j o u r n a l s  a s  S o c i a l  
Hygiene ( 1 9 1 6 ) ,  i n  w hich  s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge was 
a p p l i e d  to  i s s u e s  o f  " s o c i a l  h e a l t h  and m o r a l i t y . "
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More recently, in the forties, Lynd in his now famous 
book Knowledge for What (19^8), renewed the call for 
sociological knowledge to be used directly to deal with 
social ills. Lundberg (19^7)> while considerably more 
positivistic than Lynd, and differing in other signifi­
cant ways, also urged in Can Science Save Us? sociology 
to be applied to solving social problems. Even Bierstedt, 
after arguing strongly for the value free and role 
differentiation positions presented earlier, surprising­
ly concludes that sociology should be used for extra- 
epistemic purposes:
Finally, it is time for the scientist to 
acknowledge that the ultimate test of his 
activity lies in the social use and consequence 
of his conclusions. Whatever freedom the 
sociologist may achieve from the exigencies 
of time and circumstance, it is still important, 
and now more than ever before, to narrow the 
gap between the discovery of new principles 
and their application to the sphere of human 
relations. Society should not be the victim 
of a cultural lag between sociological know­
ledge and social use. No scientific scruples, 
therefore, as important as those scruples are 
should delay a constantly increasing sensi­
tivity to the social role of social science 
(Bierstedt, 19^8:318) .
The calls for sociological knowledge to be used, 
or to be developed that it may be put to use, are still 
heard, and are likely to continue. Tarter (1973)» for 
example,calls for increasing interest and work in the 
area of developing social technologies, and for socio­
logists to become social technologists. The goal is a
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planned society, with behavior changes in "desired" 
directions. Unfortunately, Tarter, like most of his 
predecessors, neglects to inform his readers as to 
what ends the society is planned for, or what the 
desired directions of social changes might be. He 
nonetheless proudly proclaims that "...not only will 
the social technologist be part experimental psychologist, 
he will also be part architect. Techniques of social 
intervention will be aimed primarily at direct manage­
ment of environmental dimensions of human existence" 
(Tarter, 1973 *-57).
Articles and books, such as those mentioned, pro­
claiming that sociological knowledge ought to be sought 
for its usefulness, and then employed, may no longer 
be necessary. Sociological knowledge is already being 
sought for use and used both by (1) sociologists 
themselves, and (2) others outside of sociology.
The fact that sociologists are seeking employable 
knowledge, and using their techniques for a wide 
variety of purposes, is being increasingly recognized.
It is not surprising that those who are most vocal and 
insistent in their recognition of the extent to which 
sociologists are employing knowledge for non-epistemic 
ends, are those who are critical of the values that 
direct its use. Thus Birnbaum points out that the 
primary political criticism of sociology comes from 
the left, and that this position is clear:.
S o c io lo g y  i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  form  h as  i r r e d u c i b l e  
i d e o l o g i c a l  com ponents . . .  These i d e o l o g i c a l  
com ponents a r e  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  
e le m e n ts !  s o c i o l o g i s t s  have  become a n c i l l a r y  
a g e n t s  o f  pow er, by  p e r f o r m in g  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
s e r v i c e  f o r  p u rp o s e s  o f  d o m in a t io n ,  e x p l o i t ­
a t i o n ,  and m a n ip u la t io n  (B irnbaum , 1971*73*0*
Thus, s o c i o l o g i s t s  a r e  s e e n  a s  u s i n g  te c h n iq u e s
f o r  g a t h e r i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  th e  s e r v i c e  o f  e l i t e s .
The t h r u s t  o f  t h i s  a t t a c k  from  th e  l e f t  i s  t h a t
s o c i o l o g i s t s  a re  s e e k i n g  knowledge w hich  can  be u sed
i n  d i r e c t  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  o r d e r  by
p r o v i d in g  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  a g e n c ie s  and c o r p o r a t i o n s
f o r  whom t h e y  a re  em ployed, a c t  a s  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  o r
do s o l i c i t e d  r e s e a r c h .
H e n c e fo r th  th e  i n s p i r a t i o n  o f  s o c i o lo g y  w i l l  
a lw ays be more r e s p o n s i v e  to  th e  s o c i a l  
demand f o r  a  n a t i o n a l i s t  p r a c t i c e  t o  s e rv e  
b o u r g e o i s  ends*, money, p r o f i t ,  and th e  m a in ­
t e n a n c e  o f  o r d e r .
E v id e n ce  a b o u n d s .  I n d u s t r i a l  s o c i o lo g y  
s e e k s  above a l l  th e  a d ju s tm e n t  o f  th e  w o rker  
t o  h i s  jo b .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  any  o t h e r  
a p p ro a c h  i s  l i m i t e d ,  s i n c e  th e  s o c i o l o g i s t  
who r e c e i v e s  a  s a l a r y  from  management m ust 
r e s p e c t  th e  g o a l  o f  th e  econom ic sys tem s 
to  p ro d u ce  a s  much as  p o s s i b l e  i n  o r d e r  to  
make a s  much money as  p o s s i b l e  (C o h n -B en d it  
e t  a l ,  1 9 6 8 : 5 ^ )  ■
C o h n -B e n d it  e t  a l  (1968:5*0') o f f e r  o t h e r  e v id e n c e  o f
s o c i o l o g i s t s  s e e k in g  know ledge, w hich  t h e y  v iew  as
aim ed a t  s e r v i n g  b o u r g e o i s  and n a t i o n a l i s t  en d s ,
su c h  a s  p ro p ag a n d a  r e s e a r c h  i n  p o l i t i c a l  s o c io lo g y ,
S t o u f f e r ' s  A m erican  S o l d i e r , and r e s e a r c h  f o r  th e
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advertising industry.
Regardless of whether one agrees as to the values 
that orient the use for which sociological knowledge 
is "being sought, it does indeed seem often to be sought 
for specific application. While directly applicable 
knowledge probably is sought to an even greater extent 
in the natural sciences, the sciences in general have 
emphasized applied over basic research. Bendix (1970:8^0) 
reports that in the United States in 1966, 3 . 2  billion 
dollars were spent on basic research while 18.9 billion 
were spent for applied research and development.
Presumably, sociology in the future, after a sufficient 
expansion of the basic knowledge base, will approximate 
the proportion of applied to basic research in the natural 
sciences.^ There seems even now to be an increase in 
the number of research grants that are requested or 
solicited by granting agencies (as opposed to those 
submitted, unsolicited, by sociologists); this suggests, 
if the trend continues, that knowledge will increasingly 
be sought to serve values besides the epistemic ones 
of the researcher-sociologist.
To return to the critique from the left, it is
■5Of course this does not mean that basic knowledge cannot 
be sought when doing applied research, but it does mean 
that applicability criteria must be satisfied for a 
project to be funded as "applied."
6o
argued that sociologists do not merely seek knowledge
that is useful, but that they seek knowledge that is
specifically useful to the establishment. This, it is
claimed, is due to the fact that either sociologists
agree with establishment values, or, more benignly,
the knowledge process has financial costs that can only
be satisfied by the establishment.
The profession as a whole is primarily geared 
to the service of existing power. Most socio­
logists have learned to do research that 
depends on the availability of relatively 
large sums of money, and it is obvious that 
these sums cannot come from the poor (Biblarz,
1969:^ ) .
In addition to seeking knowledge that is useful to 
those in power, sociologists are charged by the critics 
with actively engaging in using that knowledge themselves. 
As openings for sociologists increase in agencies, 
industry, and research organizations that deal with 
social planning, sociologists are actively employing 
sociological knowledge more extensively than before.
Thus, Gray (1968:180) argues that sociologists who profess 
value freedom have really become " .. .professional hand 
maidens of the going value system...No longer truly 
intellectual, they have assumed a new role as employees, 
consultants, or technicians serving the present 
establishment.” As a result, Gray suggests remedial
/r
action in terms of the sociologist suggesting policy.
Oddly, in attempting to show that one can make value
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Put most simply, critics see sociologists in their
employment of sociological knowledge as intellectual
policemen. This description may perhaps he applied
most tellingly to those involved in evaluation research,
where the primary goal is the determination of the
effectiveness of some social program in reaching some
goals set by those who establish it in reference to some
target population. Caro, who is sympathetic to evaluation
research, recognizes this characterization, but points
out that evaluation researchers themselves consider it to
be inaccurate.
Where action programs are carried out by a 
formal organization, evaluative research is 
most commonly sponsored by external funding 
sources and/or top administrators ... Those who 
actually carry out programs to be evaluated 
tend to be subordinate to those to whom evaluative 
researchers report. Although this structural 
arrangement put the evaluation researcher in 
the same organizational position as an in­
spector or a policeman, evaluative researchers 
insist their role is quite different. Thus 
Likert and Lippit emphasize '...that the 
objective of the research is to discover the
judgments and remain scholarly, Gray (1968:180) suggests 
the following, apparently as a legitimate way in which to 
employ values in guiding social policy:
Likewise, if the social scientist sees in his data 
an impending racial crisis is he (or his data? or 
sociology? or science?) in any way compromised 
should he attempt to convince the city authorities 
to take certain measures for the good of all urban 
residents concerned? Obviously not. To be 
responsible has always been a virtue VT
Undoubtedly, some black radicals would not consider this 
stance too far removed from being a "professional hand 
maiden of the going value system'."
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relative effectiveness of different methods 
and principles and that the study is in no 
way an attempt to perform a policing function.
The emphasis must be on discovering what 
principles work best and why, and not on 
finding and reporting which individuals are 
doing their jobs well or poorly...' (Caro,
1969:88).
Despite emphasis in the research being placed on 
principles, the principles that work and those who 
act upon them or actualize them are not readily separ­
able. At some point, responsibility for the failure 
or success must be laid primarily on either the prin­
ciples or the individuals, and thus the individuals must 
be evaluated at some point.
More importantly, this whole argument misses the 
point as to who is being policed. The really problem­
atic policing occurs in terms of the action program's 
target population. "Discovering what principles work 
best and why," means what works best to change the 
behavior of the target population in ways desired by 
external funding sources, or works best to maintain the 
behavior of the target population within certain para­
meters deemed tolerable by those sources. Being a 
"policeman" in this sense is not necessarily undesirable. 
Whether it is or not depends upon the extent to which 
one values the values which the action program repre­
sents .
In fact, sociologists are increasingly entering 
into professions involving evaluation research and other
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functions which are not purely epistemic, precisely 
because they share the values of the action programs. 
Thus, a review of the literature finds that one of the 
two major reasons (the other being that theoretically 
important hypotheses can often be tested) emphasized 
by social scientists for doing evaluative research is 
that
...The social action goals of some social 
scientists parallel those of their clients; 
and their belief in the potential contribu­
tion of scientific evaluation to the devel­
opment of effective programs leads to in­
volvement (Caro, 1 9 6 9 5 8 9).
For example, many such researchers express an interest
in such target populations as the aged, the mentally
7
ill, alcholoics, etc.
It should be pointed out that persons employing 
sociological knowledge do not always do so in the most 
commonly expected ways. For example, while evaluation 
researchers are often accused of maintaining the status 
quo, they are often desirous of change and perform 
their research to that end.
71t may be interesting to note the reason suggested in 
the literature as to why administrators of action programs 
wish evaluative research done. Stated reasons offered:
(1) introducing greater rationality into the decision­
making process, (2) feedback to other administrators for 
program refinement, (3) dissemination of program inform­
ation to the public, and (4) providing accounting inform­
ation to funding agencies. Covert reasons: (1) aid in 
settling an internal dispute, (2) justification of 
previous decisions, (3) support of an attempt to gain 
power, (^ ) justification of postponement of action (5) 
allowing responsibility for decisions to be placed out­
side the organization, and (6) lending an aura of prestige
6k
Researchers often have a vested interest in 
discovering inefficiency and encouraging 
change...In part, the social scientists 
justify their claim to superior knowledge 
of human affairs hy dramatizing inadequacies 
in conventional wisdom and existing programs... 
Evaluating scientists are thus predisposed o 
to see the need for change... (Caro, 1960:89).
Similarly unexpected is that fact that many self- 
proclaimed radicals have recently attempted to carry 
out research in order to make changes "within the system" 
(see Colfax, 1970:82), and have taken positions within 
established systems in order to modify them in ways 
that are more in keeping with their own values.
In short, sociologists are both seeking knowledge 
and actively applying it in order to actualize a wide 
range of values. The fact that there is such wide 
disagreement about the values that guide the use of 
sociological knowledge, suggests more strongly that 
non-epistemic values are guiding its use. These non- 
epistemic uses of sociological knowledge by sociologists 
seem likely to continue. There is no reason to assume 
that sociologists will not see problems in their various 
societies to which their knowledge can be applied. 
Further, as laymen increasingly recognize sociological 
knowledge and sociological expertise as potentially 
useful, they will increasingly put pressure on socio­
logists to actively employ their knowledge. At present,
to the program (abstracted from Caro, 1 9 6 9 :8 9).
g
It is duly noted that many critics on the left would 
consider this type of change that is valued, to be in­
significant or reactionary, yet even this type of change 
is seldom recognized nonetheless.
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while the results of attempted use of social scientific 
knowledge is sometimes disappointing, "a report of the 
National Science Foundation acknowledges that social 
scientists are being called upon at unprecedented 
rates to provide solutions to pressing national and 
local problems..." (Tarter, 1971:15zO-
As long as sociologists continue to use their 
knowledge, they will do so according to a set of values, 
and thus, as description, the value free position is 
inaccurate. Further, as long as sociologists continue to 
use their knowledge, the value free position is prescrip- 
tively of little value, in that it must remain silent 
concerning the crucial question of which values should 
be actualized.
Use of Sociological Knowledge by Non-Sociologists
It may be asked, however: What if sociologists 
in the future (1) completely ceased seeking knowledge 
for reasons other than for its own sake, and (2) 
consistently refused to use this knowledge? In other 
words, if sociologists only sought basic knowledge with 
no thought of application, would not then sociology be 
value free? Even if we grant for the moment this 
possibility, which seems extremely unlikely given the 
preceding discussion, all that would be granted is 
that sociologists had become free of values, and not 
necessarily sociology. Sociology is not simply those
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who practice it, it is also a body of knowledge.
Even given that sociologists decided against using 
this knowledge for valued ends, the question still 
remains as to whether it will be used by others - 
in short, whether it will remain free of value employ­
ment .
Let us assume then that the body of sociological 
knowledge that has been produced by sociologists is 
neutral with respect to values. Being neutral, it 
would not preclude use of that knowledge in the actual­
ization of widely divergent a n d  often contradictory 
values. Also, regardless of the nature of their values, 
that knowledge can be employed by anyone who (l) is 
aware of the potential usefulness of the knowledge in 
acheiving their ends, and (2) has access to the resources 
required for its implementation.
...The sciences are neutral in terms of 
theoretical knowledge but are not neutral 
in the consequences resulting from the pract­
ical application of that knowledge which could 
be manipulated for positive and constructive 
or negative and destructive ends. As Bertrand 
Russell made clear: 'Science in so far as 
it consists of knowledge, must be regarded as 
having value, but in so far as it consists of 
techniques the question whether it is to be 
praised or blamed depends upon the use 
that is made of the technique' (Vrga, 1971s2^7) •
Thus, ideally, the value free sociologist produces
knowledge that can be used by anyone in the service
of any valued ends. The implications of this aspect of
the value free position are suggested by Gray:
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should the full impact of Lundherg's observ­
ation that physical scientists are not as 
severely disturbed by political upheaval 
not be appreciated, he stated more precisely the 
virtue of his position for one concerned 
with the survival or success of his individual 
careers 'The service of real (i.e. value free)9 
social scientists would be indispensible 
to Fascists or Communists or Democrats, just 
as are the services of physicists and physi­
cians' (Gray, 1 9 6 8 :1 7 9).
In this situation, the body of sociological know­
ledge is analogous to the body of a whore or a gigolo - 
used by anyone and in a wide variety of ways. The 
analogy breaks down in that the sociologist producing 
the knowledge would ideally not be directly compensated 
financially for services rendered. Not only can the 
body of sociological knowledge be used, even if not by 
sociologists, but there is also an extremely high 
probability that it will be used. As various segments 
of society recognize its potential usefulness in attaining 
their various ends, it will increasingly be used. Its use 
would increase still further as that body of knowledge is 
refined, and instances of successful employment are recog­
nized and become more plentiful. There seems little reason 
to think that the world has become or will become in the 
near future a less problematic place in which to live 
than it was in 19^8 ;
Insistent public dilemmas clamor for solution. 
Decisions will be made and public policies 
established - because no delaying or turning
9The convention used throughout is that "C J" are placed 
by the present author, while "( )" occur in the original.
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back is possible in this hurrying climactic 
era. If the social scientist is too bent on 
•waiting until all the data are in,' or if 
university policies warn him off controversial 
issues, the decisions will be made anyway - 
without him. They will be made by the 
'practical' man and by the 'hard headed poli­
tician' chivviedlO by interest and pressure 
blocks (Lynd, 19^8:9).
Thus, even if sociologists free themselves of 
values in terms of using sociology, it does not seem
likely that sociological knowledge will be freed from
11value employment. Sociological knowledge, and thus 
sociology, are not freed from an intimate connection 
with values. Yet the question still remains, do 
sociologists share in any responsibility for the use
10Chivvied?'.
11Not only will sociological knowledge be used in accord­
ance with values, it will also probably be used to change 
the values of others. This is often the case in 
"mission" oriented programs (i.e. poverty, mental 
health, etc.) where the necessary first step is to 
change the values of the target population so as to 
correspond to those of the persons running the pro­
gram. Andrews (196?:3) puts it this ways
This problem non-shared goals in a program is ex­
pressed, in the statements that 'middle class values' 
of the programmers are not necessarily held by 
those for whom the project is provided. In that 
instance the manipulator has to intervene in the value 
constellation of the population prior to other 
attempts to change the condition of that popula­
tion. In some sense this interplay of values is 
involved in most applied programs designed to 
alleviate social problems and the individuals 
served by the program are under constant pressure 
to adopt the goals of the practioners.
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of the knowledge they produce? It is argued here that
they do "because they produce it (unless they do so under
duress), just as the weapons manufacturer incurs an indirect
responsibility when his weapons are used. Further,
"scientific research is expensive and society must
divert resources from other needs to support it. By
accepting support, the sociologist incurs an obligation
to reciprocate" (Kulgen, 1970:186). The nature of
this obligation is open to question, but clearly
sociologists have some responsibility to the society
that supports the research which yields knowledge.
The sociologist at minimum has a responsibility not to
remain silent concerning the values that guide the use
of sociological knowledge.
Thus, the minimum one could suggest is that the
sociologist has the responsibility, even if he is able
himself to avoid the use of knowledge, to act as
"watchdog" concerning its use by others. In an editorial
in Science, Abelson argues for this role.
Others have pointed out that once facts have 
become generally known, the scientist can no 
longer determine how his discoveries may be 
applied. To some degree this argument is 
valid. Nevertheless, scientists will have 
continuing and important roles in deter­
mining how science is applied. One important 
function is that of watchdog.
In exploiting scientific discoveries,
humanity will squander resources and unwittingly
conduct profoundly important experiments on
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itself and its environment. Who will eval­
uate such experiments and he alert to emerging 
problems? The man on the street can scarcely 
fill such a role. Government might, but its 
leadership is in the hands of the politicians 
who rarely act until an issue is crystallized 
by others. Scientists or engineers in govern­
ment service might act as watchdogs, but in 
general, politicians prefer that bureaucrats 
speak only when spoken to. Employees in industry 
are in much the same circumstance. Thus, academic 
scientists and scientific societies have respons­
ibilities that they cannot escape (Abelson, 1970*2^1).
But even to provide this minimum role of watchdog, the 
individual scientist or scientific society needs a set of 
values or an overriding decision or goal orientation in 
order to decide when to bark and when to remain silent. It 
is difficult to be an effective watchdog without knowing 
what one is watching for. And the value neutral position by 
definition cannot help us with this problem of selecting 
the requisite value orientation.
This has hopefully become clear in the preceding pages: 
sociology is, and in all probability will continue to be, 
highly involved with extra-epistemic values. While we may 
disagree with Warren Bennis concerning the lack of litera­
ture in this area, we may nonetheless agree with his final 
conclusion: "The social scientist's own value system Cisl a 
topic, it hardly needs saying, that we pay scant attention 
to, except for some rather bored and pious statements about 
how value free we are, a statement that seems more empir­
ically free than anything else..." (1 9 6 8:2 -^2 ).
It has hopefully been shown that (1) at numerous points
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in the knowledge process choices are necessary which often 
seem to demand extra-epistemic values. Further, (2) socio­
logists are increasingly using knowledge and directly 
seeking knowledge so that it might be used, and this seems 
likely to continue in the future: this again involves extra- 
epistemic value choices. Further, (3) even if sociologists 
somehow managed not to employ sociological knowledge, that
knowledge will be used by others in accordance with their 
12values. Actually both sociologists and non-sociologists
will probably employ this knowledge. As Kenneth Benne
suggests, this is the case for all the sciences.
Whether we have achieved formats, methods, 
and value orientations for an adequate inte­
gration of scientific and non-scientific 
resources is problematic. That the desegregation 
of scientific and non-scientific personnel 
has been widely and unevenly achieved, is a 
fact (Benne, 1965:6).
12We might even go further in this argument, contending 
that even if sociologists did not employ sociological 
knowledge for certain ends, and even if others did not 
directly employ that knowledge, sociology still would 
not be freed of the necessity of choosing value orien­
tations . This is because the process of seeking know­
ledge often creates changes in the phenomena studied 
(even if these changes are not sought) which may or may 
not be valued. Even in the physical sciences - usually 
offered as the models of detachment - the idea that 
the scientist is merely an observer has had to be 
abandoned.
Increasingly, the scientist creates the universe 
which he studies. Physicists are producing par­
ticles unknown in nature. Chemists have produced 
elements unknown in nature and innumerable new 
compounds. The biologist produces new hybrids, 
new genetic arrangements, and may shortly begin 
to intervene in genetic evolution on a massive
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Thus, the real question confronting sociology is not 
whether to include an extra-epistemic value orientation, 
but which extra-epistemic value orientation should be 
chosen.
One who holds doggedly to the value free position may 
still wish to argue that we need not consider which extra- 
epistemic value orientation should be chosen, despite the 
evidence presented in the preceding pages. It is contended 
here that individual sociologists as well as the discipline 
as a whole must choose and make explicit such a guiding 
extra-epistemic value orientation, even though it has not 
been argued that sociologists must necessarily (always) 
employ extra-epistemic values.
If it had been argued that there is something inherent 
in doing sociology that makes value employment an unavoidable 
necessity, it would be considerably easier to demonstrate 
the need to choose an overriding value orientation to guide
scale. Our knowledge of ecology is likely to 
change the whole ecological system of the 
earth.
Social sciences are dominated by the fact that the 
social scientist and the knowledge he creates are 
themselves integral parts of the system which is 
being studied. Hence, the system changes as it is 
studied and because it is studied (Boulding, 1967*12).
While all such changes are not foreseeable nor significant, 
many are, and the question remains as to their value.
Further, responsibility for these changes can only be 
placed with the scientist who produces them.
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such necessary value employment. Not arguing for the 
necessity of extra-epistemic values makes it much more 
difficult to rule out a position of value neutrality as 
sufficient by itself to act as a guide for the discipline. 
Although it would make the current task of demonstrating 
the need for an extra-epistemic value orientation more com­
fortable, at the beginning of this Chapter (see especially 
pp. ^0-^1 and footnotes 1 and 2), it was stated that for 
numerous reasons it would not be argued here that sociolo­
gists will inescapably make value judgments. Rather, the 
"weaker" but more realistically demonstrable position has 
been taken that sociology is, and seems likely in all prob­
ability to remain, to an important degree not value free. 
Specifically, sociologists do now, and probably will con­
tinue to, employ extra-epistemic values to a significant 
degree in guiding and justifying the numerous decisions in­
volved in (a) seeking knowledge, and (b) employing it. The 
form of this argument suggests that it is conceivable, but 
highly improbable, that sociologists in the future might 
cease to employ such extra-epistemic values.
Thus, we have not completely ruled out the possibility 
of value freedom. In other words, an adherent to a value 
free position might argue: "Since value freedom or neutrality 
is still a possibility then we should still strive to attain 
it, to seek it as far as possible. Although I may now hold 
a wide range of values and seem likely to employ them as a 
sociologist now and in the future, this fact by itself in
7^
no way precludes me from doing my best to try to eliminate 
them whenever and wherever I can." While we may feel strong­
ly the need to disagree with the position which claims that 
our discipline is only obliged to produce knowledge, it may 
not be necessary for us to maintain those arguments in order 
to demonstrate the need for a high level extra-epistemic 
value orientation. That is, we may accept the above-quoted 
value free adherent's reasoning, as far as it goes (pro­
vided he does not go on to argue that as a result the value 
free position is sufficient for guiding our actions). In 
particular, we may agree that to the extent that individual 
sociologists continue to employ extra-epistemic value judg­
ments (either (a) because they feel for various reasons that 
they ought to, or in the case of the value free sociologist,
(b) because they do despite efforts to avoid them), a decision
or goal orientation must be chosen to deal with the values
employed, if we hold strongly to any of the following:
either, (1) We wish to avoid the hypocrisy of saying
we are free from all values other than the
value of knowledge when we are not,
o r ,  (2) We f e e l  t h a t  we must  j u s t i f y  s p e c i f i c
value choices that we do make,with reference 
to a more general value orientation,
or, (3) We feel we have an obligation to evaluate
the decisions made by other sociologists and
which have an impact that extends beyond the
discipline.
If the above are accepted, and they will be here, both indiv­
idual sociologists and the discipline as a whole must choose
an extra-epistemic decision or goal orientation that could
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be used to guide, justify, and evaluate those values that 
are employed despite the efforts of some to avoid them.
Again, to the extent that extra-epistemic values do 
and seem likely to continue to play an important role in 
the discipline of sociology, the value free position is 
both descriptively and prescriptively inadequate in dealing 
with them. As a result, it is argued that sociology must 
choose an extra-empistemic value orientation, and the real 
question confronting sociology is not whether to include 
an extra-epistemic value orientation, but which such 
orientation should be chosen.
Before turning to this question, let us briefly examine 
three additional major positions concerning values in 
sociology to see to what extent they can help us in answer­
ing it.
Sociology as "Value Full" - Value Explication
From time to time one hears sociology students and 
faculty in conversation tossing out the idea that sociology 
must be "value full." Unfortunately, the meaning of this 
term is not quite clear. Presumably, the term means that 
one should accept all values as legitimate (or why might 
one strive to be full of them?), yet the call for "value 
fullness" is usually preceded by a critical remark concerning 
the value of the types of activities that value free socio­
logists are believed to engage in. A variant is that in
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light of the fact that sociologists cannot be value free,
they must therefore be "value full." Again, if we take
the phrase at face value this argument can be extended to:
I cannot avoid eating and still live; therefore, I must
make a pig of myself. Presumably, however, we don't have
to incorporate all extra-epistemic values into sociology -
especially not those that are obviously contradictory, or
those that are simply not valued by anyone. Thus, the
real meaning of "value full" probably is that sociology
ought to be value relevant rather than value laden.
However, saying that we should be value full in this
sense is of as little help in making the choices we
face as saying that we ought to be value free. Thus, as
far as help in making value choices is concerned, we have
gained nothing by switching to this position.
A corollary of the value full position, with similar
problems, is the commonly held idea that since we cannot
be value free we should express and clearly delineate or
explicate the values which we employ in doing sociology
(for example, see Braude, 196^:399)- Thus, because
value judgments
...are unavoidable...there is and can be 
no value free sociology. The only choice 
is between an honest expression of one's values, 
as open and honest as it can be, this side of 
the psychoanalytical couch, and a vain ritual 
of moral neutrality which, because it invites 
men to ignore the vulnerability of reason to 
bias, leaves it at the mercy of irrationality 
(Gouldner, 1962:212).
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We m ig h t  a t  l e a s t  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h o s e  who u rge  us to
13express our values should express their own, y  which is
o f t e n  n o t  t h e  c a s e .  ( I t  s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  s a y i n g  some
form of "I value that which is good," hardly constitutes
an explication of one's values, in that all it does is
s t a t e  r e p e t i t i o u s l y  t h a t  one has  th e m .)  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,
while sociologists' expressing their values seeifts to be
all that is required, this hardly seems sufficient.
One must  a g r e e  t h a t  th o s e  who c a l l  f o r  s o c i o l o g i s t s  to
express their values would not be entirely satisfied
i f  a l l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  were to  p u r c h a s e  so a p b o x e s ,  s t a n d
upon them, and proudly proclaim all of their values.
I f  one were more s u s p i c i o u s  s t i l l ,  one m ig h t  s u s p e c t
that when others often ask for values to be expressed,
they do so because they have already guessed what they
are and wished to have them verbalized so they may be
more r e a d i l y  a t t a c k e d .  At any  r a t e ,  a g a i n  i t  would seem
that all values are not equally valued by sociologists,
any  more t h a n  by  o t h e r s .  While  e x p r e s s i n g  v a l u e s
may be an important first step, it is not much help to
14us in choosing between them.
^It should be pointed out that at least in a later 
article Gouldner (1 9 6 8) does explicate his dominant 
value (which will be discussed in the final chapter).
lit.
N e i t h e r  does  m e r e ly  e x p r e s s i n g  v a l u e s  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  
t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  b i a s i n g  e f f e c t s  w i l l  be r u l e d  
o u t .
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The Ultimate Benefit of Knowledge
Early in Shapter II, the idea of knowledge as an 
end in itself was discussed as a corollary of the "value 
free" position. It was pointed out that this idea was 
usually put forth in conjunction with the distinguishable 
notion that knowledge will ultimately be of benefit to 
mankind. Merton (1 9 6 3 *8 6) contends that both an intrinsic 
and an ultimate rationale underlies all science. It is 
quite understandable that sociologists who by training and 
inclination come to love and revere knowledge would also 
hold the faith commitment that something that is believed 
to be good in itself will lead to a greater good. Since the 
goodness that is assumed to be brought about by knowledge 
is in the distant future (ultimately), what clearly is 
involved is_ a faith commitment, or a hope, which is 
usually recognized as such. This hope for usefulness 
and benefit in the long run is stated in different 
ways. Bendix states that "...there is the hope that in 
the long run the constructive use of knowledge will 
prevail" (1970:833)* Sociologists do not go "...so far 
as the famous mathematician who, when asked what he was 
doing, replied that whatever it was he hoped it would 
never be of use to anybody," but are willing to endure 
the "...considerable time lag between their discovery 
and their final impression upon society" (Bierstedt, 19^8 :3 1 6 ).
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Goser states this faith commitment as well and with
as much specificity as anyone;
This sociological enterprise , as all 
scientific enterprise, is ultimately grounded 
in the hope that greater knowledge of man will 
enhance his stature. While we may no longer 
be able to harbor the idea of the Enlightenment 
that the truth necessarily will set man free, 
we still cling obstinately to the hope that our 
endeavors will enhance the self awareness of 
mankind and enable, through self-conscious 
planning, to overcome at least some of the 
impediments that have been the burden of 
previous history (Coser, 1 9 6 9s 132).
The faith commitment that sociological knowledge
will ultimately be beneficial is both attractive and
comforting. Regretably, it is not without difficulties.
The first problem with this faith commitment is that it
is a faith commitment - and faith commitments can be
discussion stoppers. That is, once one sociologist
states that "I have faith that sociological knowledge
will ultimately issue into a wide range of benefits to
mankind," and a second states that "I have just as much
faith that sociological knowledge will ultimately be
harmful to mankind and eventually destroy it," they
really can have very little more to say to one another
on the topic. If the basis for their positions is
merely faith, there is really no way of choosing between
them. Still, if we treat the statement, "knowledge will
ultimately be beneficial," as an assumption rather than
as a matter of faith we can question whether there are
adequate grounds for this assumption.
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Lynd contends that this faith commitment in
ultimate benefit originally was grounded in 19th
century optimism.
Immediate relevance has not been regarded as 
so important as ultimate relevance, and, in 
the burgeoning nineteenth century world which 
viewed all times as moving within the Master 
System of Progress, there was seemingly 
large justification for this optimistic 
tolerance.
Our contemporary world is losing its 
confidence in the inevitability of Progress.
Mens' ways of ordering their common lives 
have broken down so disastrously as to make 
hope precarious (Lynd, 19^8s2).
Assuming that no Master Plan will lead to the beneficient 
use of knowledge, there is no reason to assume that men 
will use knowledge to the benefit of mankind. If Marx 
has made any contribution to sociology it is clearly 
that mental changes or changes in the spirit need have 
no effect on the objective social situation, and thus 
the growth of knowledge need say nothing about any required 
changes in objective conditions to insure that benefit 
will result. Further, as discussed earlier, if know­
ledge is ethically neutral in that it can be used for 
a wide variety of ends - ultimately beneficial and 
harmful - then there seems to be no warrant for assuming 
that it will lead to ultimate benefit.
In the final analysis, it is probably impossible 
to predict whether knowledge is of ultimate benefit, 
if the nature of "benefit" is not specified. Since
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there are innumerable conceptions of what "benefit" 
or good might consist of, it is indeed difficult to 
assess whether it will occur. Holding such a general 
faith commitment creates a dilemma. If it is left at 
such a general level, there is no way of knowing the 
likelihood that "ultimate benefit" will be achieved, or 
even if the conception of benefit of the person who 
holds the commitment is congruent or antithetical to 
the conception held by others. On the other hand, 
if the benefit is specified (we know what it is and 
express it) it is likely that many will disagree that 
this ultimate benefit is a benefit. Further, even if 
the nature of the benefit is agreed on, the question 
still is are the odds good enough that this benefit will 
occur without our intervention, that we should risk 
not attaining it. If it is a benefit, why should we 
not seek it directly rather than merely hope for its 
occurance?
Finally, the hope that knowledge will ultimately 
lead to "good," does not, due to its lack of specificity, 
help us in choosing values to employ in doing sociology. 
Saying that sociological knowledge will ultimately lead 
to benefit does not indicate that one is neutral with 
regard to values, but only that one is unable or 
unwilling to specify them. At the same time, it is of 
little help in guiding value choices, as is the position 
of value freedom.
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S o c i o l o g i c a l  R e lev ance
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h o s e  who se e  a n  u l t i m a t e  b e n e f i t  
o f  s o c i o l o g y ,  t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  t h o s e  who s e e k  a n  imm edia te  
b e n e f i t .  Lynd, w h i le  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  i n  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
" . . . i m m e d i a t e  r e l e v a n c e  h as  n o t  been  r e g a r d e d  a s  so 
i m p o r t a n t  a s  u l t i m a t e  r e l e v a n c e , " a r g u e s  t h a t  im m edia te  
r e l e v a n c e  s h o u l d  be g i v e n  p r i o r i t y  and t h a t  r e s e a r c h e s  
and a c t i v i t i e s  o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  s h o u l d  be made 
r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  p rob lem s  o f  th e  day ( 1 9 ^ 8 : 2 f f ) .  This  
i d e a  t h a t  s o c i o l o g y  s h o u l d  p o s s e s s  an  imm edia te  r e l e v a n c e  
i s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  many fo rm s ,  r a n g i n g  f rom s a y i n g  t h a t  
s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge s h o u l d  be s o u g h t  and a p p l i e d  t o  
imm edia te  e n d s ,  t o  c a l l s  t h a t  th e  s o c i o l o g i s t ' s  l i f e
sh o u ld  be r e l e v a n t  to  c u r r e n t  s o c i a l  p rob lem s  th ro u g h
a c t i v e  a t t e m p t s  t o  s o l v e  them.
At one end o f  th e  co n t inuum ,  i t  may be a rg u e d  t h a t
w h i le  i t  i s  q u i t e  p e r m i s s i b l e  f o r  th e  s o c i o l o g i s t  t o  
do "p u re  r e s e a r c h , "  t h a t  r e s e a r c h  s h o u l d  be made r e l e ­
v a n t  b y  " a f t e r  an  a p p r a i s a l  t h a t  may w e l l  be a g o n i z i n g ,  
d e c l a r  Q-ng] a l l  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n seq u e n ce s  he may f o r e s e e ,  
however  d im ly  which  a r e  even  r e m o t e l y  l i k e l y  t o  f o l l o w  
th e  d i s c l o s u r e  n o t  o n ly  o f  h i s  own c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  s c i e n c e  
b u t  a l s o  th o s e  o f  o t h e r  s c i e n t i s t s  w i t h i n  h i s  wide a r e a  
o f  competence"  ( S i r  R. W atson -W at t ,  i n  B e n n i s ,  1968s253)«  
O th e r s  a rg u e  t h a t  im m edia te  r e l e v a n c e  o f  r e s e a r c h  m ust  
be w e ig h te d  more h e a v i l y .
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Preceding research, the extent to which various possible
researches would contribute to the body of sociological
theory, and the solution of social problems should be
predicted. Since both may not be maximized in any
single piece of research, it is suggested that relevance
to social problems must be maximized. Beal argues in
this way for optimizing sociological relevance.
Basically what I have argued for is that it 
is probable that the maximization of the goals 
of conceptual development, theory building, 
and testing, measurement, improvement in 
analysis techniques, and research on signi­
ficant social problems are at some point in 
conflict. With the present state of knowledge, 
methodology, personnel, and funds, we cannot 
maximize all of these goals...1 am...arguing 
for a heavier weighing of the contribution of 
the knowledge produced to the relevant 
social problems variable in the optimizing 
model (Beal, 1969 •
Still others argue that it is not sufficient for 
the knowledge of a social science to be relevant. In 
addition, the lives of social scientists themselves 
must be directed in terms of relevant action. (Clearly 
the term relevance applies here, although it is often 
not used in this context, in that some kind of immed­
iate rather than ultimate benefit is directly sought.) 
Thus, Bennis offers a general plea for relevant social 
activity: "I see no alternative to an active role for
the Faculties of Social Sciences. This means they 
should not only adapt to societies, but that they should 
also influence society directly" (1 9 6 8 :2 5 2 ). Similarly, 
Etzkowitz argues, "...as sociologists we do not have
to confine ourselves to merely understanding and 
analyzing what others are doing. As sociologists, we 
have the possibility, as well as the moral obligation, 
to enter into the institutional life of our society to 
initiate reforms or even to take part in the construction 
of new institutional conceptions as social realities" 
(1969:12) .
It should be noted parenthetically, that pleas 
for relevance in sociology are met with criticism, and 
some of these criticisms have already been encountered 
in terms of the "value free sociology" and "knowledge 
for its own sake" positions. One primary criticism is 
that shifting emphasis to relevance may have a dilatory 
effect on the body of sociological knowledge. Thus,
Coser states that while the work of scientists such as 
Freud and Mendel at the time seemed irrelevant, their 
work had a profound and revolutionary impact on the 
world as well as on the body of knowledge. On the 
other hand, "The majority of those men who, in their 
day, worked on the 'relevant issues' remain of interest, 
at best, to specialized historians of ideas" (Coser, 
1969:132). Contrary to Coser, it may be argued that 
it was precisely those who worked on the "relevant 
issues" of their day, such as Pasteur, who significantly 
contributed to their respective sciences. This may be 
especially true of sociology if Kulgen is correct 
when he argues that there is a close relationship
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between sociological and social problems: "It is no 
accident, however, that problems are so often socially 
and sociologically important. In society humans are 
doing what in sociology humans are studying...what large 
numbers of people identify as serious social problems 
are likely to involve basic and disputed questions 
about the relation of man to his social environment" 
(Kulgen, 1970*183-^) ■ Yet the question of the actual 
historical impact which knowledge which was sought for 
its direct relevance has had on the bodies of knowledge 
is difficult to assess. Since numerous examples and 
counter-examples could be mustered for each side of the 
issue, the question of the contribution of "relevant" 
research to the body of knowledge through the history 
of science is probably best left to those best 
qualified - historians of science.
A more telling criticism of the pleas for relevance 
may be that they are "hollow" or empty. They are 
hollow in two senses. First, sociologists are already 
relevant. Second, these pleas do not tell us to what we 
should be relevant.
First, it must be pointed out that those socio­
logists who would presumably be the objects of the 
accusations of those who deplore a lack of relevant 
research - are often doing research that is relevant 
to the body of sociological knowledge. Obviously, these 
sociologists are not doing research then that is totally 
irrelevant to anything. However, it may be argued by
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those who make such pleas that "this criticism is 
unfair. Clearly by the term 'relevant' we mean relevant 
to valued ends which are non-epistemic in nature." Even 
though it may not be clear to us to what the relevance 
requested is relevant, we may grant this, and still 
the objection that the pleas are hollow stands. This 
is because sociologists are also doing, and have been 
doing, research that is relevant to non-epistemic valued 
ends .
Also, it must be stressed that, to a consider­
able degree, sociologists are engaged in 
studies that are relevant, and which usually 
involve a value judgment even if it is 
unstated. What else are we to make of all 
the studies on crime, delinquency, race 
relations, the family, industrial sociology, 
suicide, urban problems and political behavior 
and so on?
Few people will argue that the issues...are 
not relevant, and it seems fairly clear that 
most of the sociologists involved are against 
crime, delinquency, and suicide, and are con­
cerned with understanding these phenomena 
in order to help in their prevention and 
control. In fact, these judgments are often 
quite explicitly stated (Biblarz, 1 9 6 9:3 ).
Sociologists, then are and have been "relevant."
While they recognize the relevance of sociology, there
are those who strongly oppose the ways in which
relevance is seen as manifesting itself.
In at least one sense, there seems to be little 
doubt about the relevance of the discipline as 
presently constituted...As consultants, 
managers, and administrators, sociologists 
have had the sense of being centrally in­
volved in policy formation and implementation.
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Involvement and relevance have been mani­
fested in as many ways as policy and fashion 
dictated: one generation of social scientists 
would provide the social science brief for 
discriminatory immigration laws; the next 
would as assuredly document the case for 
school desegregation. And with the rise of 
national welfare bureaucracies, the prolifer­
ation of private and public funding agencies, 
and the adaptation of the university to govern­
mental needs, the sociologist has clearer 
evidence for believing in his relevance - 
but all too often fails to recognize that his 
prime relevance is to a limited category of political, 
corporate, and bureaucratic clients (Colfax,
1970:73) •
Whether we value the values to which sociology 
is currently directed, it must be recognized that 
sociology is in fact relevant to some values. Thus, 
pleas for sociology to become relevant are hollow in
1^
that they ask sociology to become what is already is. J  
Much of this chapter bolsters this criticism that the 
call for relevance is a hollow one, in that it demon­
strates that sociologists are seeking knowledge which is 
useable by themselves and others for valued ends, and that 
further, they are directly involved in attaining such ends. 
There are innumerable examples in the past and the pre­
sent of sociology being made relevant to a wide range 
of social concerns. These include sociology being used 
by sociologists in areas such as law enforcement, the 
development of foreign policy, race relations, social
^It is difficult to explain why these calls for 
relevance persist, but it may be that the concept of 
relevance may be used ego-centrically. In other words, 
research is accused of irrelevance if it is irrelevant 
to those ends which "I" value.
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planning with regard to poverty, coping with aging,
community development, manpower, public health, peace
research, and adaptation to rapid change (for detailed
examples of sociological relevance in these and other
areas, see Lazarsfeld et al., 1967; and Shostak, 1 9 7^).
Moreover, these pleas for relevance are hollow in
a second sense - they do not tell us to what we should be
relevant. As a result they are of little help in
guiding the choices we must make. For example, consider
how much the following exhortation actually tells us:
It is much simpler to withdraw from the world 
of men and rather contemplate them from the 
Olympian heights of abstruse scholarship.
It is precisely this which the sociologist 
has done. He has surrendered to an image of 
science his mandate not only to discover 
but to use his knowledge for the human weal.
It is not enough to say as he has said:
I have knowledge; here it is to use - by 
others . It is not enough to retire from 
the field, hors de combat. The sociologist 
has the responsibility to enter the fray and, 
as sociologist, cry out for a better human 
condition than now obtains (Braude, 196^:398).
While some find exhortations such as these uplifting and
exhilarating, in the final analysis they tell us very
little. "A better human condition" is desirable, but
just what might that better condition be? We often
have little idea as to what ends sociologists should value
and to what their research activity should be relevant.
To say that the work of sociologists should be relevant
to social problems says little more than that we should
not value what should not be valued. In other words,
these pleas merely urge us to seek the good and avoid the
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bad, but leave unanswered the question as to what 
each of these might be. Some of these pleas for 
relevance are more specific as to exactly what the social 
problems are to which they refer— i.e. war, crime, poverty, 
etc. However, still left unspecified are the values that 
underlie these choices and the justification for those 
values.
Thus Robert Lynd, in Knowledge for What?, 
contrasted the gravity of our social 
problems with the triviality of much social 
research. 'Seismologists watching a volcano' 
he called the fact finders, and he appealed 
to them to tackle manfully their main job, 
which is to reconstruct our whole society.
Max Lerner enthusiastically applauded this
'unashamed instrumentalism.' He hailed Lynd
for having staked out 'the most spacious
claims for the possibilities of social thinking;'
he condemned the 'detachment' and 'objectivity'
of other social scientists as mere 'dodges to
avoid thinking, devices for saving their
skins.' Both men are saying, at bottom,
that now is the time for all good men to
come to the aid of their country (Muller, 196^:17^)1°
Unfortunately, these and similar pleas urge this
and offer little more in terms of the nature and
justification of the values to which sociology should
be relevant. In short, these pleas do not allow us the
means for making the necessary value choices. Early
in this chapter the value free position was criticized
for not allowing us to deal with the extra-epistemic
I
Muller (196^:17^) continues: "Unhappily, these stirring
words do not solve the actual problem (not to mention 
the question of just what a scientist can do about a 
volcano)."
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values that are present in sociology and seem likely to 
continue in the future. Given the fact that numerous 
decisions must he made in sociology which demand extra- 
epistemic values, the value free position was criticized 
for not helping sociologists make these decisions. We 
have further seen that the "sociological relevance," 
as well as the "value full - explication," and the 
"knowledge as ultimate value" positions are similarly 
unhelpful in dealing with extra-epistemic values, even 
though analysis of these issues makes us all the more 
aware that values are present and remain to he dealt 
with. This is not to say that each of these positions 
has not performed a valuable and necessary service - 
they have, but it is now time to go beyond them.
As Kenneth Benne points out, the fact that there 
is so much concern about values by sociologists and 
other social scientists is rather unusual. It would 
not be surprising, under conditions where power is 
unequally distributed, for those who possess the 
predominance of power to discuss the validity and value 
of their possessing that power. It would also not 
be surprising for those with relatively little power to 
attempt to sanction the norms that control the exercise of 
control by those in power. "It is probably more unusual 
for men with some new legacy of power to seek norms 
controlling their own exercise of that power in their
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relations with others" (Benne, 1965:1). Social scientists 
now have some limited power, "...and accumulating 
behavioral knowledge promises to enlarge the power of 
psychologists and other behavioral scientists over others. 
What normative orientation, what value system, should 
constrain and guide the scientist in the exercise of 
and contribution to behavioral control?" (Benne, 1965:1).
The question of what normative orientation 
sociology as a profession and sociologists as indiv­
iduals should choose must now be met squarely rather 
than simply alluded to. It is perhaps finally time 
to actually explicate our values and cease calling for 
their explication. We must deal with the questions of 
what benefit sociology is likely to be in the near 
or distant future, to what valued ends it should be 
relevant.
It has been argued in the preceding pages that 
sociologists face numerous decisions that cannot be 
made solely with reference to pure knowledge concerns. 
Further, the profession as a whole needs an extra- 
epistemic reference with which to evaluate these decisions. 
What needs now to be discussed and debated is the "decision 
orientation" or "goal orientation" which could serve as 
such a point of reference. Also, both individual sociolo­
gists and the profession as a whole are faced with 
questions concerning how sociologists might justifiably 
use the knowledge themselves, and in what directions the
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use by others should be encouraged or discouraged.
These answers to the questions again imply the choice 
of a "decision orientation," and a specification of the 
ends we are seeking in terms of a "goal orientation."^
The choice of a decision or goal orientation in turn 
demands the discussion of the basis for such a choice. 
Chapter IV presents a discussion of what might be called 
the "sceptic's view" concerning the use of facts as the 
basis for the choice of a non-epistimic orientation. 
ChapterVI returns to the basic question of the basis of 
choice of an orientation, discussing' an "evolutionary- 
naturalistic view" which clearly runs counter to the 
"sceptic's view."
__
'Since the setting of a high level goal orientation also 
acts to orient decisions by providing a reference for 
evaluating decisions, and in short one high level orien­
tation can suggest both sub-goals and decisions as to 
how to obtain them, the terms "decision orientation" and 
"goal orientation" are used interchangeably, although 




ONE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE CHOICE OF A DECISION OR 
GOAL ORIENTATION: THE SCEPTIC'S VIEW OF 
FACTS AND VALUES
Sociologists and sociology as a profession are now 
in a position where they must explicitly discuss extra - 
epistemic decision orientations which may direct and be 
used to evaluate choices involved in seeking knowledge, 
action by sociologists, and the use of sociological 
knowledge. If we consider a value to be a standard of 
worth (Kaplan, 196^:370), which expresses a preference, 
a system of values may be considered to be a system or 
set of preferences. Boulding (1967:12-13) argues that 
any subculture holds such a system of value-preferences, 
which while common to the members of the subculture are 
distinguishable (uncommon) in reference to other sub­
cultures . More importantly, each subculture possesses a 
metavalue or set of metavalues, which Boulding terms an 
"ethic" (and that is termed here a "decision or goal 
orientation"),^ and which may be used "for evaluating and
1While the term "ethic" probably conveys what Boulding has 
in mind, its usage in philosophy seems to demand greater 
specificity and a somewhat different form than do sets 
of meta-values such as those we loosely term "truth" or 
"knowledge". To avoid confusion the terms "decision 
orientation" and "goal orientation" are used here in place 
of the term "ethic". This distinction will be discussed 
later.
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legitimating preference systems" (Boulding, 1967*12).
Science may similarly t>e said to be a subculture and
also to possess a decision orientation which is generally
agreed upon and made explicit. As Boulding points out,
this orientation exists in two closely related yet
distinguishable forms.
There is in the first place, a high preference 
for veracity. The only really unforgivable 
sin of the scientist is deliberate deception 
and the publication of false results. The 
career of any scientist who has destroyed 
his credibility in this way is virtually 
over. . .
Along with the preference for veracity goes 
a strong preference for truth. These are not 
the same things. Veracity is the absence of 
deceit, and truth is the absence of error 
(Boulding, 1967*13)*
This set of metavalues or orientation of sociology, 
and indeed of all science, is clearly enistemic in nature 
and allows evaluation of a wide number of lower level 
values systems. On the basis of the preceding arguments, 
it may further be argued that a similar, non-epistemic 
orientation is needed in sociology. This non-epistemic 
orientation would, in a parellel manner, allow evaluation 
and legitimation of lower level value systems inherent in 
making the necessary choices involved in seeking and 
using sociological knowledge, which cannot be made solely 
on the basis of knowledge-related values. Ideally, we 
would like to "prove" the validity of our choice of an 
orientation. However, this may not be possible.
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There are those who do argue that the correctness of 
values may be proven in that values may be shown 
to be correct or incorrect by empirical test. In 
other words, the correctness of values exists to be 
discovered, and may therefore be treated as objective.
Thus, Kolb p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  g roup  o f  s o c i o l o ­
g i s t s  who b e l i e v e  t h a t  " . . .somehow i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  th e  u n i v e r s e  v a l u e s  o b j e c t i v e l y  e x i s t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
o f  t h e i r  a p p r e h e n s i o n  and e s p o u s a l  by  man. Thus i f  i t  
i s  o b j e c t i v e l y  wrong t o  commit m urder  i t  i s  wrong even 
though  no man knows o r  e s p o u s e s  i t "  (W. Kolb i n  Dewey and 
Humber, 1 9 6 6 :6^7 )*  I n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  t h i s  v iew ,  s i n c e  
v a l u e s  i n h e r e  i n  o b j e c t s ,  t h e i r  c o r r e c t n e s s  may be p r o v e n  
o r  d i s c o v e r e d  e m p i r i c a l l y .  For  exam ple ,  a  s o c i o l o g i s t  can  
p ro ve  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  s o c i a l  a r r a n g e m e n t  i s  wrong b e ca u se  
i t  l e a d s  to  h u n g e r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  s o c i o l o g i s t s  c an  p r e ­
sum ably  s t u d y  th e  s o c i a l  w o r ld  and d i s c o v e r  which n o n -  
e p i s t e m i c  o r i e n t a t i o n  s h o u ld  g u id e  t h e i r  d i s c i p l i n e .
A contrary position to that just briefly presented is 
offered here. It might be called the "sceptic's view", in 
that it is sceptical about our ability to validate or justify 
claims of value solely with reference to knowledge claims or
2
The idea that values may be treated as objective is argued 
in a different way by those who hold what philosophers term 
the "Intuitionist" perspective (who might argue for example 
that human beings possess a unique faculty for intuiting 
values; that value statements are therefore descriptive 
statements; and that values are objective but non-observable.)
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facts. According to this sceptic's view the idea that
the correctness of values is provable, in that they are
empirically discoverable, is at this time an undemonstrated
assertion. Until this assertion or some other assertion
can be more adequately demonstrated, the sceptic's view
sees another assertion that runs counter to it as being
more acceptable.
Specifically, it is asserted that the validity of
values is ultimately non-demonstrable or provable by refer- 
3
ence to facts. This assertion is based on the idea that 
every statement of the value of some given object or state 
of affairs is based on a prior, higher level value judg­
ment. Each statement of value at increasingly higher levels 
in turn demands yet a higher level value judgment until 
finally a metavalue is chosen which must be merely asserted 
to be of value. In short, the justification of every 
value requires higher level values until we reach a point 
at which the value of that value is necessarily assumptive.^
3
-'The term "fact" is used here to designate what is the 
case, or is actual.
ij.
It should be pointed out that the sceptic's view does not 
contradict the idea that in practice groups' values 
change with changes in their conception of the facts, or 
that the choice of values may be explainable sociologically 
in terms of fact. Rather, this view argues that values 
cannot be validated or justified solely with reference to 
facts. In short, the sceptic's view sees an important 
separation between explaining held values and justifying 
them. In ChapterVI a contrary "evolutionary-naturalistic" view 
is presented which offers a strong challenge to this separation.
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Consider the case of an agricultural reform. If 
a sociologist studies an experimental agricultural reform 
within a culture, how is he to determine that this reform 
is of value? On studying the reform he may say "I have 
discovered that this reform is not to he valued because it 
leads to unproductively sized farm plots." When asked 
why unproductively sized farm plots are not valuable, he 
may respond that "they lead to low crop yields." When 
asked why low crop yields are not to be valued, he will 
probably refer to numerous other valued states in turn, 
until he says "because it leads to hunger." As strongly 
as many of us hold this higher level negative value 
concerning hunger, the adherent to the sceptic's view 
would argue that it must be recognized that hunger's lack 
of value is also assumptive, and would point out that there 
are groups that do value hunger, offer rationales to support 
it, and under certain circumstances are willing to fast 
until death. With regard to the "empirical test" or 
"proof" of any particular value or of the value of some 
state of affairs, the point at which one reaches the level 
of a value which is necessarily assumptive will, of course, 
vary.
Often, however, such a question of value will regress 
to a question of the value of existence. Consider the 
case of a tree. According to this position, if we look 
at a tree there is no way for us to "see" value in it»
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This is because there is no value within the tree, but
rather the value is imposed by us upon the tree.^
In contrast, it may be argued that we do not see the 
value of the tree because values do not exist in objects 
or states of affairs but rather in relations between them. 
The sceptic may grant this, and ask that we look at the 
tree and its relation to other things around it. We find 
that the tree is of value to the bird who uses it for a 
nest, the house builder who needs wood, or to the hill it
sits on in that it prevents erosion. All of these state­
ments of valued relations assume that the bird,, the house 
builder, and the hill are themselves of value, and 
the tree gains value by contributing to their welfare.
Thus, the tree's value is tied to their value. We 
may look to still other relations to support the con­
tention that the bird, house builder, and hill are 
valuable. Ultimately, however, we must reach a point 
where we say that the existence of X (i.e. the house 
builder) is of value. But what warrants stating that 
the existence of X is of value?
Without reference to another value, it cannot be
_
-'Tt is important to note that while it is argued that 
values do not inhere in the object, this in no way 
denies that valuing is an interactive process. That is 
there must exist an object to value as well as a valuer 
for valuing to take place. Yet this interactional 
process of valuing is primarily one of imposition of 
value upon the valued object by the valuer.
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demonstrated that the existence of X is of value which
is greater than the value of the existence of Y, in that
existence must equal existence,. Without reference to 
another value, it is not demonstrable that one form of 
the existence of X is greater value than some other 
form of existence of X. Or more telling still, it is 
not possible to demonstrate that the existence of X 
is of greater value than the non-existence of X . If
this were the case, all that is ought to be. As
logically odd as it might appear, we can say further 
that non-existence is just another form of existence 
(in that as far as we know matter and energy do not 
cease to exist but rather change form and are contin­
ually reorganizing). To put this matter somewhat more
concretely, would the universe be less of value if man
£
had never existed in it? Ultimately, according to the 
sceptic's view, we must assume even the value of a given 
substance - its value is neither discoverable nor demon­
strable (unless of course we make reference to some 
assumed higher level value). It is asserted then that
z-------------All that would be lost perhaps is values themselves. 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that it can be 
argued that mankind has added value to the universe 
in that he has a possibility of comprehending the 
universe, and that if man had never existed this 
possibility and thus value would be lost. While this 
idea may be comforting to man, it is unclear how this 
would comfort the universe, or how the universe would 
be of less value for having never been comprehended.
100
the validity of values is non-demonstrable or provable 
by reference to facts in that such a demonstration 
rests upon (a perhaps implicit) a priori assumption of 
value.
It may be argued in opposition to the sceptic's 
view that the correctness of certain states of affairs 
is discoverable, in that certain of these high level 
values are shared by all mankind, and therefore we can 
determine whether the state of affairs is to be valued 
by seeing if it or its consequences are implied by this 
universally shared higher level value. It may be agreed 
that once a value is universally held, certain states 
of affairs can be tested against it and it can be there­
fore "empirically shown" whether those states are in ac­
cordance with that value. Similarly, certain lower level 
values can be said to be consistent or inconsistent with 
the higher level value. Even granting this, (l) it is 
unlikely that any universally held highest level value 
would exist, and (2) even if such a value was found, it's 
value would only universally be assumed, and would not 
necessarily be valid because it is universally held.
Whether there are in fact any such universally held 
high level values probably can be put to an empirical 
test if we are willing to commit the immense time and 
resources necessary. However, even if such a 
test were carried out, it seems highly unlikely that
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any such test would yield a universally held highest 
level value. For example, consider the possibility 
of men all valuing their own existences. While there 
would he those who would prefer life over any other 
value, there would also be those who would prefer non­
existence over certain forms of existence. In short, 
there are those who would, and have, preferred death 
to certain forms of life.
In the same vein, while societies probably con­
sider every person who commits suicide to be irrational, 
there is no necessary reason for sociologists to make 
the same characterization. Clearly all of us can imagine 
that one would quite reasonably and rationally choose 
to commit suicide rather than continue in that form of 
existence. No matter how strongly we may disagree with 
their actions, it is likely that it is we who are being 
irrational if we assume that every Kami-Kazi pilot 
who deliberately sacrificed his life in World War II 
was irrational.^
^It is unclear if there are any societies that when faced 
with what appears to be intolerable circumstances, have 
"chosen" non-existence directly, or courses of action 
which are recognized as having a high probability of lead­
ing to nonexistence. At any rate, one can clearly 
conceive of such a "choice" (if societies can make 
choices), and certainly there are numerous examples 
of societies going to war in which they risk non­
existence for the sake of other valued ends, suggesting 
that societal existence was not the highest value.
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As is the case with existence, there seems to "be 
no higher level value which would be held universally.
It is important to note that even if there were such 
a universally held value, no validity would be conferred 
upon it by virtue of the fact that it is universally 
valued. We would have discovered not something that 
is correct because it is universally held, but only a 
value that is universally assumed.
In sum, then, the sceptic's view asserts that values 
are ultimately non-demonstrable with reference to facts.
As such, this view can probably best be categorized as what 
is termed in the philosophical literature a non-cognitivist 
or non-descriptivist view. As Frankena points out, "the 
most extreme of these are a number of views that deny ethical 
judgments, or at least the most basic ones, to be capable of 
any kind of rational or objectively valid justification"
(1973’ 105)• The sceptic's view clearly would concur with 
such a position and thus is probably best classified as a 
non-cognitivist view. Strictly speaking it seems, however, 
that philosophers assume that non-cognitivist theories make 
statements not only about the demonstrability of values, but 
also about the nature of the meaning of value statements 
For example, "emotivists" argue that value statements, 
rather than making a statement of fact, are really express­
ing deep-seated emotions. To illustrate, one "emotivist,"
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A. J. Ayer, "...has suggested that ethical predicates are 
like exclamation points of a special kind, that 'stealing 
is wrong'.' is a misleading way of putting 'stealing'.'.'.' 
where the triple exclamation point is taken to express 
horror or indignation" (Brandt, 1959*20^). Some logical 
positivists, like Rudolf Carnap, agreed that value state­
ments are not descriptive of anything, but considered them 
to be disguised commands. Thus, Carnap would take "stealing 
is wrong'." as meaning in a disguised way, "do not steal." 
Both Carnap and Ayer would agree that value sentences 
are forms of speech that are important to social life, 
but such forms of speech certainly do not state a fact, 
nor describe that which is true or false (Brandt, 1959!20^). 
Still other views as to the meaning of ethical statements 
have been offered, such as that of Bertram Russell, who 
held that moral judgments merely express a certain kind 
of wish (Frankena, 1973sl05)• In presenting the sceptic's 
view, no specific theory of the meaning of ethical state­
ments has been offered and presentation of such a theory 
seems unnecessary for present purposes. However, at a gen­
eral level the various theories seem to concur that value 
statements are non-descriptive and non-factual, even 
though they sometimes may be improperly presented as 
factual or descriptive. Thus, the sceptic's view seems 
most appropriately fixed philosophically with the "non- 
cognitivists" or "non-descriptivists," even though
1<&
its prime focus is the jsutification rather than 
the closely related area of the meaning of value 
statements.
In the preceding pages, the "sceptic's view" of 
the relationship between facts and values has been 
presented. It asserts that the validity or correctness 
of values is ultimately non-demonstrable with reference 
to facts - in short, unless some high level value is 
simply assumed, one cannot legitimately go from an 
"Is" to an "Ought." At the same time the values held 
by individuals, groups, and societies can be explained 
by the social sciences without reference to a mystical 
or cosmic source from which values were once universally 
believed to spring. It may be implied that if the 
sceptic's view is adopted, and values are not seen as 
validated by facts or allowed the claim of legitimacy 
due to a mystical parenthood, values have been robbed 
of their importance. Yet it need not follow that 
they have been so robbed, for even if the social 
sciences reach the point where the holding of values is 
fully explained, values would remain important to men
g
in that men act on the basis of values. There is no
^----------------------
even if we re-name and/or reconceptualize them.
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reason to believe that because we have explained values
we have made them less valuable to men. Although we
may quantify them, re-label and dissect them with new
constructs, and reach a point where we can predict
their occurrence, this in no way proves that they are
invalid or incorrect. Nor do we show that values are
unimportant or unnecessary. When we explain something,
we explain it - we do not explain it away.
Herbert Muller argues cogently in this areas
And the familiar- statement that human life is 
'meaningless' may itself be meaningless for 
practical purposes. All readers are acquainted 
with the melancholy picture: of matter as a 
mad dance of electrons, of life as 'a disease 
which afflicts matter in its old age,' of man 
as a forked form of life that has learned to 
strut and fret - of the whole witless show 
playing itself out mechanically before an 
empty house, the only issue being whether the 
universe is exploding or running down. But in 
denying the existence of a consciousness 
outside the universe, an intelligible purpose 
behind the whole enterprise, the disenchanted 
forget that there is nevertheless a conscious­
ness aware of the universe, and that life has 
a very urgent meaning for those who consciously 
live it. If man's purposes make little 
perceptible difference to the universe, they 
make a great deal to him.
Yet neither is this to say that whatever 
is is right. We cannot prove that it is better 
to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied, even if we alone know both sides 
of the question. We cannot say that conscious­
ness and thought must be good because nature 
produced them; nature has produced, and 
destroyed, all kinds of oddities (Muller, 1 9 6^:3 3 ) •
When we explain why someone finds a situation
meaningful, with all the necessary references to social-
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ization, reinforcement contingencies, environmental 
constraints, or what have you, we make the situation 
no less meaningful to that person. Nor have we 
demonstrated that it is invalid to find it so.
Even when a child cries over something that we con­
sider insignificant, we need not deny the reality of the 
hurt or pronounce it insignificant to the child. Sim­
ilarly, the sociology of religion, while it makes no 
assumption concerning the existence of God and assumes 
that religious beliefs are explainable in "natural" terms, 
does not assume that practices are insignificant or that the 
feelings that lead to them are not deep. In short, neither 
assuming that peoples' possession of values is explainable 
in "natural" terms, nor asserting with the sceptic that 
the validity of values is non-demonstrable, implies that 
they are or should be insignificant in human life.
Moreover, the assertion made - that the validity of 
values is ultimately non-demonstrable or provable by refer­
ence to facts - asserts just that: their validity is
ultimately non-demonstrable. It does not assert either that 
all values are invalid, nor on the other hand, in some 
relativistic way, that all values are valid for those who 
possess them. First, it does not assert that all values 
are invalid in some ultimate sense. They may in fact be 
valid, but there is simply no way of demonstrating their 
validity. Just as the sociology of religion assumes that
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the existence of God is non-demonstrable, while neither 
affirming nor denying His existence, so the sceptic 
argues that the validity of values is non-demonstrable, 
without either affirming nor denying their ultimate validity.
Similarly, it should not be concluded that the sceptic's 
view necessarily implies some extreme form of ethical rela­
tivism. Presumably one who would take a stance of ethical 
relativism would argue that all individual (or group, or 
societal) value stances are valid relative to each indiv­
idual (or group, or society). To the contrary, the sceptic 
is arguing that in the final analysis all such stances are 
of non-demonstrable or merely assumptive validity.
According to the sceptic, all values are not equally valid, 
but rather they are equally non-demonstrable. What is 
argued, then, is not some form of extreme relativism, but 
rather extreme scepticism.
Since it is held that the validity of all values is 
equally non-demonstrable, knowing the characteristics of 
the individuals, groups, or societies who hold those 
values makes the values they hold no more demonstrable. Thus, 
a corollary of the sceptic's view may be offered. It is 
asserted that no characteristics of the individuals (groups, 
societies, etc.) who hold certain values confer any extra, 
special validity on those values. In this limited sense, 
it is asserted that no individual's values are of greater 
validity than those of another individual due to the char­
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acteristics that either possesses. For example, this 
assumes that a particular individual's values are not of 
greater validity because he holds a position of authority 
in a religious community and makes claims of divine in­
spiration. While certain individuals are better able to 
convince others to adopt their values, to actualize goals 
resulting from those values, etc., due to greater power, 
access to resources, or ingenuity, none of these character­
istics of the individuals confers any greater validity on 
the values they hold.
This implies that the values of sociologists have no 
greater validity than anyone else's. This is not implied 
by the counter assertion, discussed earlier, that the 
correctness of values is discoverable. If the correctness 
of values is discoverable empirically and thus is closely 
related to facts, the sociologist should have the correct 
conception of the good society in that he knows the most 
about social life. His knowledge allows him to make correct 
value judgments. His empirical competence implies a compe­
tence in making value judgments.
It [the doctrine of value freedom] is inappro­
priate for if the discipline which claims to 
know the most about the nature of social life 
does not offer its most reasoned judgments, to 
whom does the obligation fall? It would seem to 
those less competent to make them - which also 
seems absurd (Gray, 1968:180).
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This statement confuses epistemic competence 
with value judgmental competence. The validity of 
the values of sociologists has no less an assumptive 
basis than the validity of anyone's values. If 
sociological knowledge determines the correctness of 
values and dictates action, presumably we should admin­
ister a test of sociological knowledge - perhaps the 
Advanced Graduate Record Examination in sociology 
might do - find the sociologist who scores highest, 
and say "tell us what we should value and tell us 
what we should do." However, even if the sceptic admits 
that this sociologist can best show us the means to 
actualize our values, or show us the implications, there 
is no reason for assuming that the sociologist's values 
are ultimately more valuable than anyone else's. On this 
point, the sceptic's view is probably in agreement with 
those of the value free position that "the scientific 
method as such provides no technique for answering ques­
tions of value, for determining ultimate ends..." (Bierstedt, 
19^8 :3 1 2 ), and thus scientists have no monopoly on 
"correct" values.
Gouldner attempts to place us on the horns of a 
dilemma in this matter, and we have just discussed the 
first horn - that of technical competence:
If technical competence does provide a warrant 
for making value judgments there is nothing 
to prohibit sociologists from making them
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within the area of their expertise. If, on the 
contrary, technical competence provide no 
warrant for making value judgments then, at 
least sociologists are as free to do so as 
anyone else; then their value judgments are 
at least as good as anyone else's, say a 
twelve year old child's (Gouldner, 1962:2 00).
The second horn of this dilemma is not really problem­
atic if we take Gouldner at face value. Sociologists 
are just as free as anyone else to make value judgments, 
and those value judgments have ultimately the same 
assumptive validity as anyone else's. Clearly then, the 
sociologist by virtue of being a sociologist has no 
right to dictate the values of others. Sociologists, 
it is argued, can no more than others discover the 
"correctness" of values, and claims of greater knowledge, 
or greater intelligence, or whatever, make values no more 
"correct" because persons with these qualities happen to 
hold them.
The sceptic's view as presented would of course not 
be without critics. An alternate view will be presented in 
Chapter VI,that would take issue with it at several points 
and offer a very different position. This work does not 
attempt or demand a choice between the views. Rather it 
is suggested that either position is sufficiently per­
suasive that some form of either might be accepted by 
many sociologists. As such, it would seem worthwhile to 
examine the implications of the adoption of either view 
for the choice of a goal or decision orientation by the
I l l
discipline of sociology.
If the sceptic's view is accepted, sociology is seem­
ingly placed in an irreconcilably difficult position. On 
one hand, non-epistemic values significantly enter at 
numerous points in the knowledge-gathering process and 
shape the resulting body of knowledge - as well as 
decisions concerning its use by sociologists and non­
sociologists alike. It was argued in the preceding Chapter 
that we need to choose an orientation to guide the value 
choices involved in sociology. On the other hand, the 
validity of such a value orientation is ultimately 
assumptive, and sociologists cannot demonstrate the validity 
of one orientation over another by reference to f a c t s . 9 
Thus, we are placed in the awkward position of having to 
choose with no adequate grounds for choice.
9 The type of reasoning that has led to this statement has 
probably led some to feel that value freedom is the only 
tenable position. However, this would only be the case if 
the arguments in the preceding Chapter - that sociology is, 
and most likely will continue to be, not value free, and 
that to the extent that it is not we must choose - are not 
accepted. In sum, the reasoning presented suggests that 
while we must choose, the grounds for our choice are not 




A SUGGESTED GOAL/DECISION ORIENTATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION
If the preceding analysis of the sceptic's view is 
accepted, we are faced with what seems to be an insol­
uble dilemma. The profession must choose an extra- 
epistemic orientation in order to make the necessary 
evaluations of, and choices among, the numerous al­
ternatives presented in the process of seeking and em­
ploying sociological knowledge. At the same time we 
recognize that any orientation that is chosen can not 
be proven "correct" and that its validity is ultimately 
assumptive. This apparent dilemma is, however, not 
insoluble.
The implication of the sceptic's view is not that 
the choice of an orientation is impossible, but rather 
that it must be recognized that the ultimate value of the 
orientation is not demonstrable or "provable" but rather 
is only assumptive, and that the best we can do in arguing 
for an orientation is to offer persuasive reasons. Since 
any orientation that would guide the search for an employ­
ment of sociological knowledge has implications for elements 
in the social structure being maintained and or changed 
which may or may not be valued by those who par­
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ticipate in society, any such orientation at minimum 
carries with it at least indirect value imposition on 
societal members. While Chapterlll argued that a choice 
or orientation is necessary, Chapter IV:. argued sociol­
ogists have no warrant for value imposition as a result 
of characteristics possessed by them, be it greater 
intelligence, knowledge, power, etc. However, there is 
one orientation that might be adopted by the profession 
that is unique in that it may act as referent in decision 
making while minimizing unwarranted value imposition.
While additional persuasive reasons will be offered 
in Chapter VII,the uniqueness of this orientation may be 
seen as the most persuasive of the reasons offered by 
those who are swayed by the sceptic's view.
It is proposed here that the guiding goal orienta­
tion for sociology should be the seeking of societies 
which embody social structures that optimize alternatives 
(or "freedom") for their m e m b e r s G i v e n  the preceding 
discussion, it is recognized at the outset that the value 
of the orientation is assumptive rather than demonstrable. 
As a result, we are in partial agreement with the
"*"The term "freedom" here is used synomously with the 
phrase"optimization of alternatives" since it seems 
that many who use the term may imply such a usage. How­
ever, it is recognized that the term "freedom" is used 
at the writer's peril in that it has other common usages 
that are clearly excluded later in this section such as 
"absence of constraints ."
llA
psychologist Kelman who, while suggesting that
freedom is an essential part of being human, seems
to recognize that his holding of the value of freedom
is assumptively based.
...The purpose of education and of the ar­
rangement of the social order, as I see it, 
is to enable men to live in society while 
at the same time enhancing their freedom 
of choice and widening their areas of 
choice. I recognize as ethically ambi­
guous any action that limits freedom of 
choice, whether it be through punishment 
or reward or even through so perfect an 
arrangement of society that people do 
not care to choose. I cannot defend 
this value because it is not logically 
derived from anything else. I can, of 
course, offer supporting arguments for 
it...While I can offer these supporting 
arguments, I recognize that freedom of 
choice is, in the final analysis, a 
rock-bottom value for me (Kelman, 1965s
3 5 ) .
While it may be admitted that the proposed orien­
tation is of only assumptive validity it seems fair to 
demand that the reasons for adopting be persuasive. Given 
■the sceptic's view and the difficulties it presents, 
a particularly persuasive reason for adopting the pro­
posed orientation is that it uniquely mitigates those 
difficulties.
It was argued in the previous chapter that the 
correctness of all values is ultimately non-demonstrable, 
and that all values are of equally assumptive validity.
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Further, no additional validity is conferred on those 
values by the power, knowledge, or other characteristics 
of the individual or group that possesses them. This 
suggests that the sociologist as well has no right to 
dictate values to others by virtue of greater knowledge, 
intelligence, or technical competence. Since a sociolo­
gist's values share the same assumptive basis as those 
of the rest of the population, he has no warrant for 
choosing an orientation which maximizes his values at 
the expense of the values of others. Yet sociologists 
have available one orientation which has the unique quality 
of mitigating the difficulties of unwarranted imposition 
of sociologists' values upon the rest of the population. 
This orientation is the optimization of freedom of alterna­
tives .
More specifically, we may say that freedom is 
optimized when alternatives or choices are optimized, 
whether these alternatives be in thought, speech or 
action. Put more formally, it is urged that sociology 
adopt as its primary non-epistemic orientation: the
optimization of alternatives open to every individual.
While reasons of lesser importance will be offered 
later, it is urged that this orientation be chosen in 
that it has the prime virtue of in fact providing an 
orientation which allows sociologists to make and 
evaluate value choices concerning the use of sociolo­
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gical knowledge, while at the same time minimizing 
value imposition by the sociologist upon the rest of 
the population. The effects of unwarranted value 
imposition are mitigated in that the optimization of 
alternatives allows every individual, to the 
maximum degree possible, to act in accordance 
with his values and actualize them in the form of 
goals. The goal of sociology as embodied in the 
orientation, then, would not be to impose a specific 
conception of "the good" upon others, but rather to 
seek a social structure or social structures that 
optimize the alternatives open to every individual 
through which they can actualize their own conceptions
of "the good'.
The remainder of this chapter will further specify
the nature of the proposed orientation. ChapterVI offers 
a view of the basis for the choice of an orientation that
2It should be pointed out that the argument here may be 
considered paradoxical, given the discussion in Chapter 
IV. While in the sceptic's view it is a "fact" that 
ought statements cannot gain validity from statements of 
facts (and that value imposition is unwarranted), the 
primary persuasive reason offered at this point for 
optimizing alternatives is this same sceptic's view of 
what is asserted to be a basic fact. Even if it is assumed 
that an argument's being paradoxical is an important 
criticism: (l) Chapter IV' dealt with facts as a basis 
for demonstrating validity rather than as a basis for 
persuasive reasons, and more importantly, (2) if the 
argument is paradoxical it may be paradoxical in an 
unimportant or trivial sense in that it is much like 
faulting one for the paradox contained in the argument 
that "there are no absolutes:"- This does embody a 
paradox if it is stated in absolute terms but seems 
necessary to make the argument, and the accusation of 
paradox would not seem to have much bearing on the sub­
stance of the argument.
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conflicts with the sceptic's view, and yet offers a 
different but important reason for adopting it.
Chapter VI offers a view of the basis for the choice of 
an orientation that conflicts with the sceptic's view, 
and yet offers a different but important reason for 
adopting it. Chapter V U  offers other less central 
reasons for adopting the orientation and suggests 
limitations and difficulties involved in adopting the 
orientation such as problems of justice or distribution, 
and considers the relation of this goal orientation to 
the goal of knowledge.
Further Clarification of the Pro-posed Orientation
To clarify the proposed goal or decision orientation 
of the optimization of alternatives open to every 
individual, we can first contrast it to its opposite, 
and second contrast it to two other conceptions of free­
dom.
Any time sociological knowledge is used to bring 
about social changes or maintain a social system in 
its present state, some form of manipulation or control 
must be employed. Kelman suggests that this is also 
the case for changes in individual behavior: "effective 
behavior change inevitably involves some degree of 
manipulation or control, and at least the implicit 
imposition of the change agent's values on the client 
or the person he is influencing" (1965 03)* In short, 
some type of intervention must be made to produce the 
desired state which would not occur if the system were
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left to its own devices. It is argued here that the or­
ientation which minimizes the imposition of the values 
of the controller or manipulator, and maximizes the 
values of the client or person being influenced, is the 
optimization of alternatives open to every individual.
For comparison purposes, consider an example of 
behavioral manipulation in accordance with the opposite 
orientation - the minimization of alternatives open 
to every individual.
We may say that there exists a wide range of 
alternative environments open to every individual from 
which each may choose. These environments may be either 
social or physical. Further, an individual has open to 
him a wide range of alternative behavioral repertoires 
or sets of behavioral subroutines that correspond to 
any particular environment. Let us make the example 
more concrete by considering a simplified presentation 
of recreational alternatives.
In Figure 1 four alternative physical environments 
are suggested in which recreational behavior might 
occur. Also listed are seven types of recreational 
activities or behavioral repertoires, such as swimming. 
Any recreational environment has a set of behaviors which 
are appropriate to it while others are not. Similarly, 
any recreational repertoire is appropriate to certain 
environments and not to others. In this sense, the 












Figure 1. Example of mapped physical environments 
and recreational behavioral repertoires, used in 
explaining"optimization of alternatives" 
orientation.
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That is, certain environments evoke or allow a certain 
range of behaviors, and the desire to behave in a certain 
way predisposes one to seek certain environments.
Now assume that a group of people place a negative 
value on skiing and have access to the knowledge and 
the resources necessary for manipulation. They could 
either prevent access to environments where skiing (water 
or snow) was possible, i.e. the ocean, lake, or mountains, 
or they could use that knowledge to eliminate the 
behavioral renertoire called skiing. Similarly, they 
could use the available knowledge and ability to mani­
pulate and control that it implies to insure that 
positively valued recreation will occur, by eliminating 
the availability of other environments where that 
recreation does not occur, and by eliminating the 
other recreational behaviors that correspond to the 
remaining environments. In both cases, the impact of 
the manipulation is the minimization of open alternatives.
In general, the body of sociological knowledge can 
be used in this way to bring about a general decrease 
in alternatives. On the other hand, it can also be 
used for the purpose of expanding the number of alter­
native social environments and for the purpose of 
expanding the number of possible behaviors available to 
individuals within any given social or physical envir­
onment. Choosing to optimize the alternatives open
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to every individual is choosing to optimize the values 
of those who act (all), rather than only those who 
control (the few) . The most "basic choice in terms of a 
sociological orientation is between this orientation of 
optimizing alternatives open to every individual, and the 
opposite orientation of increasing the choices and freedom 
of those who control while bringing about a general decrease 
of choice and freedom for those who act.
In terms of this choice, if the general minimiza­
tion of alternatives is chosen, it makes very little 
difference who the manipulator is who places the 
actualization of his values above freedom of choice.
Whether the sociologist provides the facts to politicians 
who employ these facts in imposing their values (in a 
"decisionist" model), or whether sociologists make the 
choice of value imposition themselves by virtue of 
their professional qualifications (in a "rationalist" 
model) (Eisele, 1971-2:101), matters very little in terms 
of the extent to which freedom is removed if some other 
value is placed above it. Whether the model is 
decisionist or rationalist, the imposition of values 
(especially from the point of view of the optimization 
orientation presented here) "...is completely inadequate, 
since decisions about human existence are made by men 
who are not capable of deciding them. Decision-making 
is kept out of the public realm. The public can do no more
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than legitimize the power of decision-making elites" 
(Eisele, 1971-2:101). The orientation of the 
optimization of alternatives (and the working assump­
tion that suggests it) assumes that those best able 
and most justified to make decisions about human 
existence are those who live that existence. The 
alternative chosen is to optimize the choices open to 
every individual, and thus freedom, rather than pro­
posing that some select few possess values that are 
sufficiently justified to warrant abrogating that freedom.
Two Other Conceptions of Freedom. In addition to 
clarifying the orientation of optimization of freedom as 
the optimization of alternatives open to every individual 
by comparing it to its opposite, we may also contrast it 
to two other conceptions of freedom.
First, in the expression "optimization of freedom", 
the term "freedom" does not mean freedom from constraint 
or limits. Although the optimization of alternatives 
decreases the limits placed on choice, entering into 
society demands that any individual's behavior has 
limits. Any social environment, even one that optimizes 
alternatives, places constraints upon behavior as do 
physical environments. Freedom, then, is a social 
relationship, and not a lack of relationship.
...freedom emerges as a continual process 
of liberation, as a fight...to remain depen­
dent ...Freedom is not a solipsistic exist­
ence but a sociological action. It is not
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a condition limited to the single individual 
hut a relationship, even though it is a 
relationship from the standpoint of the 
individual (Simmel, in Wolff, 195°!120-1).
For an individual to gain the benefits of a society 
which optimizes alternatives, he must enter into that 
society and that entrance places constraints upon him.
The society necessary to optimize alternatives 
open to every individual still structures and constrains 
behavior, in that while the range of alternatives is 
broadened, that range is still limited. While in­
creasing the number of alternatives makes the society 
increasingly complex, the structuring of alternatives 
allows an organized complexity of individual behaviors, 
and not the chaotic "everybody doing his own thing."
To summarize this point, freedom, in the sense of the 
ethic proposed here, is a characteristic of structured 
social relationships, and not an isolation of the 
individual from the influence of social constraints.
What is urged is not individuals who are freed from 
constraint in their isolation, but rather societies 
whose social structures optimize alternatives open to 
all societal members.
Secondly, the term "freedom" is not meant to denote 
a freedom to restrict the alternatives open to all by 
an individual or group of individuals. This is the 
sense in which the term "freedom" is often used in 
rhetoric, as in: "We are free to do as we please, and
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my freedom to establish a monopoly, discriminate against
3
certain groups, etc., should not be abridged."-^ The 
orientation proposed here urges the optimization of alter­
natives open to every individual (all individuals), and 
in this way seeks a general optimization of freedom.
This suggests that any action designed to bring about 
a general optimization of alternatives may actually bring 
about a decrease in alternatives for some particular indiv­
idual or group of individuals. Thus, for example, economic 
freedom might at first be seen as allowing as an alternative 
the carrying out of monopolistic practices. On the con­
trary, monopolies would not be implied by the orientation 
in that they eliminate both the alternatives of those who 
wish to enter the market as well as the alternatives of
4those consumers who wish to purchase within the market.
What is suggested is that it may be necessary to eliminate 
one alternative in order to bring about optimization of 
alternatives.-^ In short, the orientation suggests that 
every individual's freedom should be optimized, and that any
-^ It may be the use of the term in this way that causes some 
to be hesitant to espouse freedom as a value.
4 . . .While it seems reasonable that monopolistic practices
would bring about a general decrease rather than a general 
increase in alternatives, whether they actually do or not 
may be treated as an empirical question.
■^ This also suggests again that what is not being proposed is 
an absence of constraints. Constraints placed on certain 
behaviors or emerging relationships that generally decrease 
alternatives are essential to a society that would optimize 
them.
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particular individual's freedom should he maintained up to 
the point that he jeopardizes the freedom of others. We 
may formalize what we mean by adding a rider to the orien­
tation to the effect that while actually present areas of 
choice open to every individual should be widened to the 
greatest degree possible, they should be opened to any 
individual (or group) to the extent that it is compatible 
with equal freedom for all. With the rider added the 
orientation urges that individual sociologists and the 
discipline as a whole seek: the optimization of alternatives 
open to every individual compatible with equal optimization 
of alternatives open to all. This rider suggests that each 
individual's freedom should be continually increased up to 
the point that it begins to interfere with others' optimi- 
zation of freedom. This orientation then clearly suggests 
an optimization of freedom not for elites, or a powerless 
minority, or even a popular majority, but for all indivi­
duals - which includes elites, minorities, and popular 
majorities.
Possible Implications of the Sceptic's View for the Relation 
Between the Optimization of Alternatives Orientation and a 
Survival Orientation
Anticipating the Chapter to follow, some discussion 
should be given of the implications of the sceptic's view 
—
Even when not stated explicitly on the following pages, 
the rider may be assumed to be implicitly present.
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for a possible decision or goal orientation of societal 
survival. It could be argued that sociology should orient 
its decision making by using as a referent the promotion 
of societal survival. That is, all decisions involved in 
the search for and employment of sociological knowledge 
should be aimed at developing and promoting the increased 
likelihood of societal survival. An adherent of the sceptic's 
view would probably argue that while most take the striving 
for survival for granted, the value of such striving is 
still non-demonstrable or assumptive. As such, it also 
depends on persuasive reasons for its adoption despite what 
may be considered the "obviousness" of the value. In that 
societal survival is clearly necessary to a society that 
optimizes alternatives, one persuasive reason for a survival 
orientation that might be offered is that the discipline 
should orient itself toward survival because this would have 
instrumental value. The survival of society might not be 
argued to be of value in itself, but rather insofar as and 
because it allowed the possibility of freedom.
The sceptic's view does not offer the possibility of 
solid grounding for the choice of an extra-epistemic orien­
tation. The promotion of social structures that optimize 
alternatives is argued to be a unique goal worthy of con­
sideration for adoption by the sociological profession. 
Alternative optimization is -unique in that it least imposes 
some substantive conception of the good upon others by
127
widening areas of choice in which societal members may 
actualize their own conceptions of the good.
The Chapter to follow takes serious issue with the 
sceptic's view, arguing that there exists firmer footing 
for the choice of such an orientation, and offers a con­
siderably different view of the assertions made in Chapter 
IV concerning the relation between facts and values.
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CHAPTER V I .
THE NATURALISTIC-EVOLUTIONARY VIEW:
ANOTHER POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE CHOICE 
OF A GOAL OR DECISION ORIENTATION
Contradicting the "sceptic's view" there are numerous 
"naturalistic" positions which in various forms argue that 
knowledge or factual claims can serve as a hasis for the 
making of value claims. While they disagree as to which 
types of facts should act as the basic referents (i.e. 
pleasure, desire, need, etc.) they would undoubtedly con­
cur in rejecting any view which denied facts a central 
role in the justification of a goal orientation (for dis­
cussion of major naturalistic positions, see Hancock 197^: 
18-^0, 58-86; Adams, i9 6 0 ; Perry, 195^; Frankena, 1973*96- 
102). All of these positions share in common some form of 
the view which identifies statements of what is good, ob­
ligatory or ought to be with some natural object or proper­
ty. The term "natural" can be defined in reference to 
objects as "something of which the existence is admittedly 
an object of experience" (Moore, 1903:38). As such reference 
is made to objects and properties which are capable at some 
point in time of being verified as "facts." "If we consider 
whether any object is of such a nature that it may be said 
to exist now, to have existed, or to be about to exist, 
then we may know that that object is a natural object, and 
that nothing of which this is not true, is a natural object"
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(Moore, 1903:^0). Further, the reference that is made in 
these views to natural objects and properties is in terms 
of basic or highest level values rather than lower level 
values .
One way of putting (the) question is to ask 
whether our basic ethical judgments can be 
justified in any way similar to those in which 
our factual judgments can be justified. It 
is therefore, by a natural impulse that many 
philosophers have sought to show that certain 
ethical judgments are actually rooted in fact, 
or as it used to be put, 'the nature of things'... 
Opponents have...countered that this cannot be 
done since one cannot get an Ought out of an Is 
or a Value out of a Fact. Now, we do sometimes 
seem to justify an ethical judgment by an appeal 
to fact. Thus, we say that a certain act is 
wrong because it injures someone...However, it 
becomes clear on a moments thought that our con­
clusion does not rest on our factual premise 
alone...We are tacitly assuming that injurious 
acts are wrong, which is a moral principle...
In such cases, then we are not justifying our 
ethical judgment by reference to fact alone but 
also by reference to a more basic ethical pre­
mise. The question is whether our most basic 
ethical or value premises can be derived logi­
cally from factual ones (Frankena, 1973>96-97)•
While many of the naturalistic formulations that
argue for justification of most basic value premises by
reference to facts are worthy of consideration, only one
has been singled out for examination here. This is the
evolutionary approach that has been argued forcefully by
Waddington in his recent book, The Ethical Animal. This
newer formulation most successfully circumvents major
arguments which have been lodged against most other
formulations of a naturalistic view.
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Most of these numerous formulations can be roughly 
said to have taken one of two general approaches in their 
line of argument. The first general approach is to 
attempt to logically derive as a conclusion premises 
containing terms such as "good" or "ought" from other pre­
mises which do not contain them. These approaches are 
accused of being fallacious in that they make a leap in 
logic which is not acceptable according to usual practices. 
That is they try to argue that A = B .'. A = C, without 
inclusion of premises that logically connect A to C .
The second general approach rather than attempting to log­
ically derive an Ought from an Is, attempts to define 
the good in terms of some natural property such as "the 
pleasurable." This approach is argued either (l) to be 
circular, in that what we wish to ascertain is defined into 
existence and often later treated as having been demonstrated, 
or (2 ) to be begging the question, in that, for example 
once "good" is defined as "pleasurable" we may still ask 
if any particular pleasurable act is also good. This latter 
question can' only be answered by reference to the term 
which we were initially trying to define. Waddington's 
evolutionary formulation takes neither of these approaches.
As a result it may be argued that Waddington circum­
vents these serious criticisms.
Waddington's Naturalistic-Evolutionary View
The perspectives suggested in E . H. Waddington's The
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Ethical Animal'1' offer numerous challenges to the 
"sceptic's view" of the basis for choosing a non- 
epistemic decision orientation. Had Waddington read 
Chapter IY of this work, he would probably begin to 
criticize the "sceptic's view" for implying a conception 
of man's reasoning about the world and his imposition of 
values upon it which presents man's intellect as standing 
apart from nature. Such implications would be criticized 
as misrepresenting the surrounding circumstances of 
life.
The human intellect is an instrument which 
has been produced during the course of 
evolution, primarily by the agency of natural 
selection, supplemented by the specifically human 
evolutionary processes which we shall discuss 
later. Like all products of evolution, it has 
been moulded by the necessity to fit in with - 
or rather, to put it more actively, to cope 
with the rest of the natural world. Its 
function is not to produce a God-like vision of 
the human situation seen from the standpoint 
above and outside the turmoil of actual 
life (1 8-1 9 ).
The sceptic's view, by making inadmissible the basing 
of an orientation that guides and justifies choices on our 
knowledge of the world, sets man apart from the nature
Since Waddington's (i9 6 0 ) The Ethical Animal (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press) will be relied upon 
heavily, page numbers in parentheses refer to this 
source. While this brief review shall attempt to con­
vey the flavor and substance of Waddington's argu­
ments , the reader is referred to the original to 
gain fuller appreciation of the richness of this 
scholar's insights.
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which molds the intellect which chooses. It might he fur­
ther argued that adherents to the sceptic's view see "a 
radical distinction between man and the rest of the world," 
viewing man as acting independently from the rest of the 
world and observing and acting upon something essentially 
foreign to himself, rather than employing faculties that 
are a product of evolution which are moulded by and allow 
man to fit into the natural world (7 6 ).
Just as Waddington would disagree with what he might 
see as the sceptic's view of nature, he would similarly 
disagree that the choice of an orientation, which embodies 
basic values and ethical considerations, can have only 
an assumptive grounding. Basic facts for Waddington are 
species' attempts to survive and species' evolution.
Further, human ethical systems are products of, and play an 
important role in, human survival and evolution. As such 
rather than asserting that there is only an assumptive 
basis for the choice of ethical systems, Waddington argues 
"that the framework within which one can carry on a rational 
discussion of different systems of ethics, and make com­
parisons of their various merits and demerits is to be 
found in consideration of animal and human evolution" (2 3 ).
Waddington argues that the situation for societies is 
similar to that of the newborn human infant who develops 
into an "ethicising being" (one who "goes in" for ethics)
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not wholly as a result of intrinsic forces but as a result 
of interaction with external circumstances. Ethical feel­
ings and beliefs are adopted because they are functional 
in assuring a child's survival and promoting his relation­
ships with others (25-27)- Societal ethical systems have 
also evolved in the process of interaction with social and 
physical environments, and have survived because they have 
promoted societal survival and evolutionary developments. 
If we grant that the function of ethical beliefs is to 
promote survival and evolutionary development, we have a 
criterion for chosing between ethical systems - the extent 
to which they fulfill or fail to fulfill this function.
Now, once we have assigned the functions to a 
general type of activity we have a rational 
criterion against which to judge any particu­
lar example of that activity. To say that some­
thing has a function is not merely to assign 
causal efficacy to it, but implies further that 
the causal network of which it is a part has as a 
whole some general character. A particular ex­
ample of the activity can then be judged by how 
well it brings about the realization of that 
character.
It is a criterion of this kind which we can 
hope to apply to human ethical beliefs. We 
have first to try to ascertain the general 
character of human evolution or, indeed of animal 
evolution as a whole. We have then to inquire of 
any particular ethical belief which comes to our 
attention, how effective it is in mediating this 
empirically ascertained course of evolutionary 
change (2 9 -3 0 ).
Thus for Waddington, the choice and justification of 
any particular belief is how well it fulfills its functions
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of promoting survival and evolution. Naturalistic views 
such as this have not been without critics, but Waddington's 
formulation is unique in its circumvention of the major 
thrust of these criticisms.
Waddington's Handling of the Criticisms Lodged Against 
Naturalistic Perspectives
As was pointed out at the beginning of this Chapter, 
many of the previous naturalistic formulations have attempted 
to logically derive ethical statements from statements of 
what is the case. Such attempts have been accused of 
making what G.E. Moore terms the "naturalistic fallacy."
These refutations find their roots in the writings of 
Hume (especially A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3» Part 
I) :
In every system of morality which I have 
hitherto met with, I have always remarked that 
the author proceeds for some time in ordinary 
ways of reasoning and establishes the being 
of a god or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised 
to find that instead of the usual copulations 
or propositions is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not concerned with an ought 
or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is however of the last consequence. For as 
this ought or ought not expresses some new re­
lation of affirmation, it is necessary that it 
should be observed and explained; and at the 
same time that a reason should be given for what 
seems altogether inconceivable; how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others that 
are entirely different from it (Hume, in Waddington: 
50-51) •
This criticism that one can not legitimately deduce 
an ought from an is can probably be legitimately applied
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to many formulations, however it does not seem applicable
to Waddington's formulation. This is because he is not
maintaining that the good is deducible from facts but 
rather that ethical systems can be chosen and justified 
by reference to a factual criterion - namely their func­
tionality in promoting survival and evolution. The crucial 
distinction here is that Waddington is arguing that one 
can employ a factual cirterion in our choice of orientation, 
not that we deduce the ultimate value of the orientation 
from facts. While it is widely assumed that some high level 
value must be the final arbiter in such choices, Waddington 
argues that a supra-ethical criterion can just as readily 
be facts.
However, for my major purpose the validity or 
otherwise of the refutation of the naturalistic 
fallacy is irrelevant. I wish to maintain that 
it is possible to discuss, and perhaps to dis­
cover, a criterion which is not of an ethical 
nature, but is, if you wish, of a supra-ethical 
character! a criterion, that is to say, which 
would make it possible to decide whether a
certain ethical system of values is in some
definite and important sense preferable to 
another (5^-5 5 )*
Using a naturalistic-evolutionary criterion is not 
argued to confer upon the chosen ethical system any ulti­
mate value. Put another way, the only "good" that can be 
said to be conferred upon the chosen ethical system is a 
"good of a kind." When we say "this is a good gun" we can 
say so without implying either that guns are good, or that 
this gun has an ultimate value. Rather we would imply that
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this particular gun performs well the functions that ob­
jects of this kind are supposed to perform, namely shoot 
straight, have high velocity, or whatever. Similarly, we 
might say that the use of an evolutionary criterion does not 
add any ultimate value to the chosen ethical system, but 
rather that it is also a good of a kind - it performs well 
the function of ethical systems generally in that it pro­
motes well survival and evolution.
In a similar fashion to the circumvention of the criti­
cism of fallacious deduction, Waddington also circumvents 
the criticisms lodged at formulations that define the "good" 
in natural terms. The "definist" formulations are often 
accused of being circular in that they begin by defining 
the "good" in natural terms, and then later assert that these 
properties or objects are "good" and are to be valued. 
Waddington is not defining "good" or "right" as "more 
evolved," and points out that there is really no resemblance 
between the characteristic we have in mind when we use 
the terms "good" or "right" and that which we have in mind 
in using the term "more evolved."
If we ask ourselves what more evolved means 
we should find in it, I think, two main ele­
ments: (1 ) that conduct so described comes in
time, after a process of evolution of more or 
less duration, and (2 ) that it has as a char­
acteristic which usually emerges in the course 
of evolution, that of being more complex in 
comparison with the simple activities which 
appear in an early stage of evolution and it 
is surely clear that neither temporal poster­
iority nor complexity nor the union of the 
two, is that which we mean to refer to when we
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use the term right or obligatory (5 1 )•
And if the factual terms and value terms are not 
interdefined there is no grounds for accusing this 
evolutionary-naturalistic formulation of circularity.
What Waddington is presenting, then is a form of argu­
ment that is radically different from classical naturalistic 
presentations, and which as a result circumvents their 
difficulties. In fact, Waddington's view is sufficiently 
different from classical naturalistic positions that we 
should perhaps take note of the difference by using terms 
such as "quasi-naturalist"2 or "second order naturalist" 
when referring to a position such as Waddington's. At 
the same time, we may reserve the term "naturalist" or use 
the phrase "first order naturalist" when referring to 
classical naturalists. First order naturalists normally de­
fine certain ethical terms with reference to natural terms. 
They do this explicitly in"definist" views, or implicitly 
when deducing ethical statements from factual ones (where 
the implicit definition is actually what allows the deduc­
tion) . In either case, the use of the naturalistic 
definition is such that once the definition is agreed to 
some ultimate, substantive ethical principle follows 
immediately from it. The proposed ethical principle, then, 
is circular, or true by definition. As Brandt points out,
2
The term "quasi-naturalist" was presumably coined by Brandt 
(1973*265-267) in discussing his own "qualified attitude 
method" of ethical justification.
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"some naturalist definitions, like the proposal that 'x is 
worthwhile in itself' means 'x is pleasant,' have the 
consequence that substantive ethical principles are true 
by definition (in this case 'something is worthwhile in 
itself if and only if it is pleasant')" (1973*266). A 
second order or quasi-naturalistic position, on the other 
hand, does not define ethical terms with reference to 
naturalistic ones, but rather defines naturalistically 
a method for choosing between ethical systems. Further, no 
important substantive ethical principles follow immediately 
from that method by definition. Waddington can best be 
considered a "quasi-naturalist." As we understand him, the 
novel thrust of Waddington's position is considerably 
different from that of earlier naturalists. A first order 
naturalist might have said, "by 'good' we mean 'x is that 
which leads to survival,'" and have concluded "x is good 
if it leads to survival." Waddington, in contrast, is 
defining naturalistically a method for choosing between 
statements. In particular, he is arguing that our criterion 
for choosing between ethical systems is the extent to which 
they fulfill their function of promoting survival and 
furthering evolution. Such a method does not automatically 
entail some particular substantive ethical principle. As 
a result of this second order or quasi-naturalistic stance, 
he successfully circumvents the criticisms lodged against the
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first order n a t u r a l i s t s . In fact, since a substantive good 
is not being defined, the criticisms, when applied to 
Waddington, may best be considered irrelevant, rather than 
incorrect.
To a theory which attempted to discover a criterion 
for judging between ethical systems the refuta­
tion of the naturalistic fallacy would be largely 
beside the point. We should be denying Moore's 
contention that 'the question, how 'good' is to 
be defined, is the most fundamental question in 
all Ethics.' Instead our standpoint would be 
somewhat nearer to that ascribed to Kant by Broad, 
when he wrote: 'Kant would say, I think, that it
is no more the business of ethics to provide rules 
of conduct than is the business of logic to pro­
vide arguments. The business of ethics is to 
provide a test for rules of conduct, just as it 
is the business of logic to provide a test for 
argument.' But we should be carrying the argu­
ment one step further. Where Kant was seeking 
to establish some particular ethical belief as 
a criterion by which to judge between alternative 
rules of conduct, we should be attempting to 
establish some general principle of wisdom as a 
criterion for judging between alternative ethical 
beliefs (5 3 -5^)•
In short, by taking a quasi-naturalistic stance, 
Waddington sidesteps the major criticisms lodged against 
earlier naturalistic positions. Given that those funda­
mental criticisms have been avoided, what facts can be 
looked at as the criterion?
The Naturalistic-Evolutionary Basis for the Choice Between 
Ethical Systems
Those maintaining an evolutionary-naturalistic view 
would not see the question of continued survival as one 
that needs justification in terms of value as the sceptic
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would argue is necessary. Rather, while it might be recog­
nized that some members of certain species and societies 
have not maintained attempts at continuation of existence, 
it would be argued that the basic fact of biological know­
ledge is that every known species and probably the existence 
of every human being has been guided by the continuation of 
that existence. A second,
...unavoidable biological fact is that of 
evolution. For at least the last hundred 
years, since Darwin wrote, biologists have 
had to consider all living things, including 
man, as being produced in such a way as to 
bring its results into adjustment with the 
circumstances surrounding it. It is by now 
absolutely conventional and a matter of first 
principles to consider the whole physiological 
and sensory apparatus of any living thing as 
a result of a process which tailors it into 
conformity with the situation with which the 
organism will have to deal. The same princi­
ple undoubtedly applies to behavioral charac­
teristics, and there is no obvious reason 
to deny it out of hand in relation to in­
tellectual and even moral characteristics in 
those organisms which exhibit them (7 2-7 3 )»
From an evolutionary-naturalistic perspective, then, 
these are the primary facts that should serve as a cri­
terion in the choice and justification of a value system.
In accordance with this view, an orientation should be 
chosen and is most justified which maximally promotes 
survival and evolution. In reality, evolution is not seen 
as a distinct criterion apart from survival, but rather the 
two are seen as highly interdependent. Evolution in a most
lkl
general sense is molded by and a product of survival, and 
evolutionary developments may be said further to generally 
increase the probability of survival.
Waddington also offers a more specific analysis of the 
biological evolutionary system with special emphasis on the 
genetic system (8 5-1 0 0 ), which while providing an excellent 
discussion of knowledge and recent insights need not concern 
us here. However, one recent insight will be of particular 
interest to social scientists. This insight is generally 
credited to Darlington. While it has been generally recog­
nized by biologists that species are evolving, only recently 
has it come to be recognized that the genetic systems re­
sponsible for evolutionary development are themselves evol­
ving. The genetic system is that whole complex of processes 
by which hereditary variation is brought into being and 
transmitted. What is being argued is that "there will be 
a natural selection in favor of more efficient systems which 
most effectively throw up hereditary variations of the kind 
natural selection will favor" (101). While a large number 
of different genetic systems have been recognized in sub­
human species the most radically different appears to be the 
"socio-genetic" in the human evolutionary system.
While the teaching of younger members of the population 
by older members plays a relatively minor role in sub-human 
species, it plays a major role in the human species, and
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many diverse modes of information transmission and reception 
have developed. "What we have here amounts to a new mode of 
hereditary transmission. It is true that this cannot trans­
mit a new variation in our bodily structure as do the genes, 
but it can transmit conceptual knowledge, beliefs, feelings, 
aesthetic creations and other mental phenomenon together 
with a vast variety of non-human artifacts" (102). Dobzhansky 
(1956) and others, have come to agree with Darlington,
Julian Huxley,and Waddington that man's development of a 
cultural system constitutes a mode of evolution which was 
previously non-existent. It is seen as a significant step 
in the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, and is often 
referred to as the "socio-genetic" mode or system.
It is highly similar to the genetic system in some 
respects. At an abstract level genes can be said to be 
primarily transmitters of genetic information from one 
generation to the next. The socio-genetic mechanism also 
passes information to succeeding generations.
Another writer trained in the classical doc­
trines of genetics, Kenneth Mather, has re­
cently expressed the same ideas as follows:
'ideas have many of the properties we find in 
genes...they are transmissible, and therefore 
permanent in the same sense as genes, they 
vary and they are selected. Because they vary 
and are selected, the caucus of ideas and con­
cepts on which the structure of society de­
pends is not only capable of evolution but must 
evolve ... this social evolution...has come to 
overlay and obscure the genetical variation that 
we see when we look within societies' (in 
Waddington, 1960:106).
1^3
The socio-genetic system has perhaps come to "over­
lay and obscure" the genetic due to important differences 
between the two. Socio-genetic transmission is not limited 
only to biological relatives, but rather information may 
be transmitted and received by a wide variety of societal 
members. Further, the information is not received 
"entirely or even mainly at one point in the life history 
of new generations." As a result, "we have, as it were, an 
enormous expansion and multiplication of paragenetic trans­
mission" (113). The result is an overshadowing of the 
genetic system, and as a result knowledge, technology and 
social structures have evolved at a tremendous pace, when 
compared with nomadic hunting populations of the Paleo­
lithic age, but with relatively slight changes in body 
structure. It should not be construed from this that the 
genetic system is no longer operating in man - it is; the 
evolutionary capabilities of each evolutionary system over 
time are said to differ.
What is presented then is a new system that is not 
argued to be merely analogous to the genetic system, but 
a new system of evolution that is both a product of the 
genetic system and continues to operate with it.
While we shall shortly consider still more explicitly 
the implications of the evolutionary-naturalistic perspective 
for the choice of an orientation, prior to that a brief
Iil4
transgression is in order to suggest some of the criticisms 
that an adherent of the sceptic's view might advance con­
cerning this position serving as a basis for such a choice. 
Potential Criticisms of The Naturalistic-Evolutionary Position
Since major criticisms have been already advanced 
against the sceptic's view, it seems appropriate that 
potential criticisms of the naturalistic-evolutionary posi­
tion be suggested. These criticisms are suggested only 
briefly here in that this work is not attempting to choose 
between these bases for the choice of orientation. Rather 
it assumes that even in light of the criticisms advanced 
toward each, that each will be sufficiently attractive to 
a significant number of professionals to warrant their 
discussion in terms of a possible orientation for sociology.
1. The first criticism that a sceptic might offer is 
that it is inappropriate to have as a criterion for the choice 
of an orientation that would guide important areas of human 
behavior, some fact or facts alone, uncoupled with some 
statement of high level values. Even if the sceptic 
admitted that the criterion was truly factual, and avoided 
the problems of fallacious or circular reasoning, it might 
be argued that the high level values ought still to be 
the final referent. Here the sceptic may doggedly ask, even 
of such a basic fact as existence, "but should we value it?" 
Even Dobzhansky, who is an acknowledged supporter of evolut­
I k  5
ionary e t h i c s 3  p0ints out that even if we were provided 
with complete knowledge of the direction of human 
evolution,
Just why should we take for granted that 
this direction, which we have not chosen, 
is good? The very fact that man knows that 
he has evolved and is evolving means that 
he is able to contemplate speeding up his 
evolution, slowing it down, stopping it all 
together, or changing its direction. And his 
increasing knowledge and understanding of 
evolution may enable him to translate his 
thoughts into reality. Despite any exhortations 
to the contrary, man will not permanently 
deny himself the right to question the wisdom 
of anything, including the wisdom of his 
evolutionary direction (Dobzhansky, 1956sl29).
Thus the sceptic, insisting on the inclusion of
questions of ultimate value, draws the argument back into
the web of infinite regress and assumptive validity. In
fairness to Waddington and others sympathetic to his
position, it should be pointed out that the idea that basic
values, rather than basic facts, should be the court of
last appeals is probably best characterized as an arguable
assertion. And while it may be asserted "that an ethical
value is ex officio the overriding principle of policy,
and can be judged only in terms of something which has still
a higher value" (5 5 ) *  this need not automatically be assumed
to be the case. On the other hand, the idea that certain
basic facts or wisdom should act as a supra-ethical criterion
3
^Waddington says that Dobzhansky is "perhaps the most 
distinguished evolutionist of today" (1 0 5 ).
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standing above basic values is also an assertion that need 
not automatically be assumed to be the case. Both views are 
seen here as assertions in that at that level of disagree­
ment one probably must assert his position in order to 
defend it.
2. The sceptic may question whether survival (in
the sense of continued existence) of a species is truly
problematic, or whether there are more serious threats
to valued ways of existence. Man's adaptability makes
serious foreseeable threats to the survival of the human
species improbable. As Waddington points out:
The recent metamorphosis in the human condi­
tion has been extraordinarily rapid. Four life 
times could not cover the essential transition.
Man's adaptability is so great that we often 
fail to realize the magnitude of this change (1 3 )*
Even if tomorrow there were an all out nuclear war,
undoubtedly the species would continue to exist in some
form. The sceptic would argue that the question lies in
the value of the form of survival.
This objection may be stated in more positive terms,
thd; is that many of us wish to do more than survive, we
wish to somehow "improve" or change in more positively
valued ways. At several points Waddington explains his
position by reference to an analogy of physical health
(i.e. see 29-31 of 59)• Thus for the nutritionist to
criticize eating habits he finds out what the function of
1 k-7
eating is, i.e., growth or health; finds out what diets 
satisfy this function; and then examines the particular 
d i e t .  What we have in Waddington's terms, is a normative 
criteria. We find out what is statistically normal and 
use this as a grounds for criticizing abnormality. "The 
criterion we are applying here is one of general accor­
dance with the nature of the world as we observe it. If 
any individual approaches a nutritionist and says that he 
prefers to grow in an abnormal and unhealthy manner, the 
nutritionist can do no more than tell him that if he does 
so he will be out of step with nature" (30) . The problem 
is that many people may wish to be "abnormal" in a 
positive sense, such as an athlete. A view tied to 
statistical normality allows no possibility of being 
extra-ordinary, exceptional, or transcendent. Similarly, 
we may wish our society to change in positively valued ways 
apart from a greater likelihood of continued existence. 
While it may be argued that the idea of evolution carries 
with it the idea of improvement, or change in positively 
valued ways apart from contribution to survival, if we 
shift the definition of evolution and embed more value 
terms within it, then we are guilty of the naturalistic 
fallacy discussed earlier in this chapter. In particular, 
the circularity of the definist position would have been 
incorporated. Further, the value of that value implicit 
in evolution would then have to be demonstrated.
3* It may be argued that since knowledge or wisdom
concerning evolution are urged to be the basis for choosing
and justifying the choice of an ethical system, we do, and
are likely to, lack sufficient knowledge or wisdom to make
such an important choice. Our knowledge of the evolutionary
process in general, and human evolution in particular has
passed through numerous radical changes. Yet, each stage
of knowledge which was later to be discredited was as
strongly believed at the time to be the "facts" as are our
current notions. Consider earlier instances of evolutionary
ethics. Waddington points out that:
Herbert Spencer and others advanced theories of 
a "Social Darwinist" kind, involving such notions 
as the inevitability of progress and the application 
of such slogans as the survival of the fittest or 
the struggle for existence to human social affairs.
These theories have been so completely discredited 
that at this time little further needs to be said 
about them (2 3 )•
Such "notions" were not simply put forth as the conject­
ure of a few, but rather were widely held, and more important­
ly were widely held to be "facts." The question is whether 
we have sufficient certainty that our knowledge and concept­
ual frameworks on the whole so accurately reflect actual 
processes, that what remains before us is a filling in of 
the gaps, as opposed to a major conceptual revolution. If 
the answer is no, do we wish to have our lives directed by 
such knowledge?
It should be pointed out that in one sense this is an 
unfair criticism. It can be argued that while numerous
1^9
decisions of application of the criterion would he affected, 
the fact of some kind of evolution seems unlikely to change 
and thus the criterion would remain at bottom unchanged.
The criticism is unfair if what is being criticized is 
the lack of knowledge involved in the application of the 
criterion, for the application of any ethical system, even 
when chosen with high level values as the criterion, depends 
on knowledge of what is, was, and will be the case and 
would fall prey to the same criticism.
k . While the general nature of change in evolution is 
argued to be progressive, it is pointed out that any 
particular stage need not be (125-126). The decision seems 
to be made in large part as to whether the change at any 
given stage is in line with the species' "character." For 
example, the movement of the horse from small four-toed 
animals, to animals with long legs and single toes is said 
to involve a series of improvements in that this movement 
enhanced the general character or organization. In particular 
their basic character is to rely for survival "on their fleet­
ness of foot to escape their enemies" (126-127). Retro­
spectively, this conception of the species' character makes 
sense. The epistemological problem is that it is arrived 
at retrospectively. If evolution had proceeded differently, 
say with horses' toes becoming claws, or hind legs developed 
for kicking, or its hide became increasingly tough and 
impenetrable we would also point to these changes as
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improvements in line with a very different understanding of 
the species’ character.
More to the point, if we truly accept the idea of 
evolution, there is no reason to necessarily assume that 
there exists some species character that starts initially 
and is continually refined. It seems equally reasonable 
to consider the possibility that each species' basic 
character or organization is also evolving. That is to 
say that each species is not so much becoming more of 
what it is, but is becoming more of what it is becoming.
If in fact a species' character is also evolving, and we 
have no way of knowing it at some evolutionary "end point" 
(should there be one) there is a serious difficulty in 
changing a point of reference.
Other criticisms could be lodged against the naturalis­
tic-evolutionary view, just as they could against the scep­
tic's view. It is highly unlikely that any position could 
be developed in this area that would be beyond criticism, 
and both positions have sufficient merit that one could 
reasonably hold either. Again, the tact taken here is not 
to attempt to choose between them, but rather to consider 
their implications for the choice of an orientation since 
each will likely attract a large number of adherents among 
sociologists. Also, the choice is not made between them 
for perhaps a more important reason. In the discussion of
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the first cirticism concerning the choice between a highest 
level value and a supra-ethical fact as the final criterion 
in justifying an orientation, it was suggested that the 
disagreement was at such a basic level that it may be un­
reasonable and may be best considered an assertion. When 
the two positions are taken as wholes the same type of prob­
lem arises! that is they may be so basic that it may be 
impossible to get outside them to choose between them.
The term "view" was chosen in describing them because they 
may be conceived of as world views. More particularly the 
two positions seem to hinge on different perceptions of 
being. Waddington seems to suggest this:
The validity of Hume's argument that one can­
not logically proceed from an 'Is' to an 
'Ought' depends entirely on what is the content 
of the notion conveyed by 'Is.'If one con­
ceives of existence as, to put it crudely,
Newtonism space-time with some billiard balls 
flying round in it, then clearly neither 
'oughts' nor 'owes' can be logically deduced.
But if, to take another extreme, existence is 
considered as the manifestation of the nature 
of a beneficient Deity, quite other conse­
quences would follow (*&).
If the two positions are in fact two very different 
world views that embody different perceptions of ontology 
or metaphysics this writer is ill-equipped to suggest the 
mechanism by which we can choose between them. Further, 
while someone will undoubtedly attempt to do so, it is 
unclear how one can without difficulty proclaim "they are
152
both right". ^ At any rate, it seems worthwhile to examine 
the implications of the naturalistic-evolutionary perspec­
tive in terms of the choice of a goal or decision orienta­
tion as we have already done in Chapter V for the sceptic's 
view.
Implications of the Naturalistic-Evolutionary View for the 
Choice of an Orientation
From the preceding pages it has become clear that 
according to the naturalistic-evolutionary formulation the 
primary criterion for choosing an orientation is how well 
it fulfills its function of contributing to the survival 
and evolution of societies or the species.^ In the pre­
vious chapter it was suggested that if the sceptic's view 
were accepted it would support the choice of an orientation 
of optimizing alternatives open to all individuals, or 
more loosely an orientation which had as its goal societies 
which optimize freedom, in that such an orientation mitigates 
the effects of unwarranted value imposition. It is suggested 
here that even if the radically different naturalistic- 
evolutionary perspective were adopted, such an optimizing 
orientation would still gain support. In particular it is 
suggested that the optimization of alternatives is con­
gruent with the dominant features of human, and to some
-------------
On the other hand, they share at least one important 
communality of ceasing to argUe in terms of ultimate values.
^The exact referent of the criterion is not totally clear.
It variously is suggested to be societies, the human species 
as a whole, and the evolution of all species as a whole.
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extent non-human, evolution as we understand it, and that, 
all things being equal, the optimization of alternatives 
increases the probability of societal and species' contin­
uing evolution and survival. Before discussing this, two 
possible lines of reasoning that may be worth considera­
tion, but which will not be pursued in depth here should be 
briefly mentioned.
The first such line of reasoning is that if there is 
some dominant and discernible feature of the human species' 
character, it would be argued to be a desire and a love for 
freedom. While there would doubtless be a multitude of 
other candidates for this basic feature of human character 
a need for freedom might be plausibly argued. It might be 
argued in line with Kelman's (1965*35) suggestion "that the 
desire to choose represents a universal human need, which 
manifests itself under different historical circumstances 
(not only under conditions of oppression)." The second 
such argument is that if it is thought that the evolution­
ary course that mankind follows is unalterable (except perhaps 
to change the rate of speed at which we move), it could 
be argued that on the whole, human evolution is moving
toward freedom as an end point and we should try to be
£
consistent with it or speed it up.
While such a position may take serious exception with 
aspects of his conception of freedom or his characterization 
of the dialectic, it still might be argued to be in agree­
ment with Hegel who "considered that the history of the 
human race is development from less to greater freedom and 
from less adequate forms of freedom to freedom in its 
perfection." (Acton ,1 9 6 7 t ^ 6 )
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Either of these positions, while arguable, would re­
quire a vast amount of research and even then would probably 
be exceedingly difficult to demonstrate conclusively. The 
lines of reasoning and evidence to follow could also not 
be considered conclusive, but the evidence coming from some 
of the most noted evolutionary scholars of today - Wadding­
ton, Dobzhansky and others - is both highly suggestive and 
supportive of the maximization orientation being proposed 
here .
Waddington starts his chapter on "The Course of Evolu- 
7tionary Progress"' by pointing out that while the evolution­
ary system as a whole is such that it is characterized by 
an inherent tendency toward progressive improvement due to 
natural selection, "this does not imply that such progressive 
improvements always occur in every evolutionary sequence." 
(125) The products of evolution are at present usually con­
sidered by biologists in terms of three basic categories.
Two of the terms which label these categories were coined 
by Rensch ("cladogenesis" and "anagenesis"), and all 
three were presented in taxanomic form by Julian Huxley.
The three categories are: (1) Stasigenesis, the 
attainment of a biologically satisfactory condi­
tion which persists unchanged through long evolu­
tionary periods. Striking examples are provided 
by such well-known cases as the Brachiopol Lingu- 
la which seems to have remained unaltered since
n
'The choice of the term "progress" is unfortunate in that 
its common usage has made it somewhat slippery and it often 
carries ideological overtones. However, we use it to re­
main consistent with Waddington.
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the Ordovician Period ... (2) Cladogenesis, the 
evolution of a diversified range of species and 
genera all falling within a single organizational 
type...The appearance of a multiplicity of, for 
instance, Dipteran flies, or deer, or land 
snails, are just a few random examples. (3 )
Anagenesis, the appearance of something which 
can be recognized as an improvement over the 
previously existing type. It is the concept of 
Anagenesis which requires the greatest attention 
in the present context, (i.e. explaining evolutionary 
progress) (1 2 6).
Waddington explains anagenesis in terms of the example 
of the horse (126-127)• The evolution of the horse 
proceeded through various stages or in J.S. Huxley's terms 
"grades" (levels through which successive improvements have 
passed). The evolutionary sequence began with small four­
toed animals that grazed on grasses and bushes. They 
evolved along with other animals that survived by grazing 
on grass and relying on speed to escape their enemies.
"The whole group of animals, considered in relation to the 
needs of its mode of life, can be considered as falling 
within a broad general type of biological organization. 
Within this type of organization, a series of improvements 
took place during evolution" (127)• Some examples are 
the lengthening of legs and gradual shift from four toes to 
one which increased running efficiency, and development 
of longer and stronger teeth for chewing grass. "Changes 
of this kind are clearly improvements in efficiency by 
the frame of reference given by the three general types of 
organization. They constitute anagenesis..." (127).
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However, while this evolutionary development may be
said to be an improvement for a narrow point of reference,
from a wider point of view these developments may close
off a larger number of patterns of evolutionary development
that were open prior to these developments.
Now, what is an improvement from a horse may 
very well be something quite different from 
another point of view. The horse's anagenesis 
has in fact led to a highly specialized crea­
ture with only one toe on each foot, highly 
fitted for carrying out any type of life but 
quite unable to earn its living in nature 
except in that specialized manner. If one 
considers from a long run point of view the 
evolution of land-living mammals in general, 
it becomes apparent that the course which 
evolution has followed in the horse group has 
cut it off from the possibility of following 
some of the lines of change that were po­
tentially open to its remote ancestors, for 
instance the development of the manipulative 
hand. Anagenesis may therefore lead to an 
evolutionary dead end (1 2 7 ).
Thus, while certain courses of evolution may con­
stitute improvement in a limited sense of improving 
immediate efficiency, from a wider point of view they may 
not be an improvement in that they cut off other potential 
lines of development which would allow further evolutionary 
development. Within the category of anagenesis a crucial 
distinction must be made in order to take this difference 
into account.
While Huxley has used the term "anagenesis" in a very 
broad way to refer to any development that can be said to 
be an improvement over the previous type, Rensch, who
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originally coined the term, used it in a more narrow way.
By the term "anagesis" Rensch meant "an improvement in 
grade w?hic.h did not, at least to any marked degree, 
restrict the potentialities for future evolutionary 
developments" (128). Waddington suggests that we may continue 
to use Huxley's broader usage if we make a sub-distinction 
within it. "If we continue, as seems wise, to use anagenesis 
in the wide sense suggested by Huxley, we can distinguish 
two types of anagenetic change: a 'closing' type which leads 
to improvement with one type of biological organization but 
a restriction of future potentialities, and an 'opening' 
type which involves improvement but no noticeable re­
striction" (128).
Waddington offers several examples of opening 
anagenesis which have been produced by the genetic system.
For instance, the development of a special part of the 
external or internal body surface to fulfill the function of 
respiratory exchange as was the case with the gills or 
the lungs carried with it no obvious limitations, and 
moreover opened up new possibilities for utilizing the 
rest of the body surface for other uses, such as protection 
or absorption of food materials. The primary criterion 
in assessing any evolutionary development as being of the 
opening type is whether it leads to an increase in the 
possibilities of evolutionary alteration rather than a 
restriction of them. An additional example of opening
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anagenesis has occurred in the evolution of genetic systems 
themselves. Diploid sexual reproduction can be seen as 
anagenesis of the opening type in comparison to systems 
of self reproduction and mutation. However since the 
development of diploid sexual reproduction, with one ex­
ception all the more recent developments in genetic systems 
(i.e., unisexual or parthogenetic and hermaphrodite re­
production) have been of the closing type leading to re­
strictive specializations rather than opening new possi­
bilities of advance. The only recent opening anagenesis 
in the evolution of genetic systems has been the evolution 
of the characteristically human socio-genetic system 
(129-131) . This concept of opening anagenesis is crucial 
to understanding both human evolution and the modern view 
of evolution in general.
It is clear that for a discussion of biological 
evolution in relation to man and human evolution, 
it is the occurrence of anagenesis which takes 
the center stage. Stasigenesis is in some ways 
a failure of evolution...If nothing but stasi­
genesis had happened in the organic world, the 
concept of evolution would never have been in­
vented. Cladogenesis - the appearance of di­
versity is, of course, a real evolutionary 
phenomenon. The notion could indeed be taken 
to cover the whole of evolution if we were con­
vinced that no anagenesis had occurred. If 
there are any biologists who, while accepting 
the notion of evolution, reject that of evolu­
tionary progress, they must presumably consider 
that all the results of evolution can be placed 
under this heading. Such a position would, 
however, be a very extreme and peculiar one, so 
far removed from a single interpretation of the 
evidence that one could scarcely avoid the sus­
picion that anyone advancing it was doing so
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merely in order to provide grounds for some 
future argument. I think that all biologists 
who have no ulterior ends in view have always, 
from the time of Aristotle, agreed that one 
can discuss a real hierarchy or progression in 
the forms of the organic world (133-13^)•
Further, there is general agreement as to the way in 
which that hierarchy is arranged, at least in terms of 
hroad categories. While introductory texts offer detailed 
outlines, it is generally agreed that at the bottom are 
bacteria and viruses, then protozoa, then sponges, then 
molluscs, etc., on up through insects and finally the 
vertebrates at the top. Within that group is clearly seen 
a progression from various types of fish through the am­
phibia to the reptiles, birds, and mammals. This hier­
archy may be explained in terms of the different points of 
development at which opening anagenesis ceased, and closing 
anagenesis became dominant.
The existence of a clear-cut hierarchy which we 
interpret as evolutionary anagenesis, within 
single groups such as anthropods, forces us to 
remind ourselves of the distinction between open­
ing and closing anagenesis. Evolution from a 
primitive anthropod to a highly evolved insect 
such as a fly or a bee has -undoubtedly involved 
the real improvement of the anthropod type of 
organization, but this improvement has at the 
same time brought with it limitations which render 
indefinite further improvements impossible (13^).
.. .Similar considerations probably apply to all 
the major groups of the animal kingdom. In each 
of them evolution has produced, by anagenesis, 
the improvement of one particular type of bio­
logical organization, but in doing so has grad­
ually eliminated various other possibilities.
Within each group anagenesis has been in the 
main closing anagenesis (135)•
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Continuing evolution, then, demands an opening ana­
genesis in which structures remain open to, rather than 
restrict possible avenues of future development, and 
thus structures that do not perfect some particular form 
of organization. Any orientation which is to be chosen 
and justified on the basis of a naturalistic-evolutionary 
view, must be congruent with this major and basic evolu­
tionary fact, and must function to promote evolution by 
promoting opening anagenesis. The naturalistic-evolutionary 
perspective,as advanced by Waddington, dictates that the 
choice of an ethical system, should be in congruence with 
facts about processes which promote evolutionary improve­
ment or progress. As Waddington states, "The major point 
about opening anagenesis, which is important to the thesis 
I am advancing here jthat there has been evolutionary pro­
gress! , is that it has occurred. This I take to be es­
tablished by the consensus of general biological opinion" 
(136) .
The proposed orientation requires the seeking of socie­
ties and social structures that optimize alternatives for 
all individual societal and species' members. Optimizing 
alternatives implies optimizing possibilities of choice, 
and thereby courses of development. The orientation was 
introduced by comparing it to its opposite - the minimi­
zation of alternatives. The latter orientation requires 
the seeking of societies which minimize alternatives in
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order to establish some particular substantive conception 
of the "good" at the expense of alternative conceptions of 
the good. Such societies, so oriented, would be attempting 
to proceed in the direction of "the perfection of one parti­
cular type of organization." This, in turn, could be said 
to constitute closing anagenesis because by so doing they 
would not leave "open the possibility of future advance." 
Again the primary choice seems to be between societies that 
are organized in such a way as to keep open and expand 
avenues of development, change, and potential advance, and 
societies which strive to organize and develop in ways 
congruent with the actualization of some particular value, 
and in the process eliminate other potential lines of 
development.
Further, we know that the dominant mode of human 
evolutionary progress is socio-genetic. In this mode 
anagenetic, or improving, developments are carried out by 
the creation, transmission, and reception of ideas and 
emotions as well as non-intellectual artifacts. Widening 
the areas of choice open to societal members increases the 
avenues of divergent experience and exploration. These 
avenues in turn increase the probability of the creative 
production of new ideas, emotions, and artifacts. These 
new ideas can then be infused into the evolutionary develop­
ment of society as a whole. The central feature to be 
recognized about the optimizing orientation is that in opti­
mizing alternatives, potentiality is optimized. The
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orientation values social structures that open, rather than 
close, possibilities to societal members.
The proposed orientation cannot be proven conclusively 
to be the sole orientation that meets well the criterion of 
promoting evolutionary advance. However, if the central 
feature of continued evolutionary advance is opening ana­
genesis, both in animal evolution in general and human 
evolution in particular, as seems to be suggested by 
biological opinion; and if this orientation will better 
fulfill the function of ethical systems in general of 
promoting evolutionary advance by promoting opening ana­
genesis, it may be justifiably chosen by the profession as 
its decision or goal orientation. While further research, 
thought, and debate must be devoted to the topic, our current 
understanding of opening anagenesis seems at this time 
both highly suggestive and supportive of the proposed 
orientation, or some form of it, which optimizes alterna­
tives .
We may further consider the related question of whether 
the proposed orientation, as opposed to other orientations 
open to us, best increases the probability of societal 
(and thus species') survival. Obviously, the factors in­
volved which lead to survival are very complex and our 
knowledge far from complete. Still, for the sake of address­
ing the question, we may hazard the hypothesis that, 
in general, the societies that have the highest probability 
of survival are those societies that have optimized altern­
atives open to their members.
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The modern understanding of species' survival, does 
not see natural selection operating to favor species 
possessing certain innately superior characteristics, but 
rather must be seen in relation to the external circum­
stances that surround the species' life. Thus natural 
selection, in the modern view, is seen to favor species 
that can fit in with, adapt to, or, more actively, best 
cope with external circumstances surrounding their life.
In opposition to the optimizing orientation an argu­
ment might be presented along the following lines: (l) 
a given society's external circumstances, i.e., its social 
and physical envoronment, resource availability, etc., are 
of such and such a character, (2) social structures of a 
society oriented to a specified value best fit in, or can 
best cope with, these external circumstances, therefore 
(3) we should accept an orientation which promotes societal 
organization in line with this value, for (4) movement in 
the direction of perfection of this organization increases 
the probability of survival, due to the congruence of the 
direction of organization with the environment as it is.
If these premises are accepted, the choice of such a 
value orientation would be reasonable if an assumption is 
accepted which underlies the argument and is not made 
explicit. This assumption is that external circumstances 
are, in the main, and in their most important features,
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static. However, the contrary view is that environments 
are not static, but rather are highly dynamic and changing 
in important ways. If this is the case, societies which 
were made more adaptive by ruling out other alternatives 
in order to allow one value to dominant, may become 
maladaptive in an environment which has changed considerably. 
The problems with such a specialized organization have clearly 
been seen in experiments on other forms of life as Dobzhansky 
points out. While it is true that adaptation to the en­
vironment by means of genotypic specialization is advan­
tageous in a relatively constant environment,
The drawback of genotypic specialization and 
fixation is that the possibilities of adapta­
tion to environmental changes become severely 
limited. Numerous and ingenious experiments 
have shown that when an animal is placed in
novel environments, its innate behavior loses
its 'wisdom.' The animal is likely to do ex­
actly the wrong thing, damaging its own chance 
of survival or that of its offspring 
(Dobzhansky, 1956:95)•
While restricting alternatives to societal members 
may be more adaptive in a particular unchanging environ­
ment, these same restrictions may threaten societal 
survival within a changing social and physical environment 
if this restriction is allowed to be perfected. In con­
trast, the optimization of alternatives open to societal 
members would increase the probability that the society 
as a whole will have open to it behaviors and structures
that remain adaptive to, and can cope with, the changing
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environment. While, it may seem extreme to discuss the 
possibility of an end to societal or human existence,
"the geological strata of the earth’s crust contain 
fossilized remains of countless thousands of species that 
became extinct without issue...They became extinct mostly 
because natural selection made them too specialized to 
live in environments which were only ^ temporary" (Dobzhansky, 
1956:84).
The thrust of this chapter has been to present a view 
of the basis for choice of an orientation that is in many 
respects radically different from, and critical of, the 
earlier presented "sceptic's view." Even though they may 
represent highly divergent world views, the optimization of 
alternatives orientation that was originally presented as 
congruent with the sceptic's view is not only not rejected 
by adoption of the naturalistic-evolutionary view, but may 
be argued to be suggested and supported by that view. This 
is not to say that it is inconceivable that once either 
position was accepted some other orientation could be argued 
from it, but rather that the proposed orientation or some 
closely related form of it is sufficiently congruent with 
either view that it should be given strong consideration.
One final point should be made before turning to the 
final chapter. It could be argued that the over-riding value 
orientation should be the promotion of survival or evolution
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rather than the optimizing orientation. Thus it would he 
argued that should survival and freedom conflict, survival
O
should he valued ahove freedom. These points should he 
made in this context. First, to argue that survival 
should he given preeminent value over freedom and the 
chance to choose it, transforms the position of survival 
from a factual criterion to he employed in the choice 
of high level value to a high level value itself. This would 
constitute a significant shift in position, and the asser­
tion of value would remain to he justified. Second, if 
the argument in the present chapter is largely accepted, 
one need not feel compelled to choose between freedom and 
survival. On one hand, optimizing of alternatives may 
promote and he necessary for survival. On the other hand, 
survival seems a clear pre-requisite for freedom. Rather 
than heing at odds with one another, hoth freedom and 
survival may imply one another. Until there is clear and 
compelling evidence to the contrary, we are not compelled 
to choose either, for the promotion of either may lead to 
the promotion of hoth.
O "
And the dehate might proceed along the lines of the debate 
between Sidney Hook and Bertrand Russell.
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CHAPTER V II .
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE 
PROPOSED OPTIMIZING ORIENTATION
Two major "persuasive reasons" for adopting the pro­
posed goal or decision orientation of seeking social 
structures that optimize the alternatives open to every in­
dividual have already been presented. It has been argued 
that on one hand the adoption of the "sceptic's view"
(the adoption and justification of any such orientation 
ultimately has an assumptive basis) suggests and supports 
the optimizing orientation in that it uniquely mitigates 
the difficulties of unwarranted value imposition. On the 
other hand the adoption of the evolutionary-naturalistic 
perspective (which sees a much firmer grounding in the 
choice of a decision orientation) also is argued to suggest 
and support the optimizing orientation in that it seems 
most congruent with the modern understanding of evolution and 
survival.^ In addition to these two major reasons, five 
other reasons may be offered that also support the adoption 
of the proposed orientation.
Other Reasons For The Adoption Of The Proposed Orientation
(1) As suggested earlier, any use of sociological
^If these arguments are accepted, the proposed orientation 
may be said to have gained additional support in that there 
is likely to be a greater consensus concerning the desirabil­
ity of actualizing such social structures, if the optimizing 
orientation is supported by both of the basic views while 
other orientations are supported by only one of them.
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knowledge to bring about changes in behavior requires 
manipulation or control. If, contrary to the pro­
posed orientation, this control is used to minimize 
alternatives in order to either impose or eliminate some 
valued state, the behavior of the controller may become 
similarly limited as a result. This apparent paradox 
may occur because, in trying to insure that only the 
valued behavior occurs, considerable energy must be 
directed toward insuring that behavior is of the valued 
type. All things being equal, the more the actor wishes 
to behave in ways contrary to the values of the con­
troller, the more surveillance is necessary, and the 
more assiduously other alternatives must be blocked off. 
As a result, the behavior of the. controller is in­
creasingly dictated and controlled by the target 
population (even if there is no conscious desire by 
that population to do so).
(2) While it is conceivable that sociological 
knowledge could be gained without it, the growth of 
the body of sociological knowledge probably requires 
the participation of willing subjects and cooperation 
from others in gaining necessary information.
Jourard (1968:3-12) argues that people are increasingly 
becoming less cooperative with social scientists in 
that they feel that their aid in the knowledge process 
will not only not benefit those who are cooperative, 
but will also be used to manipulate and control their
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b e h a v i o r  i n  ways t h a t  r u n  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e i r  v a l u e s .
I f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  o r i e n t a t i o n  i s  a d o p te d ,  and i f  i t  i s  s e e n  
t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  s o c i o l o g y  a c t u a l l y  l e a d s  t o  a 
w id e n in g  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and th u s  a g r e a t e r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
each  p e r s o n  a c t u a l i z i n g  h i s  v a l u e s ,  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  p a r ­
t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  knowledge p r o c e s s  w i l l  p r o b a b l y  i n c r e a s e . 
S o c i o l o g i s t s  and s o c i o l o g i c a l  knowledge w i l l  b e n e f i t  f rom 
members o f  s o c i e t y  c o r r e c t l y  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  
b e n e f i t  by  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  h o n e s t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s ,  t im e  and e f f o r t  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  e x p e r i m e n t s ,  
and p e r m i t t i n g  a c c e s s  to  o t h e r w i s e  p r i v i l e g e d  i n f o r m a t i o n .
(3) By accepting support from a society that 
enables the enterprise to continue and individual 
sociologists to pursue sociology as a vocation, the 
profession incurs an obligation to reciprocate with 
benefits to that society. The pleasure of attaining and 
appreciating sociological knowledge for itself is not 
likely to be a benefit to the large majority of the 
population, particularly as that body of knowledge 
becomes more complex, abstract,and removed from 
"common sense." However, in contributing to the 
optimization of freedom sociology would have satisfied 
its obligation to provide benefit to society by contri­
buting to the optimization of each member's chances of 
actualizing their values.
l?o
{ ^ )  It was suggested in Chapter II that it is 
extremely difficult to argue the position that socio­
logical knowledge is valuable for its own sake, in that 
no other non-epistemic value can he invoked which that 
knowledge would serve to actualize. If freedom is of 
value, and sociological knowledge is sought and used 
to enhance the existence of freedom, then that know­
ledge too is of value. The non-epistemic ethic of the
optimization of freedom, then, provides a rationale for
2
holding the value of knowledge.
(5) Finally, one value that all sociologists 
probably hold, even those who maintain a value-free 
position, is freedom of inquiry. This may even be true 
of any scientist in that the ability of a science to 
advance knowledge is dependent upon the ability of a 
science to define its problems for itself, and not to 
seek the solution of problems simply because some 
authority defines them as important (Bendix, 1970:839).
This "freedom of inquiry"which is valued by and demanded 
for sociologists.primarily means that the maximum 
possible number of alternative areas of inquiry be 
made open. It may quite legitimately be asked how 
sociologists could justify demanding for themselves the 
_
It should be pointed out that any non-epistemic meta­
value, and not only the optimization of freedom, could serve 
to legitimate sociological knowledge, if sociological 
knowledge contributed to actualizing that metavalue.
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optimization of alternatives in areas of prime concern 
to them, while not extending the demand for the optimiza­
tion of alternatives to others. If sociologists are 
justified in seeking and maintaining their freedom, 
presumably freedom should be extended to all others 
as well - unless sociologists possess some peculiar 
characteristics which make them particularly worthy of 
freedom (which for some reason have not become 
generally known).
We may state this argument more positively. Given 
that freedom of inquiry is necessary to the growth of 
sociological knowledge, the proposed ethic should be 
held because optimizing the freedom of every individual 
entails the optimization of freedom of inquiry for 
sociologists
Before preceding, it should be reiterated that
^While Kelman sees high level professional values as not 
being logically derivable from anything else, some of 
his comments may suggest other persuasive reasons. He 
outlines several lines of deductive argument, which he 
does not pursue, but which might be reformulated into 
additional reasons for adopting the proposed orientation. 
First, I can try to show that the desire to choose 
represents a universal human need, which manifests 
itself under different historical circumstances 
(not only under conditions of oppression).
Second, I can point out that freedom of choice is 
an inescapable component of other valued states, 
such as love, creativity, mastery of the environment, 
or maximization of one's capabilities. Third, I can 
try to argue that valuing free individual choice is 
a vital protection against tyranny... (Kelman, 1965*35) •
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freedom is a social state, even though it is expressed 
in terms of individuals. As a result, the optimization 
of alternatives is an especially appropriate orientation for 
sociology. Although they must admittedly he perceived 
by individuals in order to truly be alternatives for 
those individuals, it is structural and institutional 
arrangements that crucially determine the range of 
alternatives open to individuals. A wide range of actual 
alternatives must inhere in the social structures of 
societies if freedom is not merely to be a subjectively 
felt self deception. While at some point the extent of 
present alternatives must be judged with reference to the 
individual societal members, the optimization of alternatives 
is still seen as primarily the result of and embodied in 
social structural arrangements. Since sociology is 
normally viewed as the discipline which most clearly directs 
its attention to societal and social structural questions, 
the proposed orientation seems particularly appropriate 
to sociology. It may be legitimately argued that many of 
the considerations in previous chapters were argued at a 
high enough level of abstraction, that this orientation or 
some form of it should be considered by any discipline.
This may be agreed, but as long as the orientation is 
couched in terms of social structural characteristics 
rather than, say, individual awareness of open alternatives, 
the orientation has special relevance to sociology. In
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sum, sociology is an especially appropriate discipline
in which to seek the optimizing society.
Three Other Potential Orientations
Any reasonable choice between alternatives involves
comparison. This is no less true in the choice of an
extra-epistemic orientation for a profession such as
sociology. However, as was pointed out in Chapter III,
even those who were most critical of value free sociology
and thus most disposed to an extra-epistemic orientation,
have been more concerned with calling for a recognition of
value stands that seem to be present in the field and
calling for explication and justification of them, than
with actually presenting and justifying their own value
orientations. While such calls were argued to have been
beneficial in furthering debate at the time, the lack of
well presented and justified positions concerning
possible orientations of course makes comparison difficult.
However, three possible orientations that are variously
implied in the literature may be considered for the sake of 
L
comparison. Actually these three implied orientations 
are highly interrelated and would undoubtedly be attractive
Zf-----------
While considerable effort has been made to present these 
implied orientations in a strong form, stronger presenta­
tion of them could be best made by those who would 
advocate them, and are willing as a result to spend the time 
necessary to develop more detailed and sophisticated 
arguments. At any rate, possible weaknesses in presenta­
tion are not a result of an attempt to make the orientations 
easier to rule out.
l?k
to many sociologists. It is not argued that they are un­
attractive when held by individual sociologists. Rather, 
it is argued that they are less acceptable than the 
optimization of freedom as a dominant orientation for the 
profession as a whole that would guide the decisions invol­
ved in sociology, and serve as a goal for the enterprise.
Taking sides. It has been argued here that the num­
erous choices made by sociologists should be oriented 
by a certain state of affairs - namely, societies and thus 
social structures that optimize alternatives open to all 
societal members. The statements of some sociologists 
suggest that what the discipline should orient itself 
towards is not a state of affairs, but rather a particular 
group or class of people. The question for them is not 
what we should value, but who. Thus, our chosen orienta­
tion would tell us who we are for, and who we are against. 
In this vein, Becker (1 9 6 7) titled his Presidential Address 
before the Society for the Study of Social Problems,
"Whose Side are We On?" In Chapter II, several sociolo­
gists were quoted as not only recognizing value employ­
ment in the mainstream of sociology, but as also being 
highly critical of what they saw as a value orientation 
which suggests that they are on the side of power 
elites. As a result, it has been suggested that 
sociologists switch their allegiances, and take the 
side of the powerless:
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Two correctives are needed. One would 
entail an ideological purification, or 
reversal*, the other would entail change 
in alliances so that sociologists would 
not serve elites but other, hitherto 
dominated groups (Birnbaum, 1971s73^)*
It is argued that sociology should most highly value
the powerless, and we are asked to choose sides;
presumably our choice of ethic would reflect this choice.
Biblarz clearly expresses the choice that is seen as
open as follows:
The alternatives available to sociologists, 
then, are to continue to serve groups in 
power, thus using social science for the 
maintenance and expansion of that power, 
or to alter their commitment individually 
and collectively, and begin to use their 
skills to serve interests of groups without 
power (Biblarz, 1 9 6 9 *^ ).
The question we must ask is on what basis should 
we choose to optimize the interests and values of the 
powerless, or the powerful for that matter, or any 
class of people at all at the expense of all others?
What characteristic is there that inheres in any 
particular group that should make their interests and 
values are over-riding concern? It was argued in 
Chapter IV that we must assume that there is no 
characteristic of individuals or groups that would 
confer special validity on the values they happen to 
possess. Further, it may be argued that since sociology 
is ultimately supported and maintained by all of society, 
an obligation is incurred to produce benefit for all
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of its members. Thus, it has been proposed that freedom 
be optimized for every individual, and not only for 
some chosen group. It is admitted that a given parti­
cular empirical situation may dictate that in order to 
bring about a general increase in freedom for all 
individuals, the freedom of a group of individuals in 
some areas might have to be curtailed, and thus in a 
specific case the orientation may dictate "taking sideS"." 
However, this in no way implies that we would always 
take the same sides, or even that we should value 
taking sides over optimizing freedom for all.
Equality. If we temporarily put the taking of 
sides aside, we may state what would likely be the 
orientation of those who would choose the powerless in a 
more universal way. This orientation would be the elimina­
tion of inequality, or more positively, equality.
Freedom and equality are sometimes viewed as values 
that are at odds with each other. However, this is true 
only if one takes the view (which was shown earlier to 
be antithetical to the proposed orientation of optimizing 
alternatives for every individual) that freedom includes 
the right to abrogate the freedom of others, to repress 
them, or to reduce their alternatives. In point of 
fact, not only is equality closely related to any 
proposed freedom ethic, but also a high degree of 
equality is necessary for attaining the proposed opti­
mizing society. This is because gross inequality pre­
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eludes the existence of substantial and meaningful 
alternatives being open to every individual. The freedom 
to choose between a Ford and a Cadillac is more illusory 
than real, and presents no alternative of substance, 
if the social structure is arranged so that many cannot 
afford even a bicycle.
While a high degree of equality is probably necessary 
for the optimization of freedom, it is not sufficient.
All may be equally unfree. Equality in the possession 
of resources, both social and physical, does not 
guarantee that those resources have been used to opti­
mize freedom. If equality is not sought in order to 
bring about the alternatives necessary to optimize the 
chances that every individual's values will be actualized, 
it must be asked just what end it does serve. Further, if 
there is some other end that equality is sought to serve, 
it must be asked why that end is of greater value than 
freedom. It is argued here that equality may be viewed 
as a subgoal to the primary goal of optimization of freedom, 
and every effort to bring about equality should be 
evaluated on the basis of whether it in fact leads to 
a general increase of freedom. Conceived in this way, 
equality is not sought because it is a viable ethical 
alternative to freedom, but because a high degree of 
equality is a necessary characteristic of a society in 
which there exists the optimization of freedom for every 
individual.
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The E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  S u f f e r i n g . The f i n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e
s h a r e s  f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  p r e c e d i n g  two.  I n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f
t a k i n g  s i d e s ,  A l v i n  Gouldner  makes e x p l i c i t  why he
c h o o ses  t h e  p o w e r le s s  o r  th e  " u n d e r d o g ."
I  have acknowledged  a sym pathy  w i t h  t h e  
u nd e rd o g  and w i t h  im p u lse s  t o  c o n d u c t  r e ­
s e a r c h e s  from h i s  s t a n d p o i n t .  Y e t  i n  s e a r c h i n g  
f o r  th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  my s e n t i m e n t s  I 
m ust  a l s o  c a n d i d l y  c o n f e s s  t h a t  I  s e e  no 
s p e c i a l  v i r t u e  i n  t h o s e  who a r e  l a c k i n g  power 
and  a u t h o r i t y ,  j u s t  a s  I  s e e  no s p e c i a l  v i r t u e  
t h a t  i n h e r e s  i n  t h o s e  who p o s s e s s  power and 
a u t h o r i t y .  I t  seems t o  me t h a t  n e i t h e r  
weakness  n o r  power a r e  v a l u e s  t h a t  d e s e r v e  
t o  be p r i z e d .
The e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  a b o u t  t h e  u nd e rdo g  
i s  t h a t  he s u f f e r s  and t h a t  h i s  s u f f e r i n g  
i s  naked  and v i s i b l e .  I t  i s  t h i s  t h a t  makes 
and s h o u l d  make a c o m p e l l i n g  demand on u s .
What makes h i s  s t a n d p o i n t  d e s e r v i n g  o f  s p e c i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  what  makes him w o r th y  o f  
sym pathy ,  i s  t h a t  he s u f f e r s  (G o u ld n e r ,  1 9 6 8 :1 0 5 ) .
On th e  b a s i s  of  Mr. G o u l d n e r ' s  c o n t e n t i o n  we would p resu m ­
a b l y  choose  an  o r i e n t a t i o n  t h a t  would demand th e  e l i m i n a t i o n  
of u n a v o id a b le  s u f f e r i n g  f o r  t h e  p o w e r l e s s .  This  o r i e n t a t i o n  
i s  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a s o n a b l y  r e f u t e  b e c a u s e  
sympathy  f o r  t h o s e  who s u f f e r  i s  an  e m o t i o n a l  s t a t e  
which most  o f  us s h a r e .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  i s  d i f f i ­
c u l t  t o  r e a s o n a b l y  r e f u t e  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  b a se d  p u r e l y  on 
an e m o t i o n a l  s t a t e  o f  sym pathy  and we have no l o g i c  
t h a t  a l l o w s  us t o  choose  b e tw ee n  o r i e n t a t i o n s  b a s e d  on t h i s  
e m o t i o n a l  s t a t e  and o t h e r s ,  su c h  a s  l o v e ,  o r  h a t e ,  o r  
b l i s s ,  o r  w h a t e v e r .  Yet  s t i l l  we may t r y  to  show t h a t  
t h i s  i s  n o t  th e  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  and t h i s  r e f u t a ­
t i o n  o f  a s u f f e r i n g  o r i e n t a t i o n  f o l l o w s  t h e  l i n e s  o f  a rgum en t
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already presented.
First, choosing this orientation that is directed only 
at one group (the powerless) is unwarranted. Ann 
Davis suggests: "most men suffer" (1 9 6 8:3 0^). Gouldner 
seems also to recognize that others besides the power­
less suffer as well, but his apparent reasons for 
directing his "sympathy" and "loving consideration" 
primarily at the powerless seems contradictory. The 
powerless especially deserve our sympathy because 
their "suffering is naked and visible" (1 9 6 8 :1 0 5 ). and 
because their "suffering is less likely to be known." 
Regardless of which is the case, it is unclear how the 
obviousness or the hiddeness of one group's suffering 
makes it especially deserving of our attention and 
concern.
Even if we state the orientation more generally (and 
from the present point of view less objectionably), that 
the avoidable suffering of all men should be eliminated, 
we still would not have chosen the best possible orientation. 
If he thought about it, Mr. Gouldner (and most of the 
rest of us) would probably recognize that what really 
bothers him is those who suffer and who have not chosen 
to suffer.-^ Yet if we make the elimination of avoidable
^Gouldner (1968:106) himself makes a related distinction 
between unavoidable and avoidable suffering.
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suffering our highest value, we would have to eliminate 
also the alternative of individuals intentionally choosing 
to suffer, as do long distance runners, and even prohibit 
the choice to suffer of those (such as Jesus) who believe 
that they must and they ought to suffer. This orientation 
would further eliminate the possibility of choosing to take 
calculated risks in that they may lead either to a substantial 
good or to suffering. When suffering is freely and 
knowingly chosen it is not worthy of our sympathy.
What is worthy of our sympathy is when persons have 
no alternative but to suffer, and we have at our 
disposal, or do not seek, the knowledge necessary to 
allow them to avoid suffering. The optimization of 
alternatives seeks at once to maximize the possibilities 
of avoiding suffering, and yet does not prohibit the free 
choice of suffering by some individuals in the service of 
some individually held higher order value.
Sociological Knowledge and Freedom
Even if sociologists agree to adopt the optimization 
of freedom as their non-epistemic orientation, this adop­
tion does not imply its relationship to what has been 
recognized as the professions most basic epistemic orienta­
tion - an orientation towards "truth." Freedom could 
variously be viewed as an orientation which should be given 
precedence over knowledge, be subordinate to knowledge, or 
share a co-equal status with knowledge. While some may
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feel it necessary to choose between the first of these two 
possibilities, and insist upon the pre-eminence of knowledge 
or freedom, we do not feel so compelled.
It is admitted that in some particular situations 
some individual sociologists may correctly feel compelled 
to choose one over the other (for example, in a social 
situation in which power was normally used in a way that 
would indicate that a certain type of knowledge, if 
sought and obtained, will most likely be used to bring 
about a decrease in alternatives). However, even if such 
personal choices must be made from time to time, this does 
not indicate that the profession needs to determine some 
eternal priority. Neither we nor the profession are forced 
to make a choice in that only does the adoption of an 
orientation of either knowledge of freedom not preclude 
the other, each orientation may be instrumental in actual­
izing the values embodied in the other.
Freedom and "Truth!1 Three possible lines of reasoning 
might be offered by one who wishes to show that the 
adoption of the optimization orientation would lead 
sociologists away from the "Truth", and thus would preclude 
attainment of the profession's knowledge goals. These 
along with suggested refutations are presented below.
(1) "Coherence." It may be argued that seeking 
knowledge which is relevant to any values, freedom in­
cluded, may lead sociology away from truth in that the 
search for relevant knowledge may remove from the body
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of knowledge a coherence or unity which is allowed 
when the body itself solely dictates the search for 
knowle dge .
Demands for an exclusive priority of social 
relevance in research and curriculum places 
a limitation on the consistency and coherence 
of sociological thought and, therefore, on 
the development of the discipline. If the 
choice of problems is guided by extra-disci­
plinary concerns, and if it is connected to 
a succession of political and moral issues 
in society, and if there is acceleration 
of social change, then research efforts 
will become fragmented and knowledge will 
cease to be cummulative (Silvers, 1 9 6 9 :5 9 )*
This criticism would apply to the optimizing orientation 
only if that orientation entailed the "exclusive priority 
of social relevance," which as we shall see shortly (3) 
it does not. Also, this criticism assumes that for a body 
of knowledge to be at all relevant to an extra-epistemic 
value, it must be relevant to every fleeting social concern. 
The proposed orientation is of lasting value, and is not a 
fleeting concern. Contrary to the criticism, if the orienta­
tion of freedom were adopted by generations of sociologists, 
it would provide an additional extra-epistemic unity and 
coherence to the body of research aimed at its attainment.
(2) "Objectivity." It may be argued that holding an 
orientation of the general optimization of alternatives may 
preclude truth in that it would not allow sociologists to be 
"ob jective."
The refutation of this argument is made difficult 
since the term "objective" is ambiguous. As Rudner
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(1 9 6 6 :7^-7 5 ) points out, the term "objectivity" may 
be taken as the opposite of "subjective." In this 
sense, "subjective" and "objective" mean something 
similar to "psychological" and "non-psychological."
This is quite different from "objective" as "unbiased" 
or "tending to be free from error." "No one has ever 
demonstrated that psychological, per se, is identical 
with the biased; nor is it easy to imagine how a 
cogent demonstration of this could possibly proceed" 
(Rudner, 1966:7^)* Since we would not want to assume 
that any subjectively arrived at knowledge is necessarily 
invalid, "objective" as the opposite of subjective is 
probably not an adequate way to define the term.^
"Dictionary definitions of 'objective' are stated 
in terms like 'existing independent of the mind,' or 
'external to the mind' and so forth" (Taylor, 1968:302). 
These definitions are also inadequate in that while 
"truth" may exist outside the mind, our knowledge of 
it certainly cannot exist without a mind. However, we 
would like our knowledge to have a close correspondence 
to the truth, so we might modify the definition of 
"objective" knowledge to "external to the mind that 
initially discovers it." This suggests that others 
could repeat our methods and arrive at the same know- 
_
Such a definition of "objectivity" would also rule out 
the possibility of "intersubjective certifiability" 
which is necessary to many types of research such as 
disaster research and participant observation.
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l e d g e  -  " o b j e c t i v e "  knowledge would  a l l o w  what  
G ou ldner  (1968 :1 1 3 )  c a l l s  " t r a n s p e r s o n a l  r e p l i c a b i l i t y . "  
H e r b e r t  F e i g e l  a r g u e s  f o r  t h i s  usage  o f  th e  te rm ,  
s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  
o f  s c i e n c e  i s  " . . . t h a t  th e  knowledge c la im s  o f  s c i e n c e  
be i n  p r i n c i p l e  c a p a b le  o f  t h e  t e s t . . . o n  th e  p a r t  o f  
any  p e r s o n  p r o p e r l y  e q u ip p e d  w i t h  th e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
and t h e  t e c h n i c a l  d e v i c e s  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n  o r  e x p e r i ­
m e n t a t i o n "  ( i n  Vrga,  1971 *24-3).
Thus, o b j e c t i v e  knowledge i s  d e r i v e d  from an 
o b j e c t i v e  method,  and an  o b j e c t i v e  method i s  t h a t  
which  o t h e r s  can  r e p e a t  and y i e l d  th e  same r e s u l t s . 
However, t h i s  t r a n s p e r s o n a l  r e p l i c a b i l i t y  i s  no 
g u a r a n t e e  o f  l a c k  o f  b i a s  o r  l a c k  o f  e r r o r .  Methods 
may be h i g h l y  b i a s e d  and y e t  i f  t h e y  a r e  w e l l  e x p l i ­
c a t e d  can  be d u p l i c a t e d  by  anyone w i th  t h e  same r e s u l t s  -  
i . e .  l e a d  t o  t h e  same e r r o r .
T a y lo r  (19 68 ) i n  a  c i r c u l a r  f a s h i o n  seems to  c o n ­
c lu d e  t h a t  a n  o b j e c t i v e  method i s  a  method t h a t  
s c i e n t i s t s  a g re e  w i l l  y i e l d  know ledge .  This  i s  an 
i n a d e q u a t e  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  may a g re e  t o  
a h i g h l y  b i a s e d  m ethod .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  " o b j e c t i v e "  
methods must  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from methods t h a t  a r e  
b e l i e v e d  t o  y i e l d  knowledge i n  t h a t  t h e  whole r e a s o n  
f o r  t a l k i n g  a b o u t  o b j e c t i v e  methods i n  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e  
i s  t h a t  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e y  a r e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  h e l p f u l  
i n  d e c i d i n g  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  methods a r e  l i k e l y  to
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lead to knowledge.
The term "objectivity" may be too hopelessly 
ambiguous to allow it to be a very useful concept.
However, the concern that holding some strongly felt 
value may lead sociology away from truth is potentially 
significant enough to warrant a reply. Thus, for the 
purpose of this discussion, we must accept some usage 
of the term even if it is too crude for discussion by 
philosophers of science. The problem with the previous 
definitions may be that the most fruitful referent 
of objectivity is neither methods nor knowledge, but 
rather an attitude in selecting methods and seeking 
knowledge. An attitude or objectivity is one that 
seeks to eliminate bias wherever possible, and to the 
maximum degree allows the empirical world to object 
if we mininterpret it. The prime virtue of the value 
free position lies not in its conclusion about the 
ends to which knowledge should be used, but rather in 
embodying this attitude concerning the way knowledge 
should be sought. Holding the proposed orientation in 
no way works in opposition to this objective attitude 
toward seeking knowledge. While valuing the optimization 
of freedom may dispose us to seek knowledge in some areas 
rather than others, it disposes us neither to discover a high 
degree of alternatives that do not exist, nor to ignore 
alternatives that do exist. Further, there is little
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r e a s o n  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  h o l d i n g  t h e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  o r i e n t a t i o n
w i l l  n e g a t e  o b j e c t i v i t y ,  even  i f  one o f  th e  p r e v i o u s  d e f -
7 8i n i t i o n s  i s  em p lo y ed . ' ’
(3)  " B a s ic  R e s e a r c h . " I t  may he a rg u e d  t h a t  h o l d i n g  
such  a  n o n - e p i s t e m i c  d e c i s i o n  o r i e n t a t i o n  may l e a d  s o c i o ­
l o g y  f rom  knowledge ,  i n  t h a t  i f  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  were 
s t r o n g l y  h e l d ,  th e  v a l u e  p l a c e d  on r e s e a r c h  t h a t  was 
d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  o p t i m i z a t i o n  would he  so  h i g h  as  t o  
p r o h i b i t  " p u re "  o r  " b a s i c "  r e s e a r c h .  Such b a s i c  r e s e a r c h ,  
w h i l e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  knowledge o f  t h e  w ork ings  
o f  s o c i e t y ,  m ig h t  n o t  be v iew ed  ( a t  t h a t  t im e )  as  r e l e v a n t
7This is not to say that adopting the optimization orienta­
tion would not change the shape of the body of sociological 
knowledge. Since it would imply a preference for certain 
areas of inquiry over others, the body of knowledge would 
undoubtedly differ from the body of knowledge had not 
the orientation been chosen. While the adoption of the 
optimization orientation may lead to certain areas 
being chosen for inquiry, it would in no way imply a 
non-objective inquiry in these areas or a less satis­
factory knowledge of them.
O
While the validity of such an assertion may be difficult 
to assess, it may be that the proposed orientation of 
general optimization is less biasing than other alter­
natives, especially those which demand personal involvement 
with one group to the exclusion of others. Kulgen states:
The dangers of personal involvement are obvious. They 
are perhaps the dangers which those who advocate 
value-free objectivity in science have in mind. Pro­
blems of one’s group may become more important than 
the problems of sociology. One’s interests, focused 
in particular loyalties, hopes, and antagonisms, 
are a source of bias. They dispose one to view 
evidence selectively and accept arguments which 
one wants to be true (1 9 7 0 :1 8 7 ).
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to the optimization of alternatives. This argument, 
however, would be mistaken in two ways. First, the 
optimization of alternatives for every individual entails 
the optimization of alternatives in sociological inquiry. 
Thus, the sociological researcher would in no way be 
prohibited from doing basic research, although his holding 
of the orientation would imply that he make the implica­
tions of basic research for freedom known as they become 
clear. Second, the process of answering questions that 
seem directly applicable to the optimization of freedom 
may require basic research which may not seem directly 
applicable. This is often the case when a social scientist 
deals with practical problems related to actualizing valued 
ends .
A social scientist who undertakes to work 
on a practical problem...quickly finds 
that the popular or 'common sense' state­
ment of the problem is either incomplete 
or misleading: that 'the problem is really 
many problems...The social scientist gets 
driven back to more fundamental questions 
that bear less and less resemblance to the 
practical problem until they appear to be 
irrelevant; furthermore, some of these funda­
mental questions raised in this way take on 
a life of their own and become genuinely 
dissociated from practical problems' (Reicken, 
in Beal, 1969167) .
In none of the ways enumerated above does holding the 
proposed orientation necessarily or with significant 
likelihood mitigate against the attainment of "truth." On 
the contrary, earlier in this chapter (in "Other Reasons 
for Adoption of the Proposed Orientation") it was
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seen that holding the freedom orientation may in fact 
be very important for holding and actualizing the 
epistemic orientation. Specifically, holding the 
optimization of freedom orientation: (a) increases the
probability of the cooperation of the population at large 
in the knowledge gathering process, (b) fulfills the 
obligation to provide benefits to the population which 
provides the support necessary to engage in the knowledge 
process, (c) provides a justification for the profession's 
holding of the knowledge orientation, and (d) by directing 
and evaluating the profession's activity in the direction 
of general optimization of freedom, helps insure its own 
freedom of inquiry which is necessary in actualizing 
its goal of truth.
Knowledge and Freedom. Just as a goal of freedom need 
not work against a goal of knowledge, the goal of knowledge 
need not work against a goal of freedom.
It might be argued that valuing and seeking knowledge 
may work against freedom in that the resulting sociologi­
cal knowledge could be used to minimize as well as 
optimize alternatives. This could occur. It is least 
likely to occur when the knowledge orientation is held 
in conjunction with the orientation of a general optimi­
zation of alternatives. While the specific means chosen 
by sociologists in actualizing freedom are not dictated 
by the orientation, as will be seen in the discussion
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to follow, making and evaluating the necessary choices 
with reference to the freedom orientation is clearly more 
likely to bring about freedom than not making them on 
that basis. One choice that seems to be implied by 
the optimization of alternatives is that sociologists 
should attempt to insure that sociological knowledge be 
disseminated to the widest possible public and not simply 
maintained within the hands of the profession or 
distributed to a select few. First, wide dissemination of 
sociological knowledge is necessary for individuals must 
be aware of the alternatives that are or could be open 
to them if they are to take advantage of them in actual­
izing their values. This dissemination has not occurred, 
however, and this perhaps has been due to an attitude 
characteristic of all intellectuals and not just 
sociologists.
...The number of 'intellectuals' has become 
prodigious. The more the numbers have 
swelled, the more the members of this cate­
gory are presumed to have in their keeping 
possessions of an esoteric nature from which 
the general public is excluded. Our friends 
outside the guild, as well as other persons 
we meet more casually, take it for granted 
that we have arrived at knowledge that they 
cannot understand. Gertrude Stein, who used 
to be charged with unintelligibility, once 
said that she was writing for herself and 
strangers. We resemble herself except that 
we omit the strangers (Nef, 1 9 6 9:6 ).
It should be pointed out in fairness to social
scientists that the media have not themselves been
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very anxious to aid in the necessary dissemination 
of social scientific knowledge that may he useful in 
bringing about a widening in the range of general 
alternatives. Yet this wider dissemination is important 
for an additional reason. If sociological knowledge is 
not to be used only to control the social structure so 
as to minimize alternatives open to the wider public, 
the public must also possess this knowledge in order 
to be aware of and help prevent control which is con­
trary to their values. This case would be similar to 
that when knowledge used by advertisers to persuade 
consumers, becomes increasingly less effective as con­
sumers also gain that knowledge.
The increased knowledge benefits not only 
the persuader but also the target of per 
suasion. As the persuaders become more 
sophisticated, so do the people to be 
persuaded. One way of reading the history 
of the development of techniques of per­
suasion is that persuaders have been in a 
race to keep abreast of the developing 
resistance of the people to be persuaded 
(Bauer, 1968:26^).
While a wide dissemination is necessary for in­
suring that there is not a general minimization of 
alternatives, this dissemination will not always be 
an easy task. However, if competent popularization 
of sociological knowledge is encouraged, and if recent 
trends toward mediating periodicals (such as Society
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and Behavior Today) and increasing interest by the 
mass media continue, such dissemination would be 
possible.
General dissemination of sociological knowledge is 
just one example of how the conjunction of the 
orientation of freedom and the orientation of know­
ledge will increase the likelihood that sociological 
knowledge will not be used to minimize freedom.
Further, seeking knowledge may not only be said not 
to decrease the chances of actualizing the goal of the 
optimization of alternatives open to all societal members. 
On the simplest level, individuals need knowledge to both 
recognize and make use of alternatives. More important is 
the fact that sociological knowledge is necessary to trans­
form objective social institutions in ways that optimize 
alternatives open to societal members. In short, the 
actualization of the optimizing society demands sound and 
fundamental sociological knowledge.
The proposed optimization orientation and the 
profession's current epistemic orientation of truth do 
not seem to seriously or necessarily work against each 
other. More importantly, holding either orientation 
seems to have at minimum an instrumental value in actual­
izing the other, and the holding of either may in fact 
necessitate the holding of both. As a result, until the 
profession is presented with convincing arguments and 
evidence to the contrary, sociology does not seem forced
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to choose between its epistemic and non-epistemic orienta­
tions , but rather can allow them to operate interdependen- 
tly, and confer upon them co-equal status.
Limitations of the Proposed Orientation
The goal or decision orientation that has been put 
forth here can be criticized on at least two general levels 
even if the bulk of the argument to this point has been 
accepted. First, it may be argued that there is no need 
for a goal orientation that would guide the decision making 
that is likely to take place in sociology. Second, it may 
be argued that the proposed orientation needs further 
specification.
The Need for an Orientation. Even if it was concluded 
on the basis of reading Chapterlll that some choice between 
non-epistemic values is necessary, and that the value free 
position was neither descriptively nor proscriptively 
adequate, it still might be argued that no over-riding 
orientation such as the one proposed is necessary. The 
argument supporting this criticism may be advanced in one 
of two forms. First, the forgoing analysis may be 
criticized on the grounds that what the discipline needs 
is not an over-riding goal orientation but a proper mix­
ture of numerous high level values (such as cooperation, 
peace, harmony, beauty, protection from harm, justice, 
or whatever). In accordance with this view, the opti­
mization of alternatives would not take the position of 
an over-riding goal orientation but would just be another
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high level value to be balanced with numerous other high 
level values. However, even if it is granted that a large 
number of high level values may be chosen by the profession 
to be actualized, this does not eliminate the need for an 
over-riding highest level orientation. Once a number of 
high level values have been chosen there are innumer­
able possible mixes or arrangements of those values in 
relation to one another. Further, in seeking an acceptable 
mix, some values will likely be found in conflict as to 
which should be given primacy, or may be incompatible 
in certain situations. The choice and justification of 
a particular arrangement of high level values, then, demand 
an orientation that is placed above them. Thus, even 
if we agree that a number of high level values will be 
chosen, the profession is still faced with the choice of 
an over-riding orientation that makes possible their 
arrangement.
The second form that this criticism (that there is 
no need for the profession to adopt the optimizing orienta­
tion) may take, is that there already exists basic 
agreement as to the state of affairs that should be sought, 
and that major disagreement that exists centers around 
the means of actualizing that valued state. Along these 
lines, it might be argued that all major thinkers from 
the earliest times to the present and in all cultures have 
sought freedom, but have primarily disagreed as to the
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means for obtaining it. Thus the concerns expressed in 
this work are misplaced. In consideration of this po­
tential criticism, several points may be made. First, 
this work in no way attempts to make such foolhardy claims 
as that "freedom" is somehow a novel notion or only re­
cently claimed to be a valued state. It may be further 
admitted that the seeking of freedom conceived of in 
ways similar to the conceptions presented here has been 
embodied in the works of numerous scholars and in the 
actions of countless others. We may go still further and 
say that an orientation such as the one proposed here 
probably implicitly underlies numerous proposals for 
other valued states. In fact such a high degree of basic 
agreement probably exists for such a proposed orientation, 
even where not explicitly recognized, that the orienta­
tion's soundness may be said to gain support. Numerous 
reasoning processes and independent judgments occurring 
within the framework of a wide variety of social and 
historical contexts suggest the soundness of the orienta­
tion. However, recognizing all of this does not imply 
universal support for an orientation that optimizes 
alternatives open to all individuals. Clearly, there 
are countless examples in history of those who have 
argued and/or acted on the basis of some perceived innate 
superiority of their races and groups in justifying the
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optimization of alternatives open for their races and 
groups while minimizing alternatives open to others. Still 
others have argued that what should he sought is the 
accumulation of power, self-interest, or military might 
at the expense of freedom, often without even the mis­
leading rhetoric that the temporary loss of freedom to 
societal members that such goals entail would lead to 
presumed general widening of areas of choice at some later 
date. Further, even those who have in their discussions 
used the term freedom have often held conceptions of it 
which are clearly different from the one expressed in 
Chapter V " .  ■ For example, calls not to meddle with the 
"free enterprise system" made by monopolistic corporate 
heads clearly involve two conceptions of freedom that 
were expressly ruled out in Chapter V - freedom from 
constraints and freedom to abridge the freedom of others. 
Also, three alternative orientations suggested earlier 
in this chapter which were said to be implied by the 
sociological literature could be persuasibly argued to 
be worthwhile candidates for the profession's adoption 
Presumably, others will also be suggested. In short, 
while there would hopefully be considerable support for 
the proposed orientation there is no reason to assume that 
this support would approach universality and that we need 
only discuss means.
Moreover, it also seems reasonable that valued end- 
states must be generally and explicitly agreed upon, be-
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fore we can most fruitfully discuss the means of their 
attainment, Finally, while we disagree with the premise 
that underlies this potential criticism, let us for the 
sake of argument grant for the moment that there is near 
universal agreement as to the advisability of the proposed 
orientation. If this is the case the worst this work can 
be accused of is redundancy. And if there is such basic 
agreement as to an orientation, there are no apparent 
problems, and undoubtedly some benefits, in making this 
orientation explicit. Further, the discussion has hope­
fully at least added some clarity to the nature of the 
orientation as well as to possible bases for its choice 
and justification.
The Need for Further Specification of the Proposed 
Orientation. Gien that there is a need for an over­
riding orientation, the proposed orientation may be 
criticized at several levels all of which would suggest 
that it needs still further specification. The idea of the 
optimization of alternatives open to every individual, 
while clarified elsewhere as well, has been primarily 
specified within the context of its initial presentation 
in Chapter Y. While change toward any valued end was 
seen as demanding the use of knowledge to control it, 
the orientation represented a different use of control 
than would be the case in attempting to actualize other 
values. While more adequate explanations have already
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been given there, the optimization orientation seeks 
societies and social structures which expand the be­
havioral repertoires and environments available to 
societal members, rather than minimize them in order to 
establish some particular substantive value. The orienta­
tion was further clarified as to what is being proposed, 
and what is more what is not being proposed. In parti­
cular, "freedom from constraints" was seen not to be 
implied in that the development of social structures 
necessary to optimization of freedom demands acceptance of 
certain rights and obligations that societal membership 
necessitates. Further, the orientation was clarified in 
terms of its exclusion of freedom to abridge the freedom of 
others, or in other words to demand further constraints on 
behaviors and structures which while bringing about an 
increase in alternatives for the few is accompanied by a 
general narrowing of areas of choice open to all. The 
primary hope in this context is that the orientation has 
been put forward clearly enough that those considering 
it for adoption may be able to consider how the orienta­
tion as stated, or in some form consistent with it, com­
pares to other competing alternative orientations (such 
as choosing to maximize some other particular value by 
minimizing other alternatives and simultaneously abridging 
societal members' right to choose it). While the general
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notion may be clear, some may still ask that the orienta­
tion be further specified in different ways before they 
commit themselves to it. In some respects, such a request, 
and the criticism implicit within it, may be quite reason­
able and several points should be made concerning it.
(1) While in certain areas further specification 
which would make the orientation a clear referent in decis­
ion making may be legitimately requested, no adequate 
orientation could probably be so specific as to in 
essence make all of our decisions for us, and to ask the 
proposed orientation to do so is clearly unfair. While 
reference to the orientation should allow the possibility 
of making many important decisions, it can in no way 
eliminate the continuing need for thought, research, 
debate, and considered judgment.
(2) Although it is generally assumed that greater 
specificity in any formulation is a virtue, this need not 
always be the case. If an orientation is to operate at
a basic level in covering wide areas of human affairs and 
is expected to be useful over a considerable period of 
time, increasing specificity may be too unduly restrictive 
to allow it to perform in this manner. Waddington argues in 
this way pointing out that while it may be charged that 
his approach is so general that in practice it becomes 
useless, this charge can similarly be made of any important 
ethical formulation. Moreover,
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No general ethical principle can be useful 
unless it is wide enough to be relevant to 
very many diverse aspects of life; and that 
implies that it cannot be precise enough 
to obviate the need for debate about par­
ticular moral issues (Waddington, 1 9 6 8 :3 1 )•
(3)  I n  one s p e c i a l  s e n s e ,  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n ' s  
l a c k  of s p e c i f i c i t y  may be s a i d  t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  i t s  u n i q u e n e s s  and t o  c o n s t i t u t e  i t s  p r im e  v i r t u e .
It was pointed out earlier that one reason that the 
term "orientation" v/as employed rather than the term 
"ethic" is that the term "ethic" when usually em­
ployed in philosophy carries with it a greater specifi­
city and entails a particular form of presentation.
Since it is truly a general orientation that is being 
sought here, the term "orientation" seems more appropriate 
and avoids adding ambiguity to what others have attempted 
to maintain as a precise usage of the term "ethic." 
Further, an "ethic" is normally understood to embody a 
conception of a "subjective" good. In one sense, it could 
be said that the proposed orientation embodies a substan­
tive good, in that societies are sought and valued which 
optimize alternatives open to societal members. However, 
more generally, the orientation could be said not to 
embody a statement of substantive good, in that it urges 
that the extent to which alternatives exist be widened 
but in most cases does not tell us what choices are to be
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made within this widened choice of alternatives. It 
is this lack of specification of a particular substantive 
good which allows the orientation to simultaneously be 
argued to mitigate the difficulties of unwarranted value 
imposition, and to promote evolutionary improvement by 
not allowing a particular value to dominate the development 
of the social structure and by keeping alternative courses 
of of development open. In this special sense, the orien­
tation's lack of specificity in terms of specifying a sub­
stantive good, may be considered its prime virtue. As 
a result, however, it must remain silent about many 
important areas of choice.
(^ ) It may however still be legitimately argued that 
further specification is needed in two important areas.
It is recognized that further thought and debate is needed 
in these areas, and it is hoped that others who are in 
general agreement with the orientation would participate 
in this further specification.
It may be agreed that the means and strategies for 
actualizing societies that optimize alternatives are import­
ant and difficult topics that need discussion. The or­
ientation proposed does not specify what means should be 
adopted in actualizing freedom - whether to actively seek 
to bring about changes or merely to monitor the use of 
knowledge in light of the orientation or to use any of 
a wide variety of means. However, it could be used in 
evaluating means in that some would seem most likely to
201
be successful while others only promise a general 
optimization of freedom while actually minimizing 
it (i.e. those that falsely request people to "give 
up these few freedoms in order that your freedom may be 
protected"). However, no over-riding orientations, when 
conceived of as over-riding goals, can dictate the means
Q
of their attainment, but they can guide the choice.
For example, Kelman suggests some specific means that 
may be implied by adopting an orientation toward freedom 
of choice (see Table l). It may be argued that these 
are not the best possible approaches the sociologist 
might take in trying to actualize the optimization of 
freedom orientation. These particular means may not be 
considered to involve enough active participation in 
bringing about fundamental changes in social structures. 
While choosing such an orientation does not dictate the 
choice of particular means and does leave them open to 
debate, the orientation makes possible such a choice 
by acting as a referent for the debate.
(5) Finally, it may be argued that the orientation 
as it is currently stated needs further specification in 
terms of the ultimate state of affairs that is being 
sought. Here it may be said that while a general con- 
_
'Sociologists have often told the public: "If you tell me 
your values, I will tell you what they imply and how to 
actualize them" (see pp. 3i'~33 ) • Presumably they are 
capable of doing the same for sociologists.
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Table 1.
Some Possible Means for Social Scientists 
to Actualize the Maximization of Alternatives 
Orientation (Adapted from Kelman,
1965*^1)
Role of Role of
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ception of the type of social structures and societies 
has been offered, further specification is necessary, and 
this presents an additional area for future thought and 
debate.
The orientation as proposed does not delineate 
specific social situations, structures, and systems to 
be valued. While the orientation does not itself delineate 
these, it does allow the possibility of choice between 
them. The optimization of freedom, for example, may 
suggest changes within a society in laws that produce 
crimes without victims, opening of alternatives for 
minorities, re-allocation of resources, etc. Further, 
it may suggest that on a more global level the population 
be reduced to generally increase alternatives, or that 
individuals be allowed to move freely between social systems. 
While a lasting orientation may guide and be used in 
evaluating the choices of valued states by generations, 
it cannot dictate which states will eternally constitute 
the optimization of alternatives (or in which areas 
optimization should be sought first). Our conception 
of the optimum possible range of alternatives is 
dependent both on our knowledge of the current range 
of alternatives and on the predictions based on the 
current body of knowledge of how various manipulations 
of the social structure would influence that range.
Thus, our specific choices would be tied not only to
20k
the orientation, but also to the changing state of the 
body of knowledge. If the proposed orientation were 
agreed upon, these specific choices would undoubtedly 
be the subject of difficult debate, research, and 
inte rpre tation.
At a more general level, further clarification of 
general features of the optimizing society demand 
attention and debate. For example, consideration must be 
given as to the areas in which the widening of alternatives 
needs priority. One particularly general feature of the 
optimizing society that needs further specification is what 
might be termed the "system of distribution." In particular, 
a question needs to be further addressed as to how to bring 
about the optimization of alternatives open to every 
individual. Phrases like "every individual," "all 
societal members," were chosen in that what is sought is 
social structures that bring about general optimization for 
all rather than on one hand a popular majority at the 
expense of a minority, or on the other hand some elite. 
However, the choice of such phrases as "all" or "every" 
raises important issues concerning how rights, duties, and 
advantages are to be distributed such that this may occur. 
This constitutes another area in which work needs to be 
done by those inclined to adopt the proposed orientation.
Those joining in such an effort would find especially 
useful and suggestive a recent work on such problems of
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distribution. This work is A Theory of Justice by John 
Rawls (1971). While it is beyond the scope of this work 
to adequately consider Rawls' insights and those of his 
critics, Rawls' work may be said to suggest types of 
thinking that may be fruitfully explored, and would seem 
highly consistent with the main thrust of the proposed 
optimization orientation. He recognizes that an institutional 
level the most just system may also demand a certain 
amount of inequality. For him the most just or "fair" 
system may be said to consist of two principles which are 
justified in terms of a contractualist framework. The 
first principle deals with the distributing of rights 
and obligations, while the second deals with the distri­
bution of advantages
First: each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive basic liberty comparable 
with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are 
to be arranged so that they are both (a) reason­
ably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to 
all (Rawls, 1971:60).
Thus Rawls recognizes that any distributive systems must 
probably have within them inequalities, but whatever in­
equalities within them must be justified by their leading
to advantages that the least advantaged in society would
11not accrue otherwise. Development of criteria such as 
__
These principles are offered in a modified and finalized 
form elsewhere in sections ^5 and 39 in Rawls (1971) but are 
introduced and largely explained in Chapters I and II
11For an excellent review of A Theory of Justice see 
Hampshire (1972).
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these will demand considerable thought and debate 
and this task also represents work to be done.
(6 ) While it is agreed that further specification in 
several important areas is desirable no orientation is 
likely to be proposed that will be sufficiently specific 
for all. Further, it is argued here that at least some 
basic agreement as to the orientation is a necessary first 
step that precedes settling on a specified form of it. 
Further, it is assumed that even when adopted any orienta­
tion will continually be revised and reformulated. The 
profession of medicine is clearly oriented toward health 
and yet what constitutes health and the means by which 
it may best be arrived at are continually being revised.
As useful as the general orientation toward justice is to 
the legal profession, the exact nature of justice is under 
continual debate and refinement, and the necessary basic 
orientation toward justice which is commonly held does not 
specify what is just in a particular case. Similarly, 
sociology's epistemic orientation is similarly highly 
general and subject to debate as to its exact nature and 
the means by which to best arrive at it. These are questions 
that are open to debate. We are not here in any way trying 
to minimize the difficulties involved in carrying such a 
debate to conclusion; we are only suggesting that the 
choice of an orientation most probably precedes it. While
207
there are differences in conceptions of the orientation, 
all that is necessary is that there he some basic agree­
ment as to its nature to allow the debate to be fruitful.
And while the freedom orientation suffers from the same 
lack of specificity as do other ethics, it similarly makes 
possible the lower level value choices, and as a result 
represents a gain in specificity over previous positions.
We need no longer call for the explication of what 
it is that we value - we may explicitly state that we 
value the optimization of alternatives for every individual. 
When we are asked "knowledge for what?" - or to what is 
sociological research and theory relevant - we may reply: 
freedom. Further, this same freedom has now been specified 
as the "ultimate benefit" to which sociology is directed.
We assume that the debate concerning the role and 
nature of values' within sociology is valuable, and is 
a debate that is likely to continue. This work has not 
held as its goal the end of debate, but rather the 
furthering of it by adding clarity to current positions as 
well as suggesting both a new position and bases for 
positions which might serve as new foci for further debate.
The "value free" and related positions are neither descriptive­
ly nor proscriptively useful for the discipline as it is 
and seems likely to continue. Although recent counter 
positions have performed a valuable service in pointing 
weaknesses in the value free stance and in showing the need
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for an extra-epistemic orientation, they have not made 
explicit the nature of, nor offered bases for the choice 
of such an orientation which would at once embody a goal 
for the discipline and at the same time orient the 
numerous decisions which must be made, and which demands 
reference to values in addition to that of expanding 
our knowledge. Two possible bases for the choice of an 
orientation have been examined - the sceptic's view and 
the naturalistic-evolutionary view. Both views while 
critical of one another and representing fundamentally 
divergent world views, suggest and support an orientation 
that demands the search for social structures that 
optimize alternatives open to societal members.
We may now turn to the question of alternatives for 
one final time. The most basic alternatives open to the 
profession are to choose an orientation that optimizes 
alternatives, or to choose for societal members the 
maximization of some other value end and abridge their 
right to choose.
Similarly, we must choose whether to promote a wider 
number of alternatives thus opening paths of evolutionary 
development, or allow possible courses of development to 
be closed by perfecting social structures in congruence 
with some particular value which would be given pre­
eminence. The most basic choice facing sociology is to
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widen objectively existent areas of choice or to allow our 
knowledge to be employed to minimize open alternatives. 
Future debate will hopefully take this basic choice into 
account. In this way it is hoped that the present work 
has contributed to the evolution of the debate - even if 
the debate is ultimately of only assumptive value.
The intriguing observation has been made that 
"values are the children of misery." It is intriguing 
because it is unclear exactly why values are children 
of misery. Values could be children of misery because 
they are discovered in situations where misery is 
present. They could be children of misery because 
they are the cause and the center of bitter contro­
versy between those who consider them undeniably 
correct and sacred and those who consider them irrelevant. 
Or values could be children of misery in that they create 
misery when the situation allows no way of actualizing 
them. Which interpretation is chosen matters little. 
Values would likely be less the children of misery if 
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